Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2017/18 by IDS et al.
Ideas from IDS: Graduate  
Papers from 2017/18
January 2019
Minimum Size
X : 15mm
X
Minimum Size
X : 15mm
X
IDS_Master Logo
IDS_Master Logo_Minimum Size
Cover photographs IDS students and graduates 
Photographers Carol Smithyes/Gary Edwards/Sarah King/Institute of Development Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citation: IDS (ed.) (2019) Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2017/18, Brighton: IDS 
Published: January 2019 
Disclaimer: The Institute of Development Studies and Authors cannot be held responsible 
for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. 
The views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the IDS and Authors. 
ISBN: 978-1-78118-507-0 
 
© Institute of Development Studies 2018. This is an Open Access paper 
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non 
Commercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC), which permits use, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited, any 
modifications or adaptations are indicated, and the work is not used for commercial 
purposes. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode 
 
Institute of Development Studies 
Brighton 
BN1 9RE 
UK 
www.ids.ac.uk 
 
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England 
Charity Registration Number 306371 
Charitable Company Number 877338 
 
               i 
Contents 
Notes on Contributors ii 
 
Abbreviations iv 
 
Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2017/18 1 
 
Social Audits: Lessons from India to Mexico 
Nadjeli Babinet 
MA Governance, Development and Public Policy 3 
 
Mni Wiconi (Water is Life): Knowledge, Power and Resistance at Standing Rock 
Amy Baum 
MA Development Studies 10 
 
What Do We Do with the Data? How Do the Concepts of Empowerment and 
Vertical Linkages Help Us to Understand Questions about the Effectiveness of 
Community Monitoring for Improving Public Service Delivery? 
Annette Fisher 
MA Power, Participation and Social Change 21 
 
Unprofitable Problems: The Limitations of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Matthew Gregora 
MA Globalisation, Business and Development 33 
 
Despite Massive Economic and Education Gains in India, Why Are So Few 
Women Working? 
Harparmjot Hans (Remy) 
MA Poverty and Development 49 
 
Challenging Conceptual Approaches to Power through Spirituality  
Ian Lee 
MA Power, Participation and Social Change 58 
 
Two Forms of Indigenous Autonomy in Mexico 
Diego Orozco Fernández 
MA Governance, Development and Public Policy 64 
 
Can Developmental States Include Labour as Stakeholders in State–Society 
Relations? 
Benjamin Preclik 
MA Globalisation, Business and Development 72 
 
Taking Off the Mask: Using Participatory Photography as the Reflective Medium 
to Explore and Understand Myself in the Web of Power Structures and 
Psychosocial Relations Underlying Feminine Appearance Norms 
Isabella Pyrgies 
MA Development Studies 82 
 
Using London as a Case Study to Examine the Positive and Negative Aspects of 
Urban Gentrification 
Tracy Taylor-Beck 
MA Poverty and Development 90 
 
               ii 
Notes on Contributors 
Nadjeli Babinet holds a master’s degree in Governance, Development and Public Policy 
from IDS, University of Sussex and another master’s degree in Energy and Environmental 
Policy and Management from Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). 
She currently works as Director of Strategic Coordination for the Ministry of Mobility, Mexico 
City. Prior to this, Nadjeli worked in academy and civil society organisations as a specialist in 
participation, conflict resolution, and sustainable development agendas. 
 
Amy Baum holds a master’s degree in Development Studies from IDS, University of Sussex 
and a BA in Anthropology from the University of Virginia. Prior to studying at IDS, she worked 
for several years in Vietnam as both an educator and non-profit volunteer and consultant 
working with local and international organisations. Areas of work have included gender-
based violence, rural community development, disability, and programme review. Amy is also 
a CELTA (Certificate in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages)-qualified teacher 
and enjoys working with both large and small groups to facilitate meaningful discussion and 
personal growth. Her research and thematic interests include participatory action research, 
gender, disability, youth civic engagement, and alternative models of social change and civic 
action. 
 
Annette Fisher is deputy team leader on a Department for International Development 
(DFID)-funded justice and gender-based violence project in Malawi. She is both a practitioner 
and researcher with an academic background in social change, governance, and conflict 
studies. Annette has over ten years’ experience in the fields of voice and accountability, 
participatory action research, and human rights, delivering projects in over 25 countries. She 
has experience working with and supporting national and sub-national governments in a 
range of countries to deliver more responsive services to citizens. She has also designed 
and implemented interventions to strengthen accountability systems and participatory 
community-based mechanisms for monitoring service delivery. Annette’s research interests 
include community monitoring of public services and social accountability related to maternal 
health care. She holds a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala 
University, Sweden and another master’s in Power, Participation and Social Change from 
IDS, University of Sussex, UK. 
 
Matthew Gregora is Head of Compliance for Tearfund, a Christian relief and development 
agency working through local partners in over 50 countries. His role is to improve 
organisational systems, processes and culture, to protect all Tearfund’s stakeholders from 
harm. He holds a master’s degree in Globalisation, Business and Development from IDS, 
University of Sussex. Prior to studying at IDS and joining Tearfund, Matt worked for the oil 
multinational BP for 12 years in operational and commercial management roles. 
 
Harparmjot Hans (Remy) holds a master’s degree in Poverty and Development from IDS, 
University of Sussex. Her thesis focused on understanding the relevance of youth’s 
aspirations (education and employment) in three different Indian national policies. Prior to 
studying at IDS, she worked at KPMG Advisory and Pratham doing monitoring and 
evaluation, programme assessments, due diligence and capacity-building work. Her research 
interests include education, employment, and technology. 
 
 
               iii 
Ian Lee is the coordinator of Dam Peoples Amazon. He is a socially engaged artist, graduate 
of Oxford Brookes University, trained in medical herbalism at the Instituto de Medicina 
Alternativa in Madrid 1996–99, the Centre for Transpersonal Psychology, London, social 
sciences, and eco-building, and recently completed a master’s degree in Power, Participation 
and Social Change at IDS, University of Sussex. He has led disaster relief in Peru for 
flooding and earthquake, and refugee work with the Karenni hill tribe. He was formerly 
director of the One World Centre in Sheffield, conducting transpersonal workshops in 
England, Peru and Chile, and managing director of a City of London commodity brokerage. 
He feels most at home in South America, with his first trip to the Amazon in 1983, most 
recently with NAPRA. 
 
Diego Orozco Fernández holds a master’s degree in Governance, Development and Public 
Policy from IDS, University of Sussex. Prior to this, he achieved a BS in International 
Business at ITESO – Universidad Jesuita de Guadalajara in Mexico, and worked for over ten 
years in the private sector. He has now embarked on a career in the field of international 
development, specialising in the role of business as a development actor. He currently works 
at a research centre for social and solidarity economy at Universidad Iberoamericana, 
focusing and driving new initiatives in the most marginalised areas of southern Mexico. 
 
Benjamin Preclik holds a master’s degree in Globalisation, Business and Development from 
IDS, University of Sussex. Prior to studying at IDS, he completed his BA in International 
Relations and Development at the University of Sussex. Recently, his research interests 
have notably been focused on the emerging phenomenon of South-South Development 
Cooperation. His dissertation explored how the Brazilian agricultural development model 
influences the country’s cooperation projects in Africa. 
 
Isabella Pyrgies holds a master’s degree in Development Studies from IDS, University of 
Sussex, where her thesis was on whether social transfer schemes can socially empower 
women in the context of Familias en Acción, Medellín, Colombia. Her research interests are 
in gender mainstreaming, conflict studies, and social protection. 
 
Tracy Taylor-Beck has worked as an operational manager in the UK charity and public 
sector for 15 years, focusing on health and social care. She completed her master’s degree 
in Poverty and Development at IDS, University of Sussex over two years whilst working full 
time. Her research specialities during her degree were nutrition, food systems and culture, 
social protection, and the challenges of urban development.  
               iv 
Abbreviations 
ACE Army Corps of Engineers 
AP Andhra Pradesh, India 
BHU Basic Health Unit 
BSR Business for Social Responsibility 
CEP critical enquiry into practice 
CFP Corporate Financial Performance 
CONEVAL National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy [Mexico] 
COP Conference of the Parties 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
DAF District Advocacy Forum 
DAPL Dakota Access Pipeline [USA] 
DFID Department for International Development [UK] 
EDT elite development theories 
EITI Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative 
EPB Economic Planning Board [South Korea] 
ETP Energy Transfer Partners 
EVA Empowerment, Voice and Accountability project [Pakistan] 
FKTU Federation of Korean Trade Unions [South Korea] 
FPIC free, prior, and informed consent 
GDP gross domestic product 
GHG greenhouse gas 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
IDB Inter-American Development Bank 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMU Independent Monitoring Unit 
INGO international non-governmental organisation 
INR Indian rupee 
KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan 
LCP Ladder of Citizen Participation 
MDG Millennium Development Goal 
MGNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry [Japan] 
MNC multinational corporation 
NGO non-governmental organisation 
NHS National Health Service [UK] 
NREGS National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme [India] 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OGCI Oil and Gas Climate Initiative 
PC Power Cube 
RTB Right-to-Buy scheme [UK] 
SDG Sustainable Development Goal 
SSA Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan programme [India] 
SSAAT Society for Social Audit Accountability and Transparency 
UK United Kingdom 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNGC United Nations Global Compact 
US United States 
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
© 2019 The Author © Institute of Development Studies  1 
Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 
2017/18  
This is the second edition of Ideas from IDS, our publication featuring top-class student 
papers from the 2017/18 academic year. Ideas form a fundamental component of 
development studies, and there are a great number of them in this collection of papers. Our 
students have done themselves and IDS proud, impressing our external examiners with their 
performance and with the stimulating content of their assignments and dissertations. The 
ideas presented here are important enough to deserve communication amongst wider 
student, researcher, and policy communities, hence this publication. 
 
In this issue, we celebrate and share the critical thinking, innovation, and excellence 
demonstrated by our students. What stands out, is not the collective endeavour within these 
papers, excellent though it is. Rather, it is the ways in which our students are asking 
fundamental questions about who is responsible for development, about the sites of 
development, and about how development might be re-envisaged to better achieve its goals.   
 
Relationships of social accountability between states and citizens 
The first three papers examine relationships of social accountability between states and 
citizens. Nadjeli Babinet asks what can be learnt from India’s Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) programme and, drawing lessons from India, 
what potential there is for successful social audits in Mexico. The next paper, by Amy Baum, 
focuses on the building of a 1,172-mile pipeline for transporting crude oil across sacred 
Native American sites. Baum argues that these processes of contestation transform Native 
Americans’ identity and, through this, wider processes of development. Annette Fisher 
explores community-generated data and monitoring in Pakistan and India. Fisher shows that, 
when the data and monitoring result in political action, community empowerment and positive 
accountability contributions are more likely. 
 
The role of the private sector in development 
The next three papers explore the potential of the private sector to address development 
issues.  Matthew Gregora examines oil multinationals’ contributions to climate change, 
resource curse effects, and development. He argues that the corporate social responsibility 
activities of these mega-corporations offer only limited succour, providing uncritical social 
commentary and promoting profit-seeking activities. Harparmjot Hans (Remy) then examines 
women’s participation in India’s labour market. Hans juxtaposes social and cultural 
constraints and barriers against women’s educational skills and capital potential. She argues 
that women’s current labour roles represent a form of modern patriarchy and that their full 
participation is necessary for India to sustain its economic and social development. Ian Lee’s 
paper examines citizens’ resistance to corporate power in Brazil and the UK. In this original 
critique of development, he draws our attention to dimensions frequently overlooked in 
development – love, goodwill, emotion, inner power, and caring – and argues that sharing is 
a more promising approach than participatory development. 
 
Politics, the state, and development 
The following two papers examine political challenges to the state and how these may offer 
new ways of seeing states and their role in development. Diego Orozco Fernández deals 
with Mexican indigenous social movements’ autonomous municipalities and their role in 
fostering social development. This paper contrasts movement-inspired governance and 
autonomy and the corresponding relationships with the state, asking whether these offer new 
opportunities for addressing dependency and re-envisaging development. Benjamin Preclik’s 
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paper also explores for new conceptualisations of the state, focusing this time on the 
inclusion of labour in East Africa, and for a re-envisaging of relations between states and 
labour, in which developmental states promote and enhance the capacity of labour.   
 
Gender, participation, social change, and urban development 
The final two papers offer a completely different take on development. Isabella Pyrgies 
shares a reflective and personal exploration of gender, identity, and femininity. In this 
evocative charting of her learning to deal with PCOS (polycystic ovaries syndrome), Pyrgies 
explores the relationships between participation, power and photography, and how this offers 
new opportunities for social change. And finally, Tracy Taylor-Beck brings a political 
economy lens to urban gentrification, examining the degree to which this offers opportunities 
for economic prosperity and freedom as opposed to, or alongside, experiences of 
displacement. Taylor-Beck challenges the notion that the free market will ensure a positive 
experience for all and asks what kinds of approaches and policies are necessary to avoid the 
combination of gentrification and dispossession exemplified in the city of London. In their 
respective focuses on the personal, and on ‘universal’ ideas of development as happening in 
the UK, both these papers provide refreshing alternatives to established development 
thinking, offering important new perspectives for current times. 
 
 
Linda Waldman 
Director of Teaching and Learning, Research Fellow 
Institute of Development Studies 
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Social Audits: Lessons from India to Mexico 
Nadjeli Babinet 
Similar to other development practitioners, I used to assume that participatory mechanisms 
of accountability, such as social audits, only prospered in contexts where citizen engagement 
was high (Gaventa 2004; Fox 2007, 2015). Nonetheless, in Rajasthan, a region with a strong 
civil society, social audits of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA) failed, while in Andhra Pradesh, with feeble civil society, they appear to 
succeed (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Pande 2014). What lessons can we learn from this 
variance? 
I focus in social audits in India because I am concerned with the factors that drive and 
constraint accountability and I consider the apparently paradoxical experiences of Rajasthan 
and Andhra Pradesh a relevant comparison. Besides, sharing lessons between two 
comparable extensive pro-poor programmes, MGNREGA in India and Prospera (To Prosper) 
in Mexico, in countries with some comparable characteristics, is meaningful.1 
I start outlining the characteristics of MGNREGA, Prospera and social audits. Afterwards, I 
measure the level success in social audits implementation and conclude that Rajasthan is 
a partial failure and Andhra Pradesh is a partial success. I identify three main lessons:      
(a) political commitment from key political elites and senior officers in charge of the reform; 
(b) the existence and effective use of a policy window by these stakeholders; and (c) an 
institutional design reducing power struggles in the reform implementation. Finally, I explain 
why political commitment and a policy window are central conditions for social audits to work 
in Mexico. 
1 Contextual and analytical framework 
MGNREGA is a policy of employment relief providing a scheme to guarantee at least 100 
days of work per year at minimum wages to rural families (Ministry of Rural Development 
2013). It is a democratically decentralised policy, since the design and funding is provided by 
the national Ministry of Rural Development, but the power and responsibility is devolved to 
the states elected governments, which are in charge of local regulation, funds administration 
and policy implementation (Robinson 2007; Ministry of Rural Development 2013). 
Prospera, formerly known as Oportunidades, is a conditional cash transfer for the heads of 
households (mostly women) in the poorest families. It is conditional because the families 
have to accomplish some co-responsibilities2 to receive the transfer (Hevia de la Jara 2008). 
Prospera has a deconcentrated operation, since the decision power and funds are 
centralised in the National Coordination, in the Ministry of Social Development, in 
coordination with the Ministries of Education and Health, while its operation is geographically 
transferred to State Co-ordinations controlled by the central government (Robinson 2007; 
Hevia de la Jara 2008). This institutional design limits state and municipalities intervention in 
Prospera implementation. 
                                               
1 Mexico shares with India democratic institutions, a wide territory, a middle-income economy and a high amount of 
population living in poverty (CONEVAL 2016; World Bank Group 2017). Also, both countries developed extensive 
poverty alleviation programmes which suffer from the same drawback: corruption (Fox 2007; Hevia de la Jara 2008; 
Afridi and Iversen 2014; Aiyar and Mehta 2014; Pande 2014). 
2 Such as the attendance to monthly workshops on health care for the heads of households and regular attendance to 
classes for children and adolescents (Hevia de la Jara 2008). 
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Social audits are a vertical3 or social accountability mechanism, mandatory for local states 
implementing MGNREGA (Schedler 1999; Ministry of Rural Development 2013). The logic of 
social audits is based in the short route of accountability: citizens (MGNREGA’s 
beneficiaries) oversee and hold accountable providers (MGNREGA implementers) to prevent 
power abuses (World Bank 2003). It can be considered as a soft accountability mechanism 
since it includes answerability procedures (monitoring and justification of public officials 
practices), but lacks enforcement (capacity to impose sanctions) measures (Schedler 1999; 
Fox 2007). 
2 Social audits’ level of success in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh 
While social audits are mandatory, its implementation has substantial variations among 
states (Chopra 2015; Lakha, Rajasekhar and Manjula 2015). I analyse two cases of 
implementation, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, because I consider it a robust comparison 
of similar cases with dissimilar results.4 To analyse the level of success of each case, I start 
by defining the factors for measuring success and then I apply them to the cases. 
Since continuity is a challenge for policy reforms, a key factor for measuring success is the 
continued implementation of the reform (Schneider and Heredia 2003). Besides, following 
the logic of the mechanism, the use of social audits should drive a more effective (better 
attainment of employment goals) and efficient (decrease in corruption) implementation of 
MGNREGA (Aiyar and Mehta 2014; Lakha, Rajasekhar and Manjula 2015). So, I consider 
effectiveness and efficiency as additional factors for measuring success. 
Despite having the largest budget for MGNREGA’s implementation and an active citizenship, 
Rajasthan’s experience is a partial failure. Social audits started with a high impetus but were 
not sustained over time (Chopra 2014; Pande 2014). As a result of a strong citizen demand,5 
in 2009 the Congress Party started social audits’ implementation (Pande 2014). 
Nevertheless, after an ephemeral period of reformist fervour, a counter-campaign against 
social audits from local bureaucrats and politicians (judicial confrontations, intimidation to 
supporters, threats of strike) led to the reform stoppage (Chopra 2014; Pande 2014). 
In contrast, the case of Andhra Pradesh can be considered a partial success. It is the only 
state with continuously implemented social audits and evidence of enhancement in 
MGNREGA’s efficiency, with the reduction of wage-related thefts and lost funds recovery 
(Afridi and Iversen 2014; Aiyar and Mehta 2014; Pande 2014). However, the impact in the 
aggregate number of wage-related thefts is modest, material corruption increased and there 
is no evidence of a substantial expansion in MGNREGA’s effectiveness (Afridi and Iversen 
2014; Aiyar and Mehta 2014). 
3 Lessons learned 
Comparing the cases of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, I identify three lessons related with 
the issues of political commitment, policy windows and institutional design. In this section I 
explain each of these lessons. 
                                               
3 In social or vertical accountability mechanisms civil society hold agents in the government accountable (Schedler 1999). 
4 I chose these cases because I can control other variables that do not affect the level of success in these experiences: 
the level of commitment of the central government (the federal government is the same and it is from the same party 
than the two local states: Congress Party); the size and population (that is similar); and the level of participation (that the 
existing literature coincides in the conclusion that it does not influence the success in these cases) (Chopra 2014; 
Pande 2014). 
5 The Right to Information and Work Campaign (Suchna Evum Rozgar Adhikar Abhiyan) pushed for the implementation 
of social audits in Rajasthan. For more information about the history of this movement and its impact for social audits 
institutionalisation at a national level see Pande (2014). 
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First, a high level of political commitment from influential political elites is imperative for the 
reform success. I understand commitment as the ‘willingness and intent of actors to 
undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives, and to sustain these actions overtime’ 
(Chopra 2015: 7). As can be noticed in Table 3.1, in Andhra Pradesh the commitment for 
improving MGNREGA was high, as four of the five characteristics demonstrating 
commitment were accomplished. In Andhra Pradesh, an elevated degree of initiative, visible 
in the creation of the Society for Social Audit Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT), was 
undertaken during the reform implementation (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Pande 2014). Also, 
constituencies were actively mobilised for support using the media coverage and a 
continuous effort for implementing social audits was maintained, allocating sufficient 
resources and capacities for the reform implementation and monitoring (ibid.). Finally, 
analytical rigour was applied using a pilot case in a smaller programme (Food for Work) 
before the reform implementation, preparing the state machinery for the reform 
implementation (Afridi and Iversen 2014; Pande 2014; Chopra 2015). However, the lack of 
commitment for applying credible sanctions can explain that the success in Andhra Pradesh 
is only partial, since even if they are fairly ‘effective in detecting irregularities, their impact, if 
any, on deterring malpractice is modest’ (Afridi and Iversen 2014: 5). In contrast, in 
Rajasthan the senior political elite lacked all the characteristics of commitment (Table 3.1). 
This can explain why senior officials were unable, or unwilling, to counter-balance the 
opposition to the reform. 
Table 3.1 Political commitment in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh 
Characteristic of political commitment Andhra Pradesh Rajasthan 
Initiative and innovation YES NO 
Analytical rigour and learning processes YES NO 
Mobilisation of support YES NO 
Actual implementation of sanctions NO* NO 
Continuity: capacities and efforts YES NO 
Note: * Some sanctions were applied, but they were scarce given the total number of cases. 
Source: Author’s own, based on the characteristics of commitment raised by Brinkerhoff (2000, cited in Chopra 2015), and 
evidence in Afridi and Iversen (2014), Aiyar and Mehta (2014), Chopra (2014) and Pande (2014). 
The second lesson learned from these experiences is the need of a policy window: an 
opportunity for the persons advocating for social audits to push that reform (Kingdon 1995). 
A policy window appears when ‘a problem is recognized, a solution is developed and 
available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, 
and potential constraints are not severe’ (ibid.: 165). Only in the case of Andhra Pradesh, the 
elected Chief Minister had an undisputed victory in the electoral process, opening the 
opportunity for him to position poverty as the key issue in the decision agenda (Pande 
2014).6 Also, in the Andhra Pradesh’s case, the Chief Minister had a role of policy 
entrepreneur creating a solid coupling between the problem of poverty and the policy solution 
of social audits (ibid.). This coupling was supported and amplified by the new senior 
bureaucracy in charge of MGNREGA’s implementation, who worked as policy entrepreneurs 
framing the reform discourse and building viable proposals for its implementation (Kingdon 
1995; Pande 2014). This facilitated the acceptance of social audits in the state government 
and in the society, allowing a smoother implementation of the mechanism. This was not 
present in the case of Rajasthan, where the party elected had a low-margin of victory. 
Because of that, the political leaders were hesitant to push forward social audits as a solution 
after encountering opposition (Pande 2014). 
                                               
6 I refer to the decision agenda as the items in the top of the governmental agenda, among which policy decisions are 
taken (Kingdon 1995: 166). 
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The third lesson learned from the cases of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan is the influence of 
the institutional design in the implementation of social audits, due to its impact on the 
perceptions of power redistribution. In Rajasthan, the local bureaucracy, closely influenced 
by local politicians, was in charge of MGNREGA and social audits’ implementation (Chopra 
2014; Pande 2014). In contrast, Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister created three new institutions 
at the state level: an insulated autonomous bureaucracy for MGNREGA’s implementation; an 
independent and non-political organisation, SSAAT, for operating social audits; and a 
vigilance agency to supervise the SSAAT (Afridi and Iversen 2014). From a political economy 
perspective, social audit reform was easier to implement in Andhra Pradesh since the 
institutional design (centralised in the bureaucracy at the state level) generated fewer 
blockages in terms of power redistribution than the Rajasthan’s institutional scheme. In 
Rajasthan, since the state and municipal bureaucracy implemented the MGNREGA policy, 
social audits were perceived by the municipal bureaucracy and politicians as an effort to 
weaken their position, influence and monetary gains (Schneider and Heredia 2003). This 
perception led to power struggles between Rajasthan’s elected officers, municipal politicians 
and the bureaucracy. In the case of Andhra Pradesh, because the implementation of 
MGNREGA was exclusively in the hands of the state bureaucracy, and the SSAAT 
coordinated social audits, those power struggles were avoided. 
4 Lessons learned: from India to Mexico 
I consider the three lessons are relevant for a successful implementation of social audits. 
However, because of the extension of the essay I only focus on the lessons of commitment 
and policy windows as necessary conditions for social audits implementation in Mexico 
because of two reasons. First, due to the differences in the levels of decentralisation 
between MGNREGA (democratic decentralisation) and Prospera (deconcentration), lessons 
around institutional design are less appropriate to be applied in the Mexican context. Second, 
because political commitment and policy windows are indispensable conditions for social 
audits to work in Mexico. In the case of the implementation of social audits in Mexico, in 
order to know if that reform actually worked, the same indicators used for the Indian cases 
could be applied: continuity in the policy implementation and impact in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Prospera. 
A successful implementation of social audits in Prospera requires the political commitment of 
key stakeholders. Based on the lessons of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, the literature 
around political commitment and my own experience in Mexican policy reforms, the 
commitment of political elites in charge of Prospera (Ministries of Social Development, Health 
and Education) is unconditionally required for the reform to succeed (Afridi and Iversen 2014; 
Chopra 2015). If a strong political commitment is attained in political elites with high power or 
influence in at least some of these institutions, they could mobilise the support of different 
constituencies in the government and abroad (Chopra 2015). These political elites committed 
with the reform could also develop new sources of commitment (such as inspiration, support, 
political incentives, sanctions) to build commitment in the bureaucracy of the National 
Coordination, who is fundamental for the continuous implementation of the reform (ibid.). 
Complementary to this, the commitment of bureaucrats in at least one of the State Co-
ordinations will be necessary to improve the locus of initiative, the analytical rigour and 
learning process for a successful reform implementation at the local level (Andrews, Pritchett 
and Woolcock 2013; Chopra 2015). I witnessed a similar effect in my own experience related 
with energy reform, where the political commitment of the Ministry of Energy generated 
incentives (such as increased budget) and sanctions for driving political commitment in local 
states and in other ministries. Lastly, according to the lessons learned and the particularities 
of the Mexican case, it is essential to strengthen political commitment so that credible 
sanctions are institutionalised and applied to all the Ministries related with Prospera 
implementation. In the particular case of Prospera, since it is a conditional cash transfer 
programme, the enforcement part of social audits is even more necessary to empower the 
beneficiaries, in order to ensure that the short route of accountability operates. In Prospera, 
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the state holds the beneficiaries accountable for receiving the cash transfer, what can be 
considered a reversed or upward vertical accountability mechanism, eroding the perceived 
power of the beneficiaries to hold the state accountable, because of the fear of sanctions 
(Fox 2007; Hevia de la Jara 2008).7 Therefore, political commitment for enforcement 
measures is fundamental. As the main beneficiaries in Prospera, in contrast with 
MGNREGA, are women, the gender barriers for raising their voice are even higher, so a 
political commitment for a gender perspective in social audits implementation will be also a 
necessary condition for its successful implementation (Hevia de la Jara 2008). 
A policy window is also a relevant condition for social audits to work in Mexico. Since 
Prospera is a centralised policy, a political change than can open a window for policy reform 
is the national electoral process of 2018. For instance, in the case of the electoral victory of 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador – a left wing candidate with a pro-poor discourse – a policy 
window could appear (MORENA 2017). Enhancing the efficiency of Prospera with social 
audits could be positioned as a necessary solution for poverty alleviation. Besides, an 
alliance of the elected president with a local social entrepreneur could help to raise the 
problem of poverty coupled with the solution of social audits in Prospera in one of the states. 
Another – more unexpected – opportunity for driving a policy window for social audits could 
be a pressing problem such as a scandal around corruption in the Prospera programme 
arising in the media, similar to other scandals opening the window for the anti-corruption 
system reform.8 Finally, the spillover effect9 of coalitions of entrepreneurs currently pushing 
for the enhancement in the implementation of the anti-corruption system could reinforce the 
policy window for other accountability reforms, such as social audits (Kingdon 1995). 
5 Conclusion 
Social audits are an accountability mechanism expected to reduce power abuses of the 
bureaucrats implementing MGNREGA. The implementation of this mechanism in Rajasthan 
shows that a strong civil society demand for social audits implementation is not enough for its 
success. Political commitment, a policy window and an effective institutional design are 
necessary for social audits to succeed. Based on these lessons, I argue that social audits 
could have higher probabilities to work in some Mexican states if broad political commitment, 
from senior politicians and bureaucrats in charge of Prospera, and a policy window, either 
related with the 2018 presidential elections or with a pressing problem rise, are achieved. In 
particular, I underline how commitment for enforcement measures and a gender approach 
towards social audits is indispensable for effectively deterring power abuses, learning from 
the deficiencies of the Andhra Pradesh experience and from the particularities of the Mexican 
scenario. 
References 
Afridi, F. and Iversen, V. (2014) Social Audits and MGNREGA Delivery: Lessons from 
Andhra Pradesh, IZA Discussion Paper 8095, Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor 
(IZA) 
Aiyar, Y. and Mehta, S.K. (2014) Spectators or Participants? Examining the Effects of Social 
Audits on Citizen–State Relations and the Local Politics of Corruption in Andhra 
Pradesh, Engaging Accountability: Working Paper Series, New Delhi: Accountability 
Initiative 
                                               
7 This was the main obstacle in the implementation of the first ombudsman effort of the Prospera programme (at that time 
Oportunidades), the Citizen Attention programme (Fox 2007).  
8 More information about the anti-corruption system reform and the corruption scandals in Mexico related with the policy 
window for the reform are available in the research of the Mexico Institute in the Wilson Center (Rios 2017). 
9 ‘The appearance of a window for one subject often increases the probability that a window will open for another similar 
subject’ (Kingdon 1995: 190). 
© 2019 The Author © Institute of Development Studies  8 
Andrews, M.; Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (2013) ‘Escaping Capability Traps Through 
Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)’, World Development 51: 234–44, 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.05.011 
Chopra, D. (2015) Political Commitment in India’s Social Policy Implementation: Shaping the 
Performance of MGNREGA, ESID Working Paper 50, Manchester: Effective States 
and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID), University of Manchester 
Chopra, D. (2014) ‘They Don’t Want to Work’ Versus ‘They Don’t Want to Provide Work’: 
Seeking Explanations for the Decline of MGNREGA in Rajasthan, ESID Working Paper 
31, Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID), 
University of Manchester 
CONEVAL (2016) Medición de la pobreza, Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de 
Desarrollo Social, www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/Paginas/PobrezaInicio.aspx 
(accessed 12 January 2018) 
Fox, J.A. (2015) ‘Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?’, World 
Development 72: 346–61, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.03.011 
Fox, J.A. (2007) Accountability Politics: Power and Voice in Rural Mexico, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Gaventa, J. (2004) ‘Towards Participatory Governance: Assessing the Transformative 
Possibilties’, in S. Hickey and G. Mohan (eds), Participation: From Tyranny to 
Transformation? Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development, New 
York: Zed Books 
Hevia de la Jara, F. (2008) ‘Between Individual and Collective Action: Citizen Participation 
and Public Oversight in Mexico’s Oportunidades Programme’, IDS Bulletin 38.6: 64–72, 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/8254/IDSB_38_6_1
0.1111-j.1759-5436.2007.tb00420.x.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 13 January 2019) 
Kingdon, J.W. (1995) ‘The Policy Window, and Joining the Streams’, in Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies, New York: Harper Collins Publishers 
Lakha, S.; Rajasekhar, D. and Manjula, R. (2015) ‘Collusion, Co-option and Capture: Social 
Accountability and Social Audits in Karnataka, India’, Oxford Development Studies 
43.3: 330–48, doi:10.1080/13600818.2015.1049136 
Ministry of Rural Development (2013) Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act 2005: Operational Guidelines 2013, New Delhi: Department of Rural 
Development, Government of India 
MORENA (2017) http://lopezobrador.org.mx/ (accessed 11 January 2018) 
Pande, S. (2014) ‘The Right to Know, The Right to Live: Grassroots Struggle for Information 
and Work in India’, Doctoral thesis (PhD), University of Sussex 
Rios, V. (2017) ‘Where is Mexico’s Fight Against Corruption Now?’, Wilson Center: Mexico 
Institute, 26 September, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/where-mexicos-fight-against-
corruption-now (accessed 13 January 2018) 
Robinson, M. (2007) ‘Does Decentralisation Improve Equity and Efficiency in Public Service 
Delivery Provision?’, IDS Bulletin 38.1: 7–17, 
http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/887 (accessed 13 January 2019) 
© 2019 The Author © Institute of Development Studies  9 
Schedler, A. (1999) ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond and M.F. 
Plattner (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New 
Democracies, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Schneider, B.R. and Heredia, B. (2003) ‘The Political Economy of Administrative Reforms in 
Developing Countries’, in B.R. Schneider and B. Heredia (eds), Reinventing Leviathan: 
The Politics of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries, New York: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 
World Bank (2003) World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
World Bank Group (2017) Where We Work: Countries Overview, 
www.worldbank.org/en/where-we-work (accessed 12 January 2018) 
© 2019 The Author © Institute of Development Studies 10 
Mni Wiconi (Water is Life): Knowledge, 
Power and Resistance at Standing Rock 
Amy Baum 
1 Introduction 
On 23 February 2017, the United States national guard, armed in riot gear, stormed into the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Reservation in North Dakota and forcefully evicted all remaining 
water protectors from the Oceti Sakowin camp, which had served as the site of the largest 
mobilisation of Native Americans since 1876 (Wong 2017). Begun by a small group of native 
youth and elders in April 2016 to stop the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) from being built 
over a sacred river that was also the sole source of the drinking water for the tribe, the 
encampment of ‘water protectors’ attracted upwards of 10,000 participants and gained 
international attention. The movement claimed victory in December 2016 when pipeline 
construction was blocked under the Obama administration and it seemed Native American 
voices and knowledge were finally being validated by the US government. However, hopes 
were crushed less than two months later when Donald Trump became president and issued 
a presidential memorandum that would see the pipeline completed and pumping oil by June 
2017 (Meyer 2017a). 
In addressing the question of whose knowledge counts in defining and doing development, l 
define development as both an intentional practice and an immanent process (Cowen and 
Shenton 1996). This paper classes the former as the capitalist model of development-as-
growth that guides US development, driven largely by the extraction and exploitation of 
natural resources (Saad 2017), and the latter as unfolding processes of social change that 
occur amongst the people affected by such planned development. In terms of what is valued, 
I define what counts as that which has the ability to create widely recognisable changes in 
social, political, and/or material processes, as indicated in this case by heighted media 
attention, the presence of thousands of citizens supporting a cause, and changes to the 
actual outcome of the planned project. 
The case of Standing Rock is extremely complicated, involving multiple actors, across 
public–private and local–national realms, with varying degrees of power and authority. In 
teasing apart the complex interweaving of knowledge and power at the heart of the process, I 
propose two refined sub-questions to guide my analysis: Whose knowledge counts when? 
and How does knowledge get deployed by different actors with varying interests and degrees 
of power? Framing my analysis around a constructivist approach to knowledge and its 
inherent relationship to power, I will explore the ways in which this relationship results in 
back-and-forth processes of domination and resistance that leave no easy answer to the 
question. Given that development is a multifaceted process, I will ultimately argue that 
although the resurgence of indigenous knowledge has transformatory value for many Native 
Americans, ultimately this knowledge counts in shifting wider processes of development to 
the extent that it aligns with the interests of those who hold greater power. To contextualise 
the forthcoming analysis, I will provide more detail to the background of the case. 
2 Case background 
In early 2014, Dakota Access, a subsidiary of Energy Transfer Partners (ETP), began the 
process of getting approval for a US$3.8 billion, 1,172 mile underground pipeline to transport 
up to 570,000 barrels of crude oil per day from North Dakota to refineries in Illinois (Levin 
2016). Though the planned route crossed mostly private lands, it would fall only .55 miles 
outside reservation borders and cross Lake Oahe, a sacred river that was the primary source 
of drinking water for the entire tribe (ibid.). Further, a substantial section of the pipeline was 
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to cross through territory that was granted to the Sioux in the 1851 Treaty of Ft Laramie but 
later taken by the government and sold without tribal permission (Clark 2002). In a meeting 
with Dakota Access representatives in September 2014, members of the Standing Rock 
Tribe expressed their clear objection to the project. Tribal Chairman David Archimbault II 
stated, ‘So just so you know coming in, this is something that the tribe is not supporting. 
Even though it’s outside of our 1889 federal boundaries, we still recognise our treaty 
boundaries.’ Phyllis Young, a tribal elder, emphasised that ‘our water is our single last 
property that we have for our people. And water is life: Mni Wiconi’ (Stand with Standing 
Rock 2014: 4.35). Despite these objections, plans moved forward, and the tribe was left with 
one recourse to stop the pipeline. 
Though 97 per cent of the land needed for the pipeline was privately owned, a mere 3 per 
cent went through water crossings under federal jurisdiction, requiring approval by the Army 
Corps of Engineers (ACE). One of these crossings was on the Missouri River at Lake Oahe. 
As Native American tribes are considered sovereign nations by the US government, ACE 
has a responsibility to fulfil several federal policies to consult with the tribe on potential 
impacts of the project to the environment and ‘historic properties of religious and cultural 
significance’ (ACHP 2008). The extent to which ACE fulfilled this duty is in dispute, but they 
began issuing permits for the federal water crossings in January 2016, and Dakota Access 
prepared for construction on the treaty lands.1 
In resistance to the impending project, on 2 April a group of youth and elders created the 
Sacred Stone Camp on the land of LaDonna Brave Bull Allard, a tribal historian and activist 
whose son and relatives were buried on land marked for construction (Allard 2016). 
Proclaiming Mni Wiconi, ‘Water is Life’ as their mantra, the self-labelled water protectors 
rested their actions on the knowledge that the pipeline’s path posed a serious environmental 
risk and ran through sacred water and territory that still belonged to them and held deep 
cultural significance. As Allard says in an interview, 
Our young people have a right to know who they are. They have a right to language, to 
culture, to tradition. The way they learn these things is through connection to our lands 
and our history. If we allow an oil company to dig through and destroy our histories, our 
ancestors, our hearts and souls as a people, is that not genocide? 
(ibid.). 
In July, despite concerns raised by three federal agencies about the potential impacts of the 
project to the environment and heritage sites, ACE issued permits for Dakota Access to 
begin construction on Lake Oahe, citing that their environmental assessment showed no 
effects ‘injurious to the public interest’ (McKenna 2016). Immediately after, the environmental 
law firm Earthjustice filed a lawsuit on behalf of the tribe against ACE in US District court, 
seeking an injunction to construction on the grounds that ACE failed in its duties to consult 
with the tribe. Throughout the summer, water protectors spread awareness of the movement 
through social media, and more and more native supporters began to arrive in support. The 
camps became fully functional living spaces that were reminiscent of traditional native 
villages: protectors lived in tipis, chopped wood, lived without electricity, and performed daily 
prayers and ceremonies in Lakota (Sioux) language (Awake 2017). 
Despite an initial lack of mainstream media attention, the movement sparked national interest 
after an incident between protectors and Dakota Access security guards went viral. From 
September through November, as thousands more native and non-native allies poured into 
the camps and media coverage swelled, law enforcement tactics became increasingly brutal. 
Armed police frequently used pepper spray and rubber bullets to stop the protectors, and in 
November even sprayed powerful waters cannons on hundreds of protectors in freezing 
                                               
1 See Plumer (2016) for a graphic that is helpful in clarifying the route. 
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temperatures (Wong 2016b). Throughout these altercations, the protectors remained non-
violent and reiterated their central mission as one of sacred ceremony and protecting Unci 
Maka, Mother Earth (Awake 2017). Before moving on to analyse the results of this 
resistance, I will first provide the theoretical framework that underpins my perspective on 
knowledge and power. 
3 Conceptual framework 
3.1 Knowledge 
To begin broadly, I employ a constructivist approach knowledge that follows the Foucauldian 
notion that knowledge is accepted or rejected within socially created ‘regimes of truth’ 
constituted from ‘the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true’ 
(Foucault 1980: 131). Discourse can be clarified as ‘ways of constituting knowledge, together 
with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such 
knowledges and relations between them’ (Foucault, cited in Weedon 1987: 108). In essence, 
knowledge and power are intimately bound and co-constitutive of what counts as truth in 
society and there is a constant negotiation of ‘reciprocal legitimation’ between knowledge 
and power (Weilier 2009: 2). As such, power can be shifted through changing the terms of 
discourse and the way that knowledge is framed and thus create pathways for resistance 
against domination. 
In this analysis, I define power as ‘the degree of control over material, human, intellectual 
and financial resources exercised by different sections of society’ (VeneKlasen and Miller 
2002: 41). Importantly, power is not absolute, but ‘dynamic and relational’ (ibid.), allowing for 
a constant interaction/process of domination and resistance. Following VeneKlasen and 
Miller’s definition, the ‘extent of power of an individual or group is correlated to how many 
different kinds of resources they can access and control’, which is predicated and maintained 
through social divisions such as gender, class, and race; and through institutions such as 
education, media and the law (ibid.: 41). 
To analyse the specifics of knowledge for the Standing Rock movement, there are stark 
contrasts between Western hegemonic knowledge and indigenous knowledge. In referring to 
Western knowledge systems, I use the notion that Western knowledge historically rests upon 
rational logic, scientific truth, and observable phenomenon (Little Bear 2000: 82; Grenier 
1998). This form of knowledge isolates individual problems and compartmentalises 
knowledge such that individuals are ‘not inherently linked will all of creation’ (Duran and 
Duran 2000: 91). As it relates to resource management, hegemonic Western knowledge is 
most easily recognised through the capitalist discourse of economic growth by means of 
resource extraction and the productive, cost-effective use of land (Bell 2015). However, as 
Western knowledge is rooted in science, there is an increasing call to protect the 
environment due to the overwhelming evidence that business-as-usual development and 
reliance on fossil fuels are causing climate change (Saad 2017). 
Native American indigenous knowledge constitutes an entirely different epistemological 
system in which land, humans and animals are inseparably bound in holistic, cumulative 
relationships of sacred knowledge that ‘rightly affects and is reflected in all that [they] do and 
discover’ (Garroutte 2003: 115). Indigenous scholar Taiaiake Alfred sums up the implications 
of how Western and indigenous knowledge systems conceive of the environment differently 
by critiquing the current notion of economic development that is driven by industrial growth 
for revenue and gives ‘no care for the qualitative and spiritual connections that indigenous 
peoples have to what developers would call “resources” ’ (Alfred 2005: 46). Grenier, quoting 
Agrawal, notes that the crucial difference between Western scientific and indigenous 
knowledge ‘lies in their relationship to power’ and that ‘it is not the holders of indigenous 
knowledge who exercise the power to marginalize’ (Grenier 1998: 45). This relationship will 
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become elucidated by the following analysis of the defining and doing of development 
through the two sub-questions I initially posed. 
4 Analysis 
4.1 Defining development: Whose knowledge counts when? 
Though the Standing Rock movement began in 2016, its roots date back 500 years to the 
birth of what would become America. Despite nationalist mythology praising the ideals of 
freedom, equality, and democracy, the history of US development must be defined as a 
process of settler colonialism, in which a state’s ‘sovereignty and political economy are 
premised on the dispossession of indigenous peoples and exploitation of their land base’ 
(Barker 2015: 44). Landing on the east coast in 1492 and successively encroaching west, 
European settlers invaded and claimed native lands in an intentional process of 
accumulation by dispossession in order to generate the capital needed for economic growth 
and development (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014; Kazanjian 2014). The primary way such actions were 
justified was through discursive practices very similar to those Arturo Escobar describes as 
the ‘making’ of the Third World in order to define the terms of US international development 
interventions (Escobar 1995). This entails a process in which identities, ways of knowing, 
and legal institutions are imposed on others by those in power to establish ‘rules of the game’ 
that dictate whose knowledge is valued and by what measure. As Escobar states, ‘since one 
of the major foundations of power is truth, the knowledge of that truth – its invention and 
confirmation – becomes a major mechanism for the legitimation of the hegemonic forms of 
power with a given system’ (Escobar 1984: 392). 
Such ‘truths’ were created by racialising native Americans as ‘primitive’ and ‘inferior’, which 
served to ‘justif[y] their domination by the superior British colonizer’. Imposing such identities 
onto Native Americans vindicated interventions to eradicate indigenous knowledge, such as 
the forced removal of thousands of native children to be put into American boarding schools 
(Farrington 2016). This is one of several cases that exemplifies the overarching strategy of 
the time to ‘Kill the Indian and save the man’ (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014: 151). Inscribing native 
people into Eurocentric legal systems of knowledge based on science, rationality, and 
efficiency further allowed the European settlers to legitimise land grabbing by decrying the 
natives’ ‘inefficient use of the land’ and the need to make it productive for the ‘public good’ 
(Leeds 2005: 52). 
The Sioux have a particularly painful history of dispossession by the US government. 
Although agreeing to treaties boundaries in 1868, the government significantly carved the 
boundaries in 1877 after gold was discovered, and in 1887 strategically fragmented tribal 
reserves to allow ‘surplus land’ to be sold privately to white settlers (ibid.). Those fragments 
represent the Sioux reservation today, although the territory from the 1868 treaty has never 
been officially ceded by the tribe (Simon 2016). Perhaps the worst connection to this case in 
particular happened during the 1940s when ACE claimed tribal land around Lake Oahe in 
order to create the Oahe Dam in the name of ‘public good’ as part of a regional hydropower 
development project (Lawson 1976). Flooding the land needed to create the dam displaced 
1,000 Indian families, desecrated a number of sacred sites and burial grounds, and 
destroyed 90 per cent of the timber land on two reservations as well as the best rangeland 
and areas for cultivation (ibid.). Once again, as it had been for hundreds of years, the logic of 
development as economic growth for the wider population silenced native knowledge of the 
land’s value. 
Given this history of material, cultural and spiritual dispossession, it is peculiar that suddenly 
a small group of indigenous people jumped to national attention and managed to gain a 
victory, albeit short-lived, over a giant oil company. Although native activists were present at 
the camps from April 2016, mainstream media coverage was scarce (WICB 2017). As noted 
above, the primary means of spreading awareness was through social media, especially the 
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use of Twitter hashtags like #noDAPL, #StandWithStandingRock, and #WaterIsLife that 
could be easily re-tweeted by one person and shared with a wider audience of followers. As 
more native supporters joined the cause, well-known celebrities and environmental activists 
like Leonardo DiCaprio, Robert Redford, and Jane Fonda showed their support through 
Twitter beginning in May (McQueen 2018: 64). With increasing buzz around the issue and 
campers utilising Facebook live to post daily videos (#NoDAPL Archive n.d.), independent 
news outlets began coverage. Still, the movement was receiving scant mainstream media 
attention until 3 September, when a Dakota Access bulldozer began construction on an area 
of land that a tribal archaeologist, just one day earlier, had testified contained ancient burial 
grounds and sacred sites (Meyer 2016b). Water protectors trying to block the bulldozer were 
confronted by private security guards wielding pepper spray and attack dogs, some of whom 
bit protectors and drew blood (Levin 2016). Following this, video and pictures of the incident 
spread with lightning speed on Facebook and Twitter, causing the mainstream media and 
wider public to take notice. 
Social media was a vital tool for those on the ground to show the world what was happening. 
As one protector put it, ‘They’ve been big issues. The only thing that’s new is the technology, 
is social media’ (Sottile 2016). In his study of social movements in the digital age, Castells 
notes that digital networks can be crucial in producing ‘counterpower’, which is the ‘capacity 
of social actors to challenge the power embedded in the institutions of society for the 
purpose of claiming representation for their own values and interests’ (Castells 2012: 5). Able 
to frame stories in their own words and perspectives, social media created a space for 
marginalised native voices to become influential in a way that had never been possible 
before. As another protector noted, ‘If it doesn't come from us, then no one is ever going to 
know the story for what it really is’ (Sottile 2016). One set of videos that showed violence 
local police perpetrated on peaceful protectors garnered upwards of four million views on 
Facebook alone (ibid.). As viral videos spread throughout September and October, hundreds 
of native and non-native allies flocked to Oceti Sakowin to support Standing Rock, resulting 
in nearly 300 tribes represented and camp numbers estimated as high as 10,000 at one point 
(Northcott 2016). While it is impossible to detangle the precise mixture of support and 
influence that elevated Standing Rock to global prominence, it is clear that social media and 
the collective presence it helped foment formed a powerful counter-hegemonic voice with the 
capacity to disrupt the standard narrative of US development. However, though Native 
American voices were being valued on a national and global level as never before, the way 
in which native knowledge surrounding the nature of the fight was framed by different actors 
brings me to the second part of my analysis and the second sub-question. 
4.2 Doing development: How does knowledge get deployed by different actors with 
varying interests and degrees of power? 
4.2.1 Native water protectors 
From the beginning, protectors on the ground expressed that the need to protect the water 
was rooted in spiritual significance and also the injustice of colonial dispossession of native 
lands and ways of life. In an effort to ground the camps in the traditions of their ancestors, 
prayer and ceremony infused the everyday actions of the camp, and many native participants 
expressed a deeper awareness and understanding of their connection to sacred knowledge 
(Gunderson 2017; Wong 2016a). Insisting that they were water protectors and not protestors, 
native people instructed non-native camp guests to remember that the camp was itself a 
ceremony (Simon 2017). As one protector stated, ‘We are peacefully defending our land and 
our ways of life. We are standing together in prayer, and fighting for what is right’ (Awake 
2017). In this way, the protectors were able to reject hegemonic forms of civic action and 
frame the events around their own language and customs. Also emphasising that the sacred 
lands they protected belonged to the Sioux by right of treaty and were stolen by colonising 
settlers, this represents a powerful narrative of decolonisation that takes place through the 
© 2019 The Author © Institute of Development Studies  15 
‘resurgence of indigenous consciousness channelled into contention with colonialism’ (Alfred, 
quoted in Sium et al. 2012: III). 
This sentiment is echoed in the remark of youth activist Lauren Howland during direct action 
resistance on Thanksgiving: 
[To] be in a protective stand to say Water Is Life and to show no fear, unarmed, it 
makes [our] ancestors proud, and it re-writes history. Today we re-write Thanksgiving, 
we take back Thanks-taking, Thanks-killing… We re-write it as peaceful, prayer action 
that shows life. 
(Awake 2017) 
With recurrent comments of an ‘awakening’ happening among the people gathered at the 
camp (Awake 2017; Wong 2016a), it is clear that the resurgence of indigenous knowledge 
has tremendous value for the broader Native American community and can be read as a part 
of the immanent processes that arise in tandem with intentional development actions. 
4.2.2 Non-native allies 
However, alongside this indigenous framing rooted in sacred knowledge, several water 
protectors noticed that the ‘dialogue around #noDAPL has become extremely climate 
oriented’ (Hayes 2016). The wider environmental movement, which has gained significant 
strength in the 2000s with mounting awareness of climate change, played a key role in 
helping to galvanise public support for Standing Rock (Bailey 2016). Indeed, media analysis 
of mainstream news coverage identified that one of the strong narratives to emerge centered 
around the environment, with some of the most frequently used words being ‘global, climate, 
pollution and environmental’ (Sehat 2017). 
Indigenous activists emphasise that this environmental framing fails to recognise that the 
fight for water is centered around an indigenous system of knowledge and is essentially 
about ‘surviving colonization’ (Hayes 2016). The movement is undoubtedly linked to the fight 
against climate change, but as indigenous scholar Kyle Whyte argues, it goes much deeper: 
‘Stopping DAPL is a matter of climate justice and decolonisation for indigenous peoples. It 
may not always be apparent to people outside these communities, but standing up for water 
quality and heritage are intrinsically tied to these larger issues’ (Whyte 2016). Although the 
movement garnered thousands of supporters, when reduced to an issue of climate change 
and environmental protection delinked from the violent history of colonial dispossession that 
tribes have been resisting for centuries, indigenous knowledge is once again subsumed 
under the more powerful discursive system of Western knowledge. As such, there is an 
inherent tension in this process of making knowledge count, whereby the very thing that 
helped the Standing Rock movement gain traction also compromised it in a critical way. 
4.2.3 Federal actors – ACE and the presidents 
As noted in the case background, after the Standing Rock Sioux’s strong opposition to DAPL 
in 2014 was ignored and ACE deemed the environmental impact of no consequence, the 
tribe’s only recourse to stopping the pipeline was by suing ACE. While the ensuing litigation 
resulted in ACE delaying the permit in mid-November, a clash between protectors and police 
on 20 November resulted in 26 injured and 141 arrests (Wong 2016b). Tensions were at an 
all-time high, and the tribe called on President Obama to deny the permit needed for 
continued construction. Obama, an advocate of climate change policies and avowed 
supporter of native causes, faced increasing public scrutiny for his lack of action up to that 
point. On 4 December, cheers of victory and tears of vindication flowed out from the crowds 
at Oceti Sakowin after ACE announced it would be denying the permit and that a full two-
year environment assessment with extensive tribal input was required (Meyer 2016a). 
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While ACE denies that Obama had any effect on their decision, what happened less than two 
months later is indicative of the ‘reciprocal legitimation’ between knowledge and power 
(Weilier 2009: 2). Less than a week after taking the office of president in late January 2017, 
Donald Trump signed a memorandum asking ACE to ‘review and approve’ the pipeline as 
quickly as possible ‘to the extent permitted by law’ (Meyer 2017b). Within a few weeks, ACE 
granted the permit necessary for construction and declared ‘no cause for completing any 
additional environmental analysis’ (Lamont 2017). Though ACE had previously 
acknowledged the need to consider the ‘history of the Great Sioux Nation’s dispossession of 
lands’ and ‘the importance of Lake Oahe to the Tribe’ (USACE 2016), all this seemed to 
change with the stroke of a pen. This provides another example of how the capacity for 
certain knowledge to count depends on how it is utilised by those in positions of power. 
5 Conclusion 
The Standing Rock case is tremendously complex, involving a range of different actors that 
traverse various levels of power and have access to different tools with which to leverage 
that power. In this paper, I have traced the way in which US development has historically 
been defined by a process of settler colonialism that required dispossessing Native 
Americans from their land in order to amass the resources needed for capitalist growth. Fast 
forward to 2016, despite another business-as-usual infrastructure development on native 
lands, social media helped create a space for native voices to be heard on a global scale and 
assert pressure on the dominant forces of power. However, the ensuing events would see 
the indigenous knowledge at the heart of the movement valued and devalued in different 
ways by natives, non-native allies, and those in government positions. Ultimately, I have 
shown that the intimate relationship between knowledge and power means that knowledge 
can count for different actors in different ways, at different times. Although the space for 
native voice created through social media helped spark a movement that lead to an 
awakening of indigenous wisdom, ultimately the capacity for this knowledge to count in 
wider, intentional plans for development is determined by the extent that it aligns with those 
holding power. 
Given the nature of this case, I would be remiss not to make brief mention of my positionality 
as the author. As a white American in the privilege position of higher education, I am acutely 
aware that I am the product of a colonial system that ‘implicates and unsettles everyone’ 
(Tuck and Yang 2012: 7). This necessitates the recognition that, in crafting an analytical 
argument around the events, I risk reifying the colonial exploitation of indigenous knowledge 
by speaking for those who are historically dispossessed of voice. While this 
acknowledgement does not entail a solution, I hope that it may be the starting ground for a 
deeper recognition by myself and other readers that supporters of native struggles must work 
broadly towards championing indigenous knowledge as a process of decolonisation, ‘instead 
of aligning with indigenous peoples only when a particular issue, such as opposition to one 
pipeline, seems to match their interests’ (Whyte 2016). 
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What Do We Do with the Data? How Do the 
Concepts of Empowerment and Vertical 
Linkages Help Us to Understand Questions 
about the Effectiveness of Community 
Monitoring for Improving Public Service 
Delivery? 
Annette Fisher 
1 Introduction 
Community monitoring is used around the world in a wide variety of contexts. The literature 
has predominantly focused on community monitoring for environmental preservation 
purposes but more recently a number of studies have been conducted, examining what 
factors can influence the effectiveness of community monitoring for improved public service 
delivery in the global South. Community monitoring has been applied in many different ways 
to education, health, anti-corruption programmes etc. 
This paper explores how the data generated by community monitoring can be used both by 
communities for their own ends and by communities for holding duty bearers to account. In 
particular this paper explores how data represent a movement of power and uses the 
concepts of empowerment and vertical linkages to explore how data from community 
monitoring can be used. This paper looks at two aspects of monitoring: (a) what communities 
do, and could do, with the data they collect by monitoring public services and how external 
actors can facilitate them, and (b) how the process of monitoring and the data generated can 
increase the communities’ own empowerment. This paper uses two case studies, one in 
Pakistan which I worked on and one in India detailed by Farzana Afridi in her 2008 study. 
Framing community monitoring through an empowerment lens and linking this to the concept 
of vertical linkages is the springboard for my critical enquiry into practice (CEP). I plan to 
embed myself in an organisation which is supporting communities to monitor public service 
delivery and explore with them what the role of the external actors is in facilitating community 
monitoring in ways which are empowering for the community and in ways which are impactful 
in terms of improving public services. 
2 Conceptual framework 
In this section I will briefly explain my use of the key concepts of empowerment and vertical 
linkages. I will start by explaining what I mean by data in the context of this paper. In this 
case data refers to the information (statistics or otherwise) generated by the community as 
part of their monitoring of public service delivery, this might be a facility checklist for a health-
care centre or a tally of teacher absenteeism. This type of community monitoring can 
produce data in a quantitative (e.g. checklist) or qualitative format (e.g. perception of users 
exit survey) but the type of monitoring I am predominantly focused on is that conducted by 
volunteer community members and which generates quantitative data. Data of this kind are 
often dismissed for their validity by governments and donors as they are not collected by 
highly trained researchers, nor under controlled circumstances. However, as studies 
analysed by Jeremy Holland in his work Who Counts? show, ‘participatory research can 
generate accurate and generalisable statistics in a timely, efficient (value for money), and 
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effective way and participatory statistics empower local people in a sphere of research that 
has traditionally been highly extractive and externally controlled’ (Holland 2013: 1). I have 
also seen first-hand the accuracy and power that data of this kind can hold both for 
communities and for social accountability processes; it is this concept of the power of the 
data and the movement of that power that this paper focuses on. 
Empowerment is a concept which means different things to different people, as captured by 
Ann Ferguson when she said, ‘What exactly is understood by “empowerment” as a process 
and a goal, and how does this concept relate to the concepts of “needs”, “interests” and 
“rights”?’ (Ferguson 2004: 1). 
For the purposes of this paper and because I connect most with empowerment defined in a 
liberalising way, I am taking Eyben, Cornwall and Kabeer’s characterisation; ‘Empowerment 
happens when individuals and organised groups are able to imagine their world differently 
and to realise that vision by changing the relations of power that have been keeping them in 
poverty’ (Eyben, Kabeer and Cornwall 2008: 6). This characterisation of liberalising 
empowerment sees power as a central issue, ‘The extent to which any individual or 
community can determine for themselves who they are and how they choose to relate with 
others is determined by structures and relations of power’ (ibid.: 8). 
Linked to this concept of liberalising empowerment is VeneKlasen and Miller’s (2002: 55) 
political empowerment process (Figure 2.1) which is helpful in situating the process of 
community monitoring within the empowerment literature, as I will show later in this paper. 
Figure 2.1 The political empowerment process 
 
Source: VeneKlasen and Miller (2002: 55), reproduced with permission. 
‘Vertical linkages’ has emerged as a concept from the work of Jonathan Fox and Joy Aceron, 
who have identified it as a potentially impactful strategy for social accountability, it refers to 
the ‘vertical integration of civil society policy monitoring and advocacy… vertical integration 
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tries to address power imbalances by emphasising the coordinated independent oversight of 
public sector actors at local, subnational, national and transnational levels’ (Fox and Aceron 
2016: 4). For the purposes of this paper, I am applying this concept very specifically to the 
use of data generated by community monitoring for social accountability goals. 
The vertical linkages concept includes in its thinking, the concept of diagonal accountability, 
which like empowerment is used differently by different parts of the literature. For the 
purposes of this paper, I am using the definition outlined by World Bank authors Stapenhurst 
and O’Brien: 
Community advocates participate in institutions of horizontal accountability, rather than 
creating distinct and separate institutions of diagonal accountability… community 
advocates bring firsthand experience about the performance of the government agency 
to the accountability process. 
(Stapenhurst and O’Brien n.d.: 3) 
3 Why community monitoring and empowerment? 
For the purposes of this essay, I think it is important to explain why community monitoring for 
social accountability and empowerment have stood out as concepts I want to explore in my 
critical enquiry into practice as it is through personal experience that I have become aware of 
the potential critical importance of the ‘data’ aspect of community monitoring. Through a 
recent exercise designed to help myself and fellow practitioners identify our ontological 
positions, I have concluded that I am a constructivist who draws on critical theory 
approaches to power structures. I believe that strong power structures (visible, hidden and 
invisible) have created a narrative and an order which oppresses people. I believe that by 
identifying and understanding these power structures we can help to transform them 
positively. I believe that where possible, knowledge should be co-created and co-constructed 
and should have emancipation as its aim. I also believe that some knowledge is often 
considered more ‘valid’ than others because of the power structures surrounding the way 
development work is designed and implemented (Guba, Lincoln, and Synham 2017).1 This 
position has not only guided me toward the literature I have used to frame my thinking on 
social accountability in general but has also guided me towards the use of liberalising 
empowerment as a lens through which to view community monitoring for improved service 
delivery. 
I was profoundly moved by the power of the fairly simple process of community monitoring, 
which the EVA project in Pakistan has been facilitating over the past five years. The 
mechanics of the process are explained in the next section but the volume, accuracy and the 
actual use of the data surprised many of us involved in the design. The data generated from 
the process became not only a key aspect of the social accountability approach facilitated by 
the project but, most interestingly, the community developed ways of using the data which 
were unplanned and potentially transformative from an empowerment perspective. Initiatives 
which include empowerment and ‘voice’ as a goal for marginalised people have become of 
great interest to me; at a young age I heard a number of witness statements at the Yugoslav 
War Tribunal in the Hague. The stories of people who had been left powerless and whose 
communities had been devastated by the actions of a few powerful people affected me and 
this experience has driven much of my career path since. 
As I witnessed the mechanics of these accountability initiatives through roles in international 
development organisations, I became increasingly disillusioned by the lip service often paid 
to empowerment and began to feel that programmes which actually had transformative 
effects in this regard were rare or non-existent. It was at this low point in my experience that I 
                                               
1 My thinking on this was guided by the framework laid out by Guba, Lincoln and Synham (2017). 
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became involved in the project in Pakistan and through that I have become excited about the 
potential power of community-generated data within social accountability. What I want to 
understand now is, does that approach translate into other contexts and what is the role of 
external actors in facilitating this? 
4 Community monitoring approaches 
There are many approaches which fall under the category of community monitoring; a recent 
World Bank review (Molina et al. 2017) of approaches categorised them into four main areas: 
1. Information campaigns 
2. Score/report cards 
3. Social audit 
4. Grievance redress mechanisms 
Community monitoring initiatives ‘are approaches where the community is given the 
opportunity to participate in the process of monitoring service delivery, where monitoring 
means being able to observe and assess providers’ performance and provide feedback to 
providers and politicians’ (Molina et al. 2017: 463) 
Pollock and Whitelaw’s study (2005) of 31 communities in Canada has, along with other 
studies on community monitoring for the environment, framed much of the work in other 
sectors. They identified key factors which can lead to promising results, firstly, the approach 
has to be context specific, secondly the establishment of an information delivery mechanism 
is necessary and thirdly the gained experience should be meaningful for participants 
(Shrivastava, Ramasamy and Shrivastava 2013: 175). 
There have also been a range of studies conducted on international development initiatives, 
some specifically on community monitoring (such as the aforementioned World Bank study) 
and others on social accountability approaches in general which include community 
monitoring (Gaventa and Barrett 2012). The evidence of the impact of community monitoring 
on improved service delivery is mixed (Olken 2007; Björkman and Svensson 2009), however 
the studies are often using different measures of impact and are often valuing different types 
of evidence. For example, the 2017 World Bank macro study predominantly takes evidence 
from quantitative research, measuring projects which approach community monitoring in very 
different ways and for different purposes. There is little exploration by the authors on why 
certain community monitoring approaches have more impact than others? The study does 
however direct researchers to explore two important areas which this paper takes note of, 
‘the potential benefits of [community monitoring initiatives] on access to and quality of 
services are likely to be higher when interventions are designed so that contact between both 
actors are promoted, and tools for citizens to monitor agents’ performance are provided’ 
(Molina et al. 2017: 1). 
As aforementioned, for the purposes of this paper and my CEP, I am predominantly 
interested in community monitoring approaches which generate quantitative data and where 
the monitoring is conducted directly by community volunteers. My focus is therefore different 
from many of the score/report card programmes employed by INGOs and donor projects 
where highly trained NGO staff convene meetings of community members and illicit 
responses to scorecard questions through dialogue. 
To illustrate my chosen approach, I have selected two case studies. The first is a project in 
Pakistan on which I had the role of Technical Manager and the other is outlined in a study by 
Farzana Afridi comparing two approaches in India. While both these case studies are in 
South Asia and at first glance might not provide the necessary context differences, the nature 
of civil society in the two countries is extremely different and warrants further investigation in 
terms of the effectiveness of community monitoring approaches. 
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The Empowerment, Voice and Accountability (EVA) Project in Pakistan aims to empower, 
organise and facilitate citizens to hold the governments of the two provinces, Punjab and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), to account for the delivery of public maternal and child health 
services. 
EVA is represented at the local level by [384] community groups. Spread across nine 
districts in the Punjab and KP, they have an average of 20–30 members each. Through 
community-based monitoring and regular consultations, members identify issues and 
demands related to service provision in their local [Basic Health Units – BHUs]. Those 
that cannot be addressed through direct interactions with service providers are 
escalated to [District Advocacy Forums – DAFs]. DAFs are small squads of influential 
and committed accountability champions from civil society. They support community 
groups to raise their voices by engaging district and, in some cases, provincial-level 
powerholders and duty-bearers to resolve their issue. 
(Palladium 2016). 
The project, 
uses community-based monitoring as a means through which to gather information on 
service provision and to bolster the project’s advocacy efforts at all governance 
levels… however, it takes steps to assure that the information that is generated is 
aligned with supply side developments and useful to those receiving it. 
(Kirk 2017: 18) 
Important to note is that all community members conducting the monitoring are volunteers 
and do not receive any financial support related to the monitoring. Additionally, the 
monitoring is conducted monthly by small groups of these volunteers in the form of a facility 
checklist2 and exit interviews with women who have received services at the facility. The raw 
data are shared with project officers and entered into a database which can generate reports 
and analysis. 
The second case study is that of the monitoring of the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme’s (NREGS) implementation in two provinces in India: Rajasthan and Andhra 
Pradesh (AP). ‘The recent spate of social audits of public projects under the NREGS in India 
provides an opportunity to re-examine the question of the impact of community monitoring in 
the Indian context’ (Afridi 2008). As Afridi outlines, the two states represent different models 
of community monitoring; the difference between the models is relevant for the analysis in 
this paper. 
Enacted by the central government as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
of 2005, the NREGS came into effect, on a pilot basis, in February 2006 in 200 
economically most disadvantaged districts of the country. The NREGS, unlike existing 
social welfare programmes, is a law whereby any adult willing to do unskilled manual 
labour at a statutory minimum wage is entitled to being employed on public works 
within 15 days of applying for work in rural areas. Each rural household is eligible for up 
to 100 days of employment in a financial year. 
(ibid.) 
  
                                               
2 This checklist was developed based on each provinces’ own health-care standards packages and essential drugs lists. 
It is measuring implementation of the policies which cover public primary health care provision. As project staff 
themselves describe it ‘it is holding government to account against the promises which it has made to the people’. 
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In Rajasthan, Afridi explains, 
Activists, NGOs and members of civil society, are playing a principal role in creating 
awareness of the rights of villagers and in securing their entitlements. In AP the state 
government has taken the lead in initiating this process and co-opted individuals from 
non-governmental institutions into it. The Rajasthan model can be called a grass-roots 
or ‘bottom up’ approach while the latter has a more ‘top down’ aspect to it. 
(Afridi 2008: 37–38). 
In AP, the monitors were paid by the government, while in Rajasthan they were volunteers. 
In both Pakistan and India the initiatives make use of the Right to Information legislation both 
in terms of filing Right to Information requests and in terms of using the laws as justification 
and protection for monitoring activities. 
5 How do the concepts of empowerment and vertical linkages help us to 
understand questions about the effectiveness of community monitoring 
for improving public service delivery? 
Eyben, Cornwall and Kabeer’s concept of empowerment includes an understanding that a 
necessary condition of becoming empowered is individuals or groups becoming conscious of 
how their world currently is, this is part of them imagining their world differently. Community 
monitoring of service delivery enables groups to understand the status quo and to learn 
about what service standards and policy implementation they can expect from the state as 
this is what they are monitoring the providers against. Thus, this process of monitoring is 
empowering in and of itself (empowerment as an end in itself) as it helps communities to 
become conscious of how their world currently is (the status quo) and to understand what 
their world could be (if service delivery standards and policy implementation improved). This 
application of the concept is supported by Pollock and Whitelaw’s findings in their study on 
Canadian communities when they say, ‘the gained experience should be meaningful for 
participants’ (Pollock and Whitelaw 2005: 225). 
This idea of participatory data being a powerful asset to a community before and outside of 
its use in accountability is explored by Parfitt (2004), Jupp and Ibn Ali (2010) and Holland 
(2013) ‘participation as an end has an emancipatory, politically radical component in that it 
seeks to address unequal power relations’ (Jupp and Ibn Ali 2010: 32). Jupp and Ibn Ali, in a 
study in Bangladesh, explored how progress towards empowerment could be measured by a 
community themselves, arguing ‘as far as they are concerned the process is one that they 
drive and own and is purely for their purposes. For them the analysis stops here’ (ibid.: 53). 
We can take the findings from this study and explore them in relation to our understanding of 
community monitoring through an empowerment lens, ‘because each group uses the 
information for its own purposes the incentives for providing distorted information are 
reduced to a minimum’ (ibid.: 80). The implication here is that since the very act of monitoring 
is empowering, if we applied Jupp and Ibn Ali’s approach to the community measuring its 
own empowerment, this might strengthen the quality of the data collected because 
communities would be recognising the inherent value to themselves of not only the data but 
also their progress towards a more empowered state. This is a question I plan to pursue 
further in my CEP and the question of quality of data and how it can be further strengthened 
is of course very relevant in its use in advocacy and diagonal accountability approaches as 
discussed below. 
However, evidence from both the cases in Pakistan and India challenge the idea that the act 
of generating the monitoring data is sufficient alone to empower communities, as the EVA 
project notes: 
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The most important moment for challenging traditional citizen–state relationships is the 
first time a community group has one of its demands resolved… with members 
beginning to view local health facilities and their staff as one of the community’s 
assets… many are beginning to organise themselves to maintain their BHUs, 
undertake small renovation projects, and to monitor the facilities outside of the project’s 
routine checks. 
(Kirk 2017: 16) 
In Pakistan, we found that communities were empowered to look for changes they could 
make themselves (they could imagine the status quo being different) at the facility as a result 
of the monitoring but only after action occurred due to the duty bearers taking account of 
their findings generated by the monitoring. The generation of the data alone did not empower 
the community but the way the community used the data to shift the power balance 
(facilitated by the project) did lead to the community becoming empowered. 
After communities became aware that the EVA project was able to run analyses on the data, 
some of the communities began to ask the project to create certain data reports for them. For 
example, more than one community requested data over a period, for certain checklist 
indicators in order that they could see if the situation had improved or deteriorated for their 
facility. In the cases where the data showed improvement, the communities were empowered 
as they directly linked their monitoring and issue raising to the improvement. More complex 
analysis would be needed to determine if this was in fact the case, but another question is, 
does it matter? The act of knowing there was improvement in the facility and experiencing a 
connection with their monitoring actions was empowering in and of itself. But this 
empowerment came not only from conducting the monitoring but also from seeing 
improvement, the communities which saw deterioration in their facility were still empowered 
to keep monitoring but not to the same extent as those who saw improvement. 
Similarly, Afridi’s findings in relation to the India case show that when there is little action as 
a result of monitoring, this can lead to ordinary villagers feeling powerless in spite of the 
conduct of the audits (Afridi 2008: 38). 
Any action taken thereafter against erring officials may be costly but the resulting 
benefits of an empowered community may outweigh the costs… unless substantive 
action is taken against officials who are found and proven guilty of corrupt practices, 
the credibility and effectiveness of community monitoring in reducing corruption could 
be insignificant. 
(ibid.: 39) 
In both the Pakistan and India cases, external actors played a role in facilitating the data to 
reach those who could take action as a result of the findings; this role will be explored later in 
the paper. 
This leads us to conclude that while the act of monitoring and most importantly the 
generation of data about service provision, is potentially powerful and likely contributes to 
empowered communities (which Pollock and Whitelaw have shown us is important for the 
effectiveness of monitoring in terms of social accountability) it is only a necessary and not a 
sufficient condition. Evidence from both India and Pakistan indicates that action as a result of 
the monitoring (the use of the data to shift power balances and thus potentially improve 
services) is also a necessary condition for empowered communities and from Pakistan we 
see that it is likely to lead to a higher level of empowerment of the community. 
The possible reason for this is suggested by VeneKlasen and Miller’s (2002) framework for 
political empowerment (see Figure 2.1), in which they show empowerment increasing by 
moving from a state of individual consciousness to political power. By applying Eyben, 
Cornwall and Kabeer’s approach to empowerment and Jupp and Ibn Ali’s findings and 
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combining them with VeneKlasen and Miller’s framework, we can understand the above 
further by seeing that while the act of generating data through monitoring is empowering, it is 
only contributing to the individual and collective levels of empowerment. It is only through 
duty bearers responding to the data when they are used to advocate for change (challenging 
the power) that we see the empowerment of the community moving to the level of ‘political 
power’ and the use of the data to make a significant shift in the power (Arnstein 1969)3 and 
improve service delivery. 
Therefore, if we understand this and accept this to be the case, the question we must now 
turn to is, under what circumstances can community monitoring and the data it generates be 
most effectively used to hold duty bearers to account and improve service delivery; what are 
most effective ways for the community generated data to shift power balances? 
Data and monitoring are important to policymakers and policy implementers as demonstrated 
by Miller and Covey’s (1997) ‘Phases of Policymaking’ (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Phases of Policymaking 
 
Source: Miller and Covey (1997), reproduced with permission. 
As shown here, monitoring is important both for assessing current policy implementation and 
for setting the agenda and design of future policies. Bureaucrats and politicians want to know 
what is working at all levels of policy implementation and therefore they frequently design 
monitoring and evaluation processes into their policies. However, they infrequently design 
bottom-up monitoring into the process and therefore the end-users of service provision rarely 
have their perspectives factored into policy design and implementation. This often leads to 
service provision which does not cater to access issues of women or marginalised 
communities or which leads to monitoring indicators which are set around priorities of what 
service providers think users care about and not what are actually priorities for communities. 
                                               
3 This use of VeneKlasen and Miller’s framework reminds us of Arnstein’s ladder of participation which is relevant 
because community monitoring which generates data is a form of participatory statistics as explored by Holland in his 
book Who Counts? 
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This was demonstrated in a very powerful way to me on the project in Pakistan; the 
government of KP had developed (with the support of donors) an Independent Monitoring 
Unit (IMU) which, 
Consists of 175 staff that monitor the provision of health (and other) services across 
the province, at all levels, and construct bi-monthly action plans to address 
deficiencies… whilst in and of themselves the IMU’s data collection efforts are 
impressive, they are being bolstered by the EVA-BHN project feeding its own citizen 
generated monitoring data into the IMU’s reports. 
(Palladium 2016b) 
The IMU had been monitoring medicine stockage at the district level and the findings were 
positive however the data generated by communities, supported by the EVA project through 
the facility checklist and the exit interviews, showed that medicine stocks were often low or 
ran out at the facility level. Analysis of the two sets of data by the IMU and the EVA team, 
alongside further investigation at the facility and district level by community volunteers, 
revealed that one of the aid disbursement led indicators of the donors had created a 
perverse incentive for stockpiling medicine at the district level instead of distributing it to 
health facilities. Without this key data from the facility level and from the user perspective, 
this gap in implementation would not have been identified. As a result, the IMU selected a 
number of indicators from the community monitoring checklist and the exit survey to add to 
their top-down monitoring indicators and together they are now used to hold service delivers 
to account through the government’s own horizontal accountability processes. This is 
significant as it not only shows why vertical linkages are critical to the effectiveness of 
community monitoring for improved service delivery; without the facilitation of ‘contact’4 
(Molina et al. 2017) between communities generating the data and the IMU, this gap would 
not have been identified, power would not have moved and action would not have been 
taken (further empowering the communities which generated it). But it also confirms Pollock 
and Whitelaw’s conclusion that ‘an information delivery mechanism is necessary’. 
In the Pakistan case, the use of the data has helped communities to shift power to the benefit 
of poor and marginalised people. Other examples of this are the volunteers’ communication 
to the duty bearers of the importance of female washrooms and a separate female waiting 
area in facilities. The community was able to show the duty bearers, through analysing the 
monitoring data (facilitated by EVA project officers), that those facilities which had these 
amenities, had a higher utilisation rate. They were then able to explain to service providers 
and decision makers that this was because women from poor, rural communities did not feel 
comfortable using services without these amenities, due to cultural constraints. 
To understand why this use of community-generated data specifically has helped to shift 
power balances in this case in Pakistan, and how the principles of the approach might 
translate to a different context, we can explore the concept of vertical linkages further. As 
Fox and Aceron argue, 
The core rationale for monitoring each stage and level of public sector decision making, 
non-decision-making and performance is to reveal more precisely not only where the 
main causes of accountability failures are located, but also their interconnected 
nature… the coordination of independent monitoring and advocacy capacity across as 
much as possible of the governance process – from policy debate and agenda-setting 
to the formulation of policy and budget decisions. 
(Fox and Aceron 2016: 4–5) 
                                               
4 Molina et al.’s World Bank systemic review identified ‘contact’ between communities and duty bearers as likely important 
to the effectiveness of community monitoring initiatives. 
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The EVA project’s experience and the example in India demonstrate a few examples of how 
the data generated by community monitoring have been used by a few of the state’s own 
arms-length oversight bodies (IMU, ombudsman, etc.) through diagonal accountability to hold 
service providers to account. However, Fox and Aceron’s concept of vertical linkages points 
to a need to go further and identify opportunities for community-generated data to be used 
‘across as much as possible of the governance process’ and for them to be triangulated with 
other types of independent monitoring; with the potential for this to have a powerful impact on 
the effectiveness of social accountability initiatives.5 
Present throughout the experiences I have had on the project in Pakistan, the case in India 
analysed by Afridi and in many of the studies on community monitoring initiatives, is the 
importance of ‘getting right’ the role of external actors to the effectiveness of community 
monitoring. The 2017 World Bank macro-study identifies facilitation by external actors of 
‘contact’ between communities and duty bearers as key to the success of the initiative 
(Molina et al. 2017) (presumably because this contributes to vertical linkages between 
actors). This is echoed by Gaventa and Barrett in their macro-study of social accountability 
approaches when they say, ‘Donors and policymakers alike can play an important role in 
protecting and strengthening spaces for citizens to exercise their voice, and can support the 
enabling conditions for citizen engagement to occur’ (Gaventa and Barrett 2010: 2407) and 
by Fox when he invites external actors to ‘deploy multiple tactics’ (Fox 2015: 346). This role 
of the external actor in facilitating community monitoring in order that the data generated are 
both used across the whole governance process and are empowering to the community, is 
something I plan to explore further in my CEP. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has shown that community monitoring can contribute to the communities’ own 
empowerment as an end in itself but it also shows that this empowerment is increased when 
action occurs as a result of the monitoring. The paper has also demonstrated that when the 
data generated by community monitoring are channelled in a strategic way through vertical 
linkages, contributing to diagonal accountability, it not only strengthens the empowerment of 
the community but it can also be a part of shifting power and more effectively holding duty 
bearers to account. 
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Unprofitable Problems: The Limitations of 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Matthew Gregora 
1 Introduction 
In 1970, Milton Friedman famously argued that the only social responsibility of business was 
to increase its profit, within the rules of fair play (Friedman 1970). At that time, it could be 
persuasively asserted that ‘states’ were ultimately responsible for social problems. Their 
unique civil authority and autonomy implied responsibility and capacity to provide public 
goods, and to regulate business to optimise private goods.1 However, in recent decades, 
many social problems and corporations have outgrown the state. The advance of 
globalisation has caused global public goods to become critically important (Kaul et al. 1999). 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) now rival states in autonomy, elusive to regulation 
(Ruggie 2017). Governance gaps have thus emerged at multiple levels (Scherer et al. 2016). 
This has prompted hopes and concerns that corporations will voluntarily self-regulate and 
proactively contribute to development – activities often described as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR).2 But can CSR support such pressure? 
This paper begins to answer that question, by arguing that corporations mainly use CSR to 
pursue or protect profit, which substantially limits what CSR can achieve for society. This 
argument is made by analysing the academic literature on CSR, linking main themes of 
research to build a case for the primary nature and limitations of CSR. These characteristics 
of CSR are then illustrated by the recent CSR activity of ten large oil MNCs regarding climate 
change and the ‘resource curse’. The paper concludes that clear discourse and research 
about CSR limitations are important for enhancing the potential of CSR and for developing 
other solutions to societal problems. 
2 Literature analysis 
The following analysis draws together main themes from the academic literature on CSR to 
demonstrate how the profit imperative limits CSR. Each subheading below represents a main 
strand of the research literature, from which selected points are made. 
2.1 Definitions and concepts 
Definitions and concepts of CSR, and cognate terms such as Corporate Citizenship and 
Corporate Sustainability, are numerous and contested (Sheehy 2015).3 This paper does not 
rely on a specific definition, but focuses on an aspect that is central to most: the voluntary 
actions of corporations to enhance their social impacts, including economic and 
environmental impacts.4 The dimensions of voluntariness, and of economic, environmental 
and social impacts are common to most CSR definitions (Dahlsrud 2008), as is the concept 
                                               
1 In simple economic models of social welfare, the state is expected to provide public goods because such goods are 
neither excludable nor rivalrous, permitting ‘free-riders’ who would reduce potential economic returns to business. 
Businesses require regulation because markets are prone to various failures in providing private goods, e.g. they 
overproduce goods with ‘negative externalities’ that impose part of the costs on society (untaxed pollution is a classic 
example). Economists also recognize quasi-public goods, club goods, etc. See e.g. Pigou (1920), Samuelson (1954), 
Arrow (1969), Cornes and Sandler (1986), and Kaul et al. (1999). 
2 Definitions of CSR are discussed further below. 
3 Carroll (2015) and Montiel (2008) observe that these terms are often used interchangeably by corporations, though 
academic literature delineates subtle differences. This paper treats them as interchangeable because the differences 
are not significant to the argument. 
4 This paper uses ‘corporation’, ‘firm’, ‘company’, and ‘business’ interchangeably to refer to publicly-owned profit-seeking 
corporations, as is typical in CSR literature. 
© 2019 The Author © Institute of Development Studies  34 
of enhancing impacts through minimising harm and maximising positive contributions (ibid.; 
UNGC 2014; EU Commission 2011). As alluded to in the introduction, voluntarily minimising 
harm can be usefully described as ‘self-regulation’ (Sheehy 2015), and ‘development’ is 
useful shorthand for making positive social contributions (UNGC 2017). 
2.2 Theories of CSR behaviour 
Theories of why corporations would display CSR behaviour are diverse and evolving. Garriga 
and Mele (2004) map them into four categories: instrumental, political, integrative or ethical. 
Most observers agree that ‘instrumental’ theories of CSR have become dominant, and have 
contributed to the recent widespread embrace of CSR by corporations (ibid.; Lee 2008; 
Scherer and Palazzo 2007). Instrumental theories assert that corporations use CSR primarily 
to pursue or protect profit. The premise of these theories is that corporations are a vehicle for 
investing capital to earn profit, and that investors have enough control over corporate 
managers to ensure that they mostly act to this end (McWilliams and Siegel 2001). Actions 
with moral or relational motives remain possible, if investors curb their profit motive, or if 
managers evade investor control (Lee 2008; Aguilera et al. 2007). Thus, multilevel theories 
of CSR behaviour are relevant, particularly to individual actions and companies. However, in 
aggregate, the primacy of profit-seeking is viewed as keeping CSR centred on activities with 
a favourable business case. 
2.3 The business case for CSR 
The abundance of literature on ‘the business case’ for CSR is often seen as prima facie 
evidence of CSR’s profit orientation. A meta-analysis by Orlitzky et al. (2003) found 52 
quantitative studies of links between CSR and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). By 
2012 there were another 42 such studies for Wang et al. (2016) to analyse. Further studies 
explore the theoretical links between CSR and CFP. The point here is not what these studies 
find, but simply that the focus on the business case for CSR indicates that profitability is 
perceived as critically important to CSR’s legitimacy and uptake (Schreck 2011). This view 
seems to be held by the key development actors who promote CSR, such as the United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC), World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), and Business for Social Responsibility (BSR). Their publications and websites 
heavily promote the business case, while still reminding that CSR is ‘the right thing to do’ 
(UNGC 2014; WBCSD 2012; BSR 2017).5 For example, in 2013, BSR co-created the 
‘Business Case Builder’ website (Business Case Builder 2018). Governments also seem 
anxious to couch CSR as good for business, not just society (UK Government 2014; EU 
Commission 2011). It is worth noting that the business case for CSR is often conceived in 
broad terms, by considering how multiple stakeholders influence corporate financial success 
(Carroll and Shabana 2010). This allows costs of CSR to be recouped creatively through 
various channels. Nonetheless, the business case imposes strong limits, as shown next. 
2.4 Determinants of CSR 
Research on what determines the level of CSR activity undertaken by different firms provides 
further evidence of CSR’s profit focus and consequent limitations. Campbell (2007) uses a 
profit-oriented model to theorise how levels of CSR will be mediated by economic and 
institutional conditions. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) do likewise for market and firm 
conditions. These two papers alone propose 18 separate determinants for the level of CSR 
activity by any corporation. Empirical studies often detect such determinants operating 
(Gamerschlag et al. 2011; Chih et al. 2010). The implication is that each firm has a different 
optimum level of CSR at any time. Some firms will enjoy conditions that favour CSR, such as 
the frequently cited examples who have found successful niches in pursuing strategies of 
                                               
5 These organisations have each published hundreds of documents on their websites which invoke the ‘business case’ for 
various aspects of CSR (WBCSD 2018; BSR 2018; UNGC 2018).  
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‘inclusive business’, ‘shared value creation’, or ethical branding – e.g. Unilever, Vodafone   
M-Pesa, and Patagonia (Porter and Kramer 2011; Jenkins and Ishikawa 2010). But for other 
firms, the optimum level of CSR will be low (Campbell 2007). Moreover, corporations which 
compete for advantage through CSR will experience diminishing returns on CSR investment, 
reducing its incremental attractiveness (Lee 2008). These implications constitute strong 
limitations to CSR, and may explain the inconsistent evidence of a correlation between CSR 
and CFP found in the empirical business case research described above (McWilliams and 
Siegel 2001). 
2.5 Contributions of CSR 
Critiques of the contributions of CSR to society often link shortcomings of CSR back to its 
profit-seeking nature (Banerjee 2008; Frynas 2005). Vogel (2007) thoroughly analyses how 
the limited ‘market for virtue’ has constrained the types of issues addressed by CSR, in 
which countries, and to what extent. He shows that customers, employees and investors 
meagrely reward most CSR, and that this causes for example, environmental CSR to remain 
weak in many developing countries, among corporations with low brand visibility, and on 
issues neglected by rich-country non-governmental organisations. Jenkins (2005) similarly 
argues that CSR has been weak in addressing poverty in developing countries, because the 
poor are rarely strong stakeholders in the business case. The research on determinants and 
contributions of CSR does not require a deterministic view of CSR activity (Frynas 2009), but 
it suggests that most corporate managers have relatively small room for agency. 
2.6 Conclusions of literature analysis 
To summarise, prominent strands in the CSR literature show that: corporations are viewed 
as using CSR primarily for profit, though other motives have a role; this is evidenced by the 
emphasis on the business case among academics and CSR advocates, and; the business 
case approach substantially constrains the CSR activities that corporations will undertake, 
even if all stakeholders are considered. These findings can be combined to draw the 
conclusion that corporations will rarely enhance their social impacts voluntarily unless it is 
profitable, which strongly limits the issues that CSR can address. Rather than being a 
criticism of corporate behaviour, this conclusion is intended as a descriptive consequence of 
how society is currently constituted. 
Perhaps this would appear trivial, if not for the growing pressure on corporations to self-
regulate and proactively contribute to development, as noted in the introduction. Governance 
gaps arising from globalisation are apparent to the United Nations (Kaul et al. 1999), CSR 
business groups (BSR 2017), and academics (Ruggie 2017; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; 
Vogel 2010). Some prominent development actors have responded by calling on 
corporations to voluntarily enhance their social impacts (UNGC 2017; Agarwal et al. 2017; 
BSR 2017; WBCSD 2012). Positive views of CSR’s potential have been expressed by official 
development agencies, including the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (Jenkins 2005), although 
this enthusiasm appears to have waned somewhat after the Global Financial Crisis.6 Harvard 
University’s Corporate Responsibility Initiative publishes frequent studies of good CSR 
practice, seeking to enhance the public contributions of private enterprise. In short, there 
seems to be a disconnect between the limitations of CSR and the hopes and concerns for 
CSR among some development actors. This disconnect will be revisited at the end of the 
paper. First, the limitations will be highlighted by a case study of the global oil industry. 
                                               
6 Jenkins’ examples are from the early 2000s. The World Bank has since closed its CSR Practice. Searches of the DFID, 
IDB and World Bank websites show that most publications and policy statements regarding CSR and cognates were in 
the early and mid-2000s. Recent annual proceedings from the Interagency Roundtable on CSR show mixed 
perspectives on CSR (CSR Round Table 2018). 
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3 Case study 
The oil and natural gas industry is an ideal test of the limitations of CSR described thus far.7 
The industry comprises many of the world’s largest MNCs, operating in dozens of developing 
countries. These MNCs are at the forefront of CSR activity and reporting, and they are 
subjected to special scrutiny on several important CSR issues. Table 3.1 indicates the size of 
the world’s five largest oil MNCs (henceforth referred to as the ‘Big-5’).8 In 2016, their 
combined revenue exceeded the collective GDP of Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Colombia, 
Iraq and Nigeria – some of the largest developing economies in which the Big-5 operate 
(World Bank 2017). Annexe 1 shows the many non-OECD/EU countries where the ‘Big-10’ 
operate.9 The Big-10 all publish detailed annual CSR reports on their websites, consistent 
with the industry having one of the highest CSR reporting rates among all sectors (KPMG 
2017). Additionally, the Big-10 are leading participants in many prominent CSR initiatives, 
e.g. the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Oil and Gas Climate Initiative 
(OGCI), UNGC, and WBCSD. Shell alone collaborates with 22 such organisations (Shell 
2017). Lastly, unique social impacts of the oil industry have prompted governments and 
development organisations to publish an array of special initiatives and guidelines to 
enhance its impacts (e.g. EITI 2016; OECD 2017; UNDP 2017; GRI 2013).10 
This case study considers just two social impacts of the oil industry – climate change and the 
‘resource curse’. These have been chosen because the Big-10 identify them among their 
major impacts, yet they respond extensively on one and minimally on the other. Analysis will 
suggest that these different sets of voluntary actions share an important trait – they are what 
the business case allows, but little more. Each impact will be considered in turn. The 
discussion relies partly on the author’s knowledge of the industry, as highlighted at the end of 
the case study. 
Table 3.1 The world’s five largest publicly-traded oil companies by revenue 
 Sinopec CNPC Shell Exxon BP 
Fortune Global 500 Revenue World Rank  
(2016) 
3 4 7 10 12 
PwC Top 100 Market Capitalisation Rank  
(March 2017) 
74 29 23 7 61 
Revenue  
(2016, US$b) 
268 263 240 205 187 
Market Capitalisation  
(March 2017, US$b) 
100 201 220 340 113 
Profit  
(2011–16 avg. US$m p.a.) 
7,710 14,604 12,894 26,794 6,557 
Taxes  
(2011–16 avg. US$m p.a.) 
45,771 63,012 9,714 46,516 8,528 
Notes: Sinopec is formally named China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation; profit and taxes stated in RMB in sources have 
been converted to US$ using 1 RMB = 0.15 US$. 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Fortune (2017), PwC (2017), Sinopec (2018), CNPC (2018), Shell (2018), Exxon 
(2018) and BP (2018). 
                                               
7 This paper frequently uses ‘oil’ or ‘oil and gas’ as shorthand for ‘oil and natural gas’. 
8 The largest five publicly-traded oil companies by revenue in 2016 (Fortune 2017). CNPC is not directly publicly traded, 
but it is the majority shareholder in publicly-traded PetroChina. Saudi Aramco and Kuwait Petroleum Company have 
similarly high revenues, but are nationally owned. 
9 The ‘Big-10’ are the Big-5 plus Chevron, Total, Lukoil, Eni, and Statoil, which were the next five largest publicly-traded 
oil companies by revenue in 2016 (Fortune 2017), after excluding Valero and Petrobras which have relatively small 
international activities. 
10 Many social impacts of the oil industry are shared with the mining industry. These industries are together often called 
the ‘extractives industries’. 
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3.1 Climate change 
There is a clear consensus among scientists and governments that humans are causing 
climate change, and that this is an urgent global threat (UNFCCC 2015; Cook et al. 2013). 
The primary mechanism is greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, of which carbon dioxide is 
most important. The oil industry directly releases 6 per cent of global carbon dioxide 
emissions, and end uses of its products contribute a further 40 per cent (Nyquist and Ruys 
2010). The oil industry’s association for environmental and social issues, IPIECA,11 
acknowledges that ‘a particular challenge for the industry is its role in climate change… [the] 
industry must be a key part of the solution’ (UNDP 2017: v). Accordingly, the Big-5 devoted 
almost a quarter of their 2016 CSR reports to describing their actions on climate change 
(Table 3.2).12 Table 3.3 shows the specific actions they described. 
Table 3.2 Composition of CSR reports for ‘Big-5’ oil MNCs (2016 annual reports) 
Topic Area Proportion of Report Allocated to Topic (% space) 
Average Sinopec CNPC Shell Exxon BP 
Climate change 24% 10% 16% 36% 26% 31% 
Local societal impacts 18% 33% 29% 6% 12% 11% 
Local development 17% 27% 17% 11% 22% 10% 
Environment 11% 10% 9% 13% 16% 10% 
Corporate governance 11% 10% 10% 15% 9% 12% 
Safe operations 9% 4% 9% 8% 10% 16% 
Human rights 5% 3% 3% 4% 4% 9% 
Other topics 4% 4% 7% 8% 1% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Method – all substantive content of these CSR reports was reviewed and allocated to topic areas and subtopics; non-
substantive content was excluded, e.g. title and contents pages, introduction, guides to the report, assurance statements, full-
page pictures) 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Sinopec (2017), CNPC (2017), Shell (2017), Exxon (2017), and BP (2017). 
While Table 3.3 shows an array of actions, the underlying commonality is what pays. By far 
the most attention is on ‘Operational emissions’, which mostly means reducing the intensity 
(and therefore costs) of energy used in production. Nyquist and Ruys (2010) show that there 
are many ways oil companies do this profitably. A notable unprofitable exception is ‘Carbon 
capture and storage’, which helps explain why the CSR reports mainly describe research on 
this rather than implementation. ‘Supply of natural gas’ and ‘Supply of renewable fuels’ are 
both prominently discussed in the reports, because both have lower carbon emissions than 
oil. However, nothing indicates these fuels are supplied for any reason except profit. BP 
clearly states that it chooses which fuels to supply based on patterns of customer demand 
(BP 2017). Its CSR report prominently declares that BP is among the top producers of wind 
energy in the US (ibid.), but does not mention that it recently tried to sell these assets, just as 
it previously divested its solar business due to low profitability (Macalister 2015). Another 
prominent topic is ‘Research and development’. It is unsurprising that oil companies would 
invest in developing low-carbon technology and fuels, given the prospect of rising tax on 
carbon. What may surprise is the minimal investments. For example, the six members of the 
Big-10 who contribute to the OGCI all advertise prominently that it will invest US$1 billion 
                                               
11 Originally the ‘International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association’, but now just ‘IPIECA’ because 
of its expanded scope of work. Shell, Exxon, BP, Total, Chevron, Eni and Statoil are members. 
12 The proportion of space allocated to a topic in a company’s CSR report is a very simplistic indicator of how important the 
company perceives the issue to be. It is adequate in this case because of how clear the result is. 
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over ten years in low-carbon technologies, but their annual individual contribution of US$10 
million looks small against billions in profit (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.3 Composition of climate change section in ‘Big-5’ CSR reports (2016 annual 
reports) 
Climate change subtopic Proportion of section allocated to subtopic (% space) 
Average Sinopec CNPC Shell Exxon BP 
Operational emissions 35% 67% 12% 28% 37% 32% 
Supply of natural gas 14% 10% 35% 17% 3% 3% 
Research and development 12% 10% 6% 8% 28% 8% 
Customer emissions 7% 4% 6% 11% 8% 8% 
Supply of renewable fuels 7% 4% 6% 8% 3% 13% 
Carbon capture and storage 6% 4% 6% 11% 4% 5% 
Energy mix forecasting 6% 0% 9% 6% 8% 7% 
Carbon pricing 5% 0% 6% 3% 6% 12% 
Carbon offset programmes 2% 0% 6% 0% 0% 3% 
Other 6% 2% 9% 9% 3% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: See source note for Table 3.2 regarding methodology. 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Sinopec (2017), CNPC (2017), Shell (2017), Exxon (2017) and BP (2017). 
Perhaps what is most revealing about the Big-10’s approach to climate change is their 
stance on government carbon pricing policy. A majority discuss it in their CSR reports, 
describing it as critically necessary, e.g. 
Government policy will be critical to creating the conditions for making the transition to 
cleaner energy… commercially possible. Shell continues to call for effective 
government-led carbon-pricing. 
(Shell 2017: 4) 
BP believes that carbon pricing by governments is the best policy to limit GHG 
emissions. Putting a price on carbon – one that treats all carbon equally… incentivises 
both energy producers and consumers to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions… 
We need governments across the world to provide us with clear, stable, long-term, 
ambitious policy frameworks. 
(BP 2017: 14) 
Similarly, IPIECA has recently written on behalf of the industry that: 
Success in moving towards a low-emissions future will depend on how effective 
governments are at creating a policy landscape that uses market forces to enable low-
GHG innovation and deployment… the most effective will… apply to all GHG 
emissions. 
(IPIECA 2016: 9) 
The oil industry calls for a universal carbon price because when all users pay, it becomes 
profitable to reduce carbon emissions and supply low-carbon products. The overall message 
of the oil companies is clear: our response to climate change will remain limited until 
governments make it more profitable. 
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3.2 Resource curse 
The developmental effects of natural resource abundance have been researched extensively 
since the late 1980s. This paper will only briefly summarise that research, because the 
priority is instead to show: (1) whether oil MNCs identify such effects among their major 
social impacts, (2) what the MNCs do in response, and (3) why. Seminal research on the 
‘resource curse’ by Auty (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Karl (1997), and Ross (1999), 
built a case that countries which heavily export natural resources (particularly oil) tend to 
grow more slowly due to various economic and political effects, e.g. inflation of the national 
currency hurting other more dynamic export sectors (‘Dutch disease’); volatility in 
government revenues promoting economic mismanagement, and; easy resource rents 
tending to promote corruption, weaken democratic institutions, and even induce violent 
conflict. Collier (2007) thus argued that extracting natural resources, especially oil, is one of 
four traps keeping the world’s ‘bottom billion’ people in poverty. Hundreds of studies later, 
many of the same resource curse effects are still advanced, though with more nuance about 
which ones may apply under different circumstances (Havranek et al. 2016). Ross (2012) 
now argues, for example, that oil-rich countries have not grown more slowly overall, but have 
become less democratic, more secretive, and created less opportunities for women. But what 
do the oil MNCs think and do about resource curse effects? 
In contrast to climate change, one needs to look harder to see that the Big-10 identify 
resource curse effects among their major social impacts. Their 2016 CSR reports do not 
discuss potential negative macroeconomic or macropolitical effects in developing countries, 
focussing instead on local impacts and local development initiatives (see Table 3.2 above). 
However, most of the reports do include a brief statement of support for the Extractives 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), as a measure to improve governance and 
accountability (CNPC 2017; Shell 2017; Exxon 2017; BP 2017; Eni 2017; Statoil 2017). The 
EITI promotes public disclosure of the revenue that governments receive from extractive 
industries, and where that revenue is allocated by governments. It is based on a Statement 
of Principles that were agreed in 2003 when the UK government convened various countries, 
companies and civil society organisations, partly in response to the Angolan government 
threatening to expel BP from Angola after BP published its government payments there in 
2001 (Frynas 2010). The Statement of Principles begins: 
We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative 
economic and social impacts. 
(EITI 2016:10) 
IPIECA has more explicitly identified resource curse effects in a recent joint publication with 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Finance Corporation 
(IFC): 
the wealth that development of hydrocarbon reserves can bring links the oil and gas 
industry to the ‘resource curse’ theory. This is the hypothesis that countries rich in 
natural resources such as fossil fuels often suffer from weak institutions and high levels 
of corruption, which drive mismanagement of oil and mineral rents… 
(UNDP 2017: 9) 
The same publication discusses the problem of ‘Dutch disease’ (ibid.: 53). The Dutch 
disease concept is further described in the Oil and Gas Sector Disclosures of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, which BP, Shell, Statoil and 
Eni helped create, and which most of the Big-10 use to prepare their CSR reports. The 
Disclosures highlight the problem that ‘where there is a strengthening of the national 
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currency, other economic sectors can become uncompetitive in the global market’ (GRI 
2013:15). 
Table 3.4 suggests that many countries in which the Big-10 operate may be at risk of 
resource curse effects from oil, per indicators of EITI status, budget openness, governance 
quality, and oil-dependency. So, how have the oil MNCs responded? 
Table 3.4 Selected countries at risk of oil-related resource curse effects, where Big-10 
operate 
Country GDP Big-10 extractives presence Resource curse risk factors 
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2016 
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2016 EITI 
Status 
2015 Open 
Budget 
Index  
(0–100) 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
(Avg. % Rank) 
Oil & Gas 
rents (% 
of GDP) 
Algeria 3,844 
 
X X 
 
X X 
  
X X Non-participant 19 21 12 
Angola 3,111 X 
  
X X X X 
 
X X Non-participant 26 16 11 
Azerbaijan 3,877 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X X 
 
X Withdrawn 51 28 13 
Chad 664 
 
X 
 
X 
      
Yet to be 
assessed 
4 9 7 
Equatorial Guinea 8,333 
   
X 
      
Delisted 4 10 16 
Gabon 7,179 
  
X 
  
X 
  
X 
 
Delisted - 27 10 
Iraq 4,610 
  
X X X X X X X 
 
Inadequate 
Progress 
3 9 29 
Libya 5,603 
     
X 
  
X X Non-participant - 4 51 
South Sudan 759 
 
X 
        
Non-participant - 3 12 
Turkmenistan 6,389 
 
X 
        
Non-participant - 10 19 
Venezuela, RB 12,237 
 
X 
   
X X 
  
X Non-participant 8 8 15 
Yemen, Rep. 990 
   
X 
 
X 
    
Delisted 34 3 2 
Notes: Colour coding is as per the sources. This table is an excerpt from Annexe 1 – see there for full key and source notes. 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from BP (2018), Chevron (2018), CNPC (2018), EITI (2018), Eni (2018), Exxon (2018), 
IBP (2016), Lukoil (2018), Shell (2018), Sinopec (2018), Statoil (2018), Total (2018) and World Bank (2017, 2018). 
In 2007 and 2008 BP briefly took substantive action on the resource curse. It funded the 
Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource-Rich Economies, and it led a Regional 
Development Initiative across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, intended to promote good 
governance, among other objectives (BP 2008, 2009; Frynas 2010). These actions may have 
been influenced by Graham Baxter, BP’s Vice President for Social Responsibility from 2003 
to 2007, who was heavily involved with EITI (see EITI 2009) and publicly acknowledged that 
‘the curse of oil is a problem that BP recognises, and we have a part to play in helping our 
hosts deal with this wall of dollar-denominated cash coming into their fragile economies’ (The 
Economist 2005). Baxter left BP in late 2007, and BP ceased reporting substantive action on 
the resource curse after 2008 (BP 2018). 
Other oil companies have not shown even this much initiative, with BP’s actions in 
Azerbaijan described as exceptional (Frynas 2010). Apart from mentioning EITI, the Big-10’s 
most recent CSR reports only discuss actions to avoid direct involvement in corruption. 
Regarding EITI, it is worth noting that there are strong critiques of its effectiveness (ibid.; 
Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Mejía Acosta 2013), based on its narrow focus on revenue, and its 
few participants. In 2008 the World Bank briefly promoted an ‘EITI++’ initiative to broaden the 
scope of EITI to include government expenditure and extractives policies (Frynas 2010). 
However, that initiative has been discontinued, and the current version of EITI merely 
‘encourages’ disclosure of information on revenue management and expenditures (EITI 
2016). Perhaps of more relevance to this paper, EITI costs oil MNCs very little, applying only 
when the host government opts in and requires participation by all extractive companies – 
avoiding a repeat of BP’s Angola experience, mentioned above. 
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The overall lack of action by oil companies on the resource curse is consistent with a weak 
business case – the affected ‘bottom billion’ can’t reward them; many of their customers are 
likely unaware or unconcerned, and; some governments involved may even punish them. 
BP’s actions in 2007 and 2008 appear to be an exception that proves the rule, being so 
short-lived. 
3.3 Author’s experience 
To conclude this case study, the author offers two brief observations from an eleven-year 
international career with one of the Big-5 oil companies. Regarding climate change, the 
author helped lead a proposal to build a world-scale renewable fuels plant. The business 
case was evaluated against the company’s standard financial criteria for investment, and 
was eventually rejected due to uncertainty about government climate policy, on which the 
profits depended. Regarding the resource curse, the author never heard it discussed. 
4 Conclusion and implications 
This paper has argued from a cross-section of the academic literature on CSR that 
corporations primarily use CSR to pursue profit, which limits the social problems that CSR 
can solve. This conclusion applies only in aggregate to publicly owned for-profit corporations, 
and is intended as descriptive rather than critical. The recent CSR actions reported by major 
oil companies support the conclusion. These companies describe various actions to mitigate 
climate change, but all the actions appear economically justifiable, and the companies say 
that meaningful progress depends on government policy to make carbon reductions more 
profitable. The same oil companies report almost no action on resource curse effects, 
despite identifying them among their major potential impacts. This inaction is consistent with 
a weak business case. The author acknowledges that the case study evidence is superficial 
and circumstantial, relying on a subset of industry self-reporting by mostly developed-country 
MNCs, and inferring the rationale for corporate actions. More conclusive evidence would 
require thorough analyses of specific corporate activities (e.g. Woolfson and Beck 2016; 
Frynas 2009). Nonetheless, CSR’s profit-seeking limitations are apparent, and are important 
given the social problems and governance gaps wrought by globalisation. 
If corporations will not reliably enhance their social impacts voluntarily, a few general 
implications follow for improving social welfare. First, hopes for CSR should not be 
overstated, as this may divert attention from broader and more effective measures, such as 
those which enhance governance capacities (Frynas 2010). Second, where governance is 
currently capable of regulating business to enhance its impacts, this should be strongly 
considered over self-regulation (Vogel 2010). Third, research should more deeply examine 
the limits of CSR and opportunities to extend CSR’s potential where governance remains 
weak (Ruggie 2017; Abbott and Snidal 2009). This should include methods to increase the 
influence of stakeholders that are currently underrepresented in the business case (Banerjee 
2008). The complicated new problems of globalisation require clear discourse and thinking 
about the potential and limitations of solutions like CSR. 
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Annexe 1 Non-OECD/EU countries of operation for selected oil MNCs, and selected 
data 
Country GDP Oil company extractives presence EITI status Resource curse risk factors 
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capita, 
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Equatorial Guinea 8,333 
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X 
  
X 
 
DL DL - 27 10 
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NP NP - 70 12 
Yemen, Rep. 990 
   
X 
 
X 
    
DL DL 34 3 2 
(cont.) 
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Annexe 1 Non-OECD/EU countries of operation for selected oil MNCs, and selected 
data (continued) 
Country GDP Oil company extractives presence EITI status Resource curse risk factors 
Per 
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Darussalam 
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Key to Annexe 1: 
2016 EITI status 
NP Non-participant 
YA Yet to be assessed 
SP Satisfactory Progress 
MP Meaningful Progress 
IP Inadequate Progress 
WD Withdrawn 
DL Delisted 
 
2011 EITI status 
NP Non-participant 
CD Candidate 
CP Compliant 
SS Suspended 
WD Withdrawn 
DL Delisted 
Colour coding is as per EITI 
designation (EITI 2018). 
2015 Open Budget Index 
Extensive (81–100) 
Substantial (61–80) 
Limited (41–60) 
Minimal (21–40) 
Scant or None (0–20) 
Colour coding is as per 
International Budget Partnership 
designation (IBP 2016) 
World Governance Indicators 
90–100 
75–90 
50–75 
25–50 
10–25 
0–10 
Colour coding is as per World 
Bank designation (World Bank 
2018).
Sources for Annexe 1: Author’s own, based on data 
from: 
● GDP; Oil and Gas rents: World Bank (2017) 
● Oil company extractives presence: 
Sinopec (2018), CNPC (2018), Shell (2018), 
Exxon (2018), BP (2018), Total (2018), 
Chevron (2018), Lukoil (2018), Eni (2018), 
Statoil (2018) 
● EITI Status: EITI (2018) 
● Open Budget Index: IBP (2016) 
● World Governance Indicators: World Bank (2018) 
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Despite Massive Economic and Education 
Gains in India, Why Are So Few Women 
Working? 
Harparmjot Hans (Remy)  
1 Introduction 
Women in India have made significant progress on a few social indicators. In contrast to the 
progress made on few social measures, women’s participation in economic life has remained 
low. Participation in economic life is measured by labour force participation rate. As per the 
Fifth Annual Employment-Unemployment Survey (2015–16) conducted by the Labour 
Bureau, labour force includes those persons in the age group of 15 years and above 
engaged in employment (self-employed, unpaid family worker, regular salaried, wage 
employee, contract worker, casual wage labour) or who are seeking employment 
(Government of India 2016). Students, persons with disabilities, housewives, persons 
engaged in domestic duties, receivers of remittances, beggars, prostitutes, young children 
and elderly are not considered as part of the labour force (Government of India 2016). 
It is evident from Figure 1.1 that women’s involvement in the labour force in India has been 
declining, almost in close comparison to Pakistan and Arab countries. After Pakistan, India 
has one of the lowest labour participation rates among women in South Asia. The 
participation difference between men and women is extremely wide wherein, women’s 
participation rate stands at only 27 per cent as compared to 83 per cent for males (Prillaman 
et al. 2017). While the proportion of men’s involvement in economic activities increased 
between the period of 2004–05 and 2009–10, millions of women withdrew from the workforce 
(Andres et al. 2017). 
Figure 1.1 Female labour force participation rate, all ages, country comparison 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Andres et al. (2017). 
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traditionally male-dominated industries such as banking and aviation. At present, there are 
three women heading India’s leading banks namely, ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank and State Bank 
of India and, according to Minister of State for Civil Aviation, Jayant Sinha, India has the 
highest number of women pilots in the world. However, at a time when more women in India 
are seen flying aircrafts and leading banks, rapes, child marriages, domestic violence and 
honour killings, still continue. Outcomes for women will not improve through increase in 
social spending, women friendly laws or increase in number of women going to professional 
schools. To reduce gender-based inequalities, distributive justice is required (Jaquette 1990). 
Despite progress achieved at the macro-level, realities for women in major parts of the 
country is still grim. 
At a macro-level, evidence reveals that increase in women’s labour force participation rate 
contributes to economic growth (World Bank 2012). India’s persistent low levels of women 
participation in the economy, indicates the level of autonomy women experience in the 
society. While some development economists argue that rising wages and education access, 
increase in incomes of households and men, stigma associated with engaging in menial work 
among women, lack of appropriate employment opportunities for educated women are 
factors that discourage women to enter or continue in the labour force, others have also 
argued that social and cultural factors play an important role in keeping women out of the 
workforce (Mehrotra et al. 2014; Chaudhary and Verick 2014; Klasen and Pieters 2013). It is 
argued in this paper that social, cultural and institutional norms promote gender bias, 
hampering women’s economic and social movement. These norms still continue to play an 
important role in keeping over 70 per cent of the women out of the workforce. While factors 
such as rising wages, increase in incomes of male household members and girls’ access to 
education may have been responsible for keeping women away from taking up employment, 
social and cultural behaviours inevitably interact with those positive economic and social 
developments, leading to almost no changes in women’s participation outcomes. 
The implication of underutilising women’s education, skills and talents can have negative 
economic and social outcomes. But on the flip side, with a 90 per cent increase in female 
labour force participation rate, estimates suggest that India’s gross domestic product can 
increase up to 60 per cent by 2025 (McKinsey Global Institute 2015). How will India activate 
its women population is a fair question to ask Indian policymakers. Most importantly, it is the 
question of human dignity for all, across social and geographical dimensions: rich and poor, 
rural and urban, male and female (Nussbaum 1999). Despite numerous national and 
international efforts, women continue to face unequal treatment in employment, education 
and other areas because laws and social institutions work to maintain these gender 
inequalities (ibid.). India’s growth story without women is not only a missed opportunity, but 
also a fundamental right denied. 
In terms of the structure, this paper is mainly divided in three parts. The first part explores 
social and cultural norms impacting women’s participation. The second part shows the 
relationship between education and social norms responsible for withdrawing women from 
work. The third part highlights gender inequalities with respect to employment. 
2 Social and cultural norms exist, discouraging women to work 
Gender norms in India discourage many women to interact with the external world. (Field et al. 
2016). There is evidence that confirms this practice wherein, 52 per cent of adult women 
reported that the decision to be able to work lies with their husband (Field et al. 2016; 
Chaudhary and Verick 2014). In addition to women’s employment decisions managed by 
men, women’s mobility is also highly constrained. Eighty-five per cent of women need to take 
permission to travel alone for short distances by bus or train (Field et al. 2016). Furthermore, 
47 per cent of women are not permitted to travel on their own (ibid.). Research by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also highlights India’s 
low ranking on its Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), revealing the impact of social 
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institutions through laws, attitudes and practices on women’s rights (OECD n.d.). Apart from 
compelling statistics through surveys and academic research, daily Indian newspaper articles 
are filled with stories of rape and violence towards women in villages and its metropolitan 
cities. Therefore, it is not surprising that women are restricted in terms of their mobility 
because the most basic forms of gender inequality and bias are still prevalent in the Indian 
society. 
Despite India’s economic growth, social norms around women’s role in the economy have 
not incentivised women to participate in the labour force (World Bank 2012). As per gender 
norms, men are the sole economic providers for the family, while women are responsible for 
care work. Women working outside the confines of their homes is believed to be a low-status 
activity especially among married women (Eswaran et al. 2013). This worldview stems from 
an age-old caste system that still exists in India wherein the upper classes maintain caste 
norms restricting activities of women (Eswaran et al. 2013). Evidence shows that only 17 per 
cent (in 2009) married women in the age group 25–54 in urban India worked as compared to 
97 per cent married men (Klasen and Pieters 2013). Furthermore, 60 per cent of urban 
women with graduate degrees attended to domestic duties (Thomas 2012). Given that 80 per 
cent of urban women are not engaged in the workforce, reveals the social norms imposed on 
women. 
Women’s participation in rural India is also changing and slowly converging with the urban 
trend. Over the years, participation rates among rural women dropped significantly 
(especially since 2004–05) and number of rural women attending to domestic duties rose 
with increase in incomes of male members (Thomas 2012). In contrast, the unchanging 
urban statistics related to women and work (as shown in Figure 2.1), seem puzzling, as one 
would expect women living in urban areas to face less social constraints to be able to 
participate in the labour force (Chaudhary and Verick 2014 ). Research, however, shows that 
one third of women attending to domestic duties want to work (Field et al. 2016). Women are 
constrained from working because it is considered respectable for women to not engage in 
labour work, to discourage engagement with other men other than their husbands and 
restrict mobility outside their homes (Eswaran et al. 2013). This kind of practice is known to 
ensure ‘purity’ of women (Eswaran et al. 2013; Field et al. 2016), which reflects the 
pervasiveness and disparity in the application of social norms, impacting only women. 
Figure 2.1 Female labour force participation rates (ages 15 and above), rural and urban 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Andres et al. (2017) 
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‘Purity’ is enforced not only on married women, but also on single women. With the rise in 
call centres and back-offices for servicing multinationals, many women in urban areas joined 
the workforce. Even though single women are economically more active than married women 
in urban areas, single women cannot make economic decisions on their own (Panda 1999). 
It remains as a household decision (Chaudhary and Verick 2014). Factors such as women’s 
workload in the house and safety of women, among other reasons, are responsible in 
influencing their participation in the labour market (Sudarshan and Bhattacharya 2009). The 
concern about safety of women points us to the role women’s bodies play in constraining 
their physical mobility. In the South Asian context, family honour is determined by a woman’s 
‘purity’. With that context, employment in the case of India does not necessarily impact 
women’s wellbeing and position at home and society, as gender norms play an important 
role in determining power positions in and outside homes. Additionally, over time, marriage 
affects job prospects for most Indian women because the caregiver role takes up a lot of their 
time. While marriage ages have increased and fertility rates have declined, marriage still 
plays an important role and is one of the factors resulting in low number of women in the 
labour economy (World Bank 2012). 
3 Education matters – for marriages, not for jobs 
One of the goals of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was to ensure universal 
access to primary education. To act upon the global goals, the Government of India initiated 
an education programme called the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). The main aim of this 
programme was to increase primary school access mostly in rural areas. Major 
improvements in school infrastructure took place and almost every village in India now has a 
primary school within one kilometre. Furthermore, in 2010, the Right to Education (RTE) Act 
came into force making it mandatory for every child between 6 and 14 years of age to 
complete elementary school. Efforts were also made by central and state governments to 
bridge the gap between girls and boys through schemes such as national scheme for 
incentives to girls for secondary education (MHRD n.d.), provision of girls’ hostels for 
students of secondary and higher secondary schools, provision of bicycles-to-girls policy to 
improve attendance among girl children (in Bihar). As a result, enrolment ratios significantly 
improved (MHRD 2016) and as shown in Figure 3.1, literacy levels improved among working 
age females. 
Figure 3.1 Level of education of working age females in India 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Andres et al. (2017) 
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Owing to massive enrolments in education, women’s participation in the age group of 15–24 
years dropped considerably (Mehrotra et al. 2014). According to the U-shape pattern of the 
effect of education on labour force participation rate, with increasing levels of education, 
labour force participation declines in the initial stages, then rises among university graduate 
students getting absorbed in high paying white-collar jobs (Das et al. 2015). So, in this case, 
the declining trends of female labour participation due to the ‘education effect’ may not 
appear to be a negative trend. However, it comes with a caveat that is if education results 
into improved labour market returns over the years after completion of education. 
Despite increasing education attainment in rural areas, and educated urban women being in 
close proximity to job opportunities, the link between education and employment participation 
may be weak in the case of India. Interestingly, education among women in India is driven by 
expected marriage and children’s human capital returns than labour market returns (Klasen 
and Pieters 2013). There is supporting evidence, analysing data of marginal effects of 
education for years 1987 and 2009. According to the authors’ analysis, in 2009, secondary 
education was required at the minimum to be able to marry a well-educated and well-earning 
spouse. Conversely, in 1987, primary and middle school education was sufficient to be able 
to attract an educated and well-paid spouse (ibid.). Furthermore, educated women are seen 
to play an important role in building human capital of their children, therefore, raising demand 
for educated women (Behrman 1999). Women’s education is also seen as a contributing 
factor to the husband’s social status directly and through increased engagement of women in 
status production activities (Eswaran et al. 2013) such as ritual activities, assistance to 
children in schoolwork, family status politics in the community (Population Council 1988). 
The U-shape pattern theory suggests that at some point, labour force participation rates 
among women will increase among highly-educated women. They typically pursue careers 
that are financially and intellectually fulfilling (Eswaran et al. 2013). However, as indicated in 
Figure 2.1, women in urban areas participate very less and of those who work in urban 
areas, only 9.3 per cent are engaged in regular salaried jobs (Chaudhary and Verick 2014). 
Increasingly, more women appear to be seen in the banking and aviation industries, but it is 
still miniscule given India’s women population (almost half of the population). In fact, 
evidence from India shows that even though female leadership influences young girls’ 
dreams to work and study, it does not impact labour market opportunities for women 
(Beaman et al. 2012). Not only do social and cultural norms constrain women, market and 
institutional norms also affect women’s labour participation outcomes. Markets and 
institutions are designed in a way that promote inequalities between men and women (World 
Bank 2012). 
4 Less women work due to structural problems 
The labour market in India reflects gender biases and offers limited employment 
opportunities for women. Unfortunately, high economic growth has not resulted in better 
types of work for women. Occupational segregation plays an important role in restricting 
women in certain types of occupations and roles (ILO 2016). Segregation blocks women’s 
development in the economic sphere (Rees 1992) given that there is heavy reliance on 
women in the informal, agriculture sector and as temporary workers in the manufacturing 
sector in the case of India (Thomas 2012). This type of engagement of women traps women 
in low paid occupations and sectors, relative to men. Sectors with high employment 
opportunities such as telecommunications, banking, automotive, manufacturing and other 
sectors such as oil and gas, steel and minerals are dominated by men (CII 2017), while very 
few women are represented in high-quality jobs in India (Thomas 2012). Women were 
represented in only 20 per cent of the jobs in male dominated industries such as financing, 
real estate and business services (Thomas 2012). 
Furthermore, in major parts of India, women participate less (as shown in Table 4.1) and hold 
more tentative jobs as compared to men. The eastern, northern and northeastern regions in 
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particular have lesser women in the labour force as compared to western and southern 
regions (Neff et al. 2012). Northern states such as Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh with 
the exception of Himachal Pradesh, have the lowest labour force participation rates in the 
country. In comparison to some southern and western Indian states, Himachal Pradesh has 
in fact one of the highest work participation rates among women in the country (Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation 2014). But, the pace of growth in terms of 
women’s economic involvement is comparatively slower than men’s, as evidence suggests. 
Participation rates among women in the state increased by only one percentage point 
between 2001 and 2011, whereas it increased by four percentage points for men between 
the same period (Government of Himachal Pradesh 2014 ). Additionally, statistics reveal that 
more women tend to be engaged in marginal types of work. For instance, almost 60 per cent 
of women were employed as marginal workers, while the remaining worked as main workers 
(ibid.). Unsurprisingly, men in the state are mostly employed as main workers (ibid.). 
Table 4.1 Female labour force participation rate by region, 2009–10 
Region In the labour force Not in the labour force 
North 40.1 59.9 
Northeast 30.4 69.6 
East 21.3 78.7 
West 52.5 47.5 
South 54.6 45.4 
Total 39.9 60.1 
Source: Neff, Sen and Kling (2012). 
By taking a closer look at one of the better performing states, one would expect an 
encouraging trend, however, the story of women’s involvement is still discouraging. Similarly, 
even though southern and western regions are comparatively better off than other regions, it 
only has slightly over 50 per cent of its women in the labour force. Due to lack of 
homogeneity in the social, cultural and economic aspects of women’s lives in these states, it 
is hard to generalise. For instance, restricted freedom in the economic sphere can co-exist 
with upper caste and higher levels of education, while a free status can co-exist with no level 
of education and lower caste (Kasturi 1996). The fact remains – a vast majority of women in 
India are denied choice and independence (ibid.). 
Differences in wages between men and women may be connected with low economic 
participation rates among women. While the wage gap in the informal sector may not appear 
to be wide, there is an almost 25 per cent difference in the formal sector wages between men 
and women. Women earn INR 481, while men earn INR 632 in the formal sector. In the 
informal sector, women earn INR 120, while men earn INR 194 (Das et al. 2015). However, 
wage gap is a global phenomenon, a phenomenon not only limited to India. Even though 
wage gaps exist globally; participation, however, is higher among women of neighbouring 
countries such as China and Bangladesh (as seen in Figure 1.1). Low participation of women 
is also reflected in formal organisations where a gender ratio of 71 males to 29 females is 
observed (CII 2017). Furthermore, some reasons associated with occupational gender gaps 
include differences in men and women’s preferences of organisations, education choices, 
salary negotiation abilities and breaks in employment (ibid.). Motherhood brings further 
disadvantage and discrimination towards women for reduced or flexible working hours for 
childbirth, childcare and family responsibilities. As a result, some women leave the 
workforce. There are not enough industries, initiatives or firms; except a few such as 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) and firms such as Belcorp and Hindustan Unilever (World 
Bank 2012) making efforts to promote women’s employment. Such efforts are not enough to 
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combat social norms around gender in the economic sphere. Existing structures need to be 
re-examined to meaningfully work towards the process of women advancement, rather than 
trying to integrate women into existing structures (Kasturi 1996). 
Women’s role and contributions may not be represented officially, but they do also work. On 
the other side of low economic participation rates among women, it is observed that the 
proportion of women engaged in household work is high across rural and urban areas as 
they continue to shoulder the burden of care work. The proportion of women attending to 
domestic duties increased over the years in both, rural and urban areas. It increased from 
29 per cent to 38 per cent between 1993–94 and 2009–10 in rural areas (Thomas 2012). 
Similarly, it also increased in urban areas from 42 per cent to 47 per cent during the same 
period (ibid.). In absolute numbers, 216 million women in 2009–10 attended to domestic 
duties (Ramaswamy 2015). According to Beneria and Sen, women will not be able to 
advance if the responsibility for ‘reproduction of the family’ is not recognised or shared with 
men (Jaquette 1990). Much of the care work such as childcare, elderly care, cooking, 
cleaning is unpaid and unrecognised. Society and national statistics fail to recognise their 
contribution (Thomas 2012) as persons attending to domestic duties are not considered part 
of the labour force. According to a leading Indian economist, Jayati Ghosh, if unpaid care 
work were recognised officially, the picture of women participation may change. I say the 
picture may definitely emerge different, but it does not change women’s desire for increased 
economic and social autonomy as over a third of women in urban India and half in rural 
areas who are engaged in domestic duties want a paid job (Field et al. 2016). 
5 Conclusion 
Women comprise almost half of the population and not being able to link them with the larger 
economic and social development agenda is a huge waste of human capital potential. My 
emphasis throughout this paper has been on highlighting inequalities towards women in and 
outside their homes, resulting in low women work participation rates. It reflects the 
persistence of patriarchal attitudes towards women in rural and urban areas, restricting 
women’s economic and social mobility. The nature of patriarchy has evolved over the years, 
where women initially were excluded from public life to women being segregated (Rees 
1992) in certain types of occupations and pay. While India’s economic journey has excluded 
women so far, women would need to play a vital part in facilitating wider economic and social 
growth, if India is to sustain its development. Nevertheless, the story of women’s 
engagement in India is not a simple story. There are many women who have worked and are 
working to change the status quo. It is important to note that some success stories of women 
have come to being as a result of globalisation and economic development. However, 
according to Boserup, modernisation does not simply improve women’s rights and status 
(Jaquette 1990). The matter of fact is patriarchy has modernised itself (ibid.). 
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Challenging Conceptual Approaches to 
Power through Spirituality  
Ian Lee 
Power without love is reckless and abusive, and love without power is sentimental and 
anaemic. Power at its best is love implementing the demands of justice, and justice at its 
best is power correcting everything that stands against love. 
(Martin Luther King Jr.) 
Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are 
ravening wolves. 
(Gospel of Matthew 7:15, King James Version) 
I will discuss the Ladder of Citizen Participation (LCP), Power Cube (PC) and Jo Rowland’s 
Questioning Empowerment with two case studies involving experiences of relations between 
the marginalised and the state where false ‘profits’ of state and business collude to use the 
law to exercise power over people and their environment, forcing consent. One is Nazaré in 
the Brazilian Amazon, on the Rio Madeira, where inner power escapes out of the flora of 
Amazonian backwaters into global fora, such as COP23. Another is about macabre tree 
chainsaw-massacre power in Sheffield, England. 
I will examine aspects of feminist cosmology presented by Jo Rowlands, emphasising the 
‘within’ end of the PC spectrum, as an antidote to ‘invisible power’, with attention to symbolic 
power. I will highlight psycho-spiritual blind areas around Power Cube and explore concepts 
from eastern metaphysics and feminism that might resolve philosophical dilemmas around 
‘change’ and ‘participation’. Success, here, would mean illustrating strengths and 
weaknesses of each framework adequately in relation to the case studies, and acceptance 
by the reader of my proposals for filling gaps as interesting or plausible. 
In 2014, floods upriver from the 2012 Santo Antonio dam impacted 75,000 people, 
approximately 500 ‘riverside’ people, killing 2,500 livestock, causing over US$180m damage. 
Most families lost their houses, 12 people committed suicide, many more suffering 
depression. According to the community, the Brazilian state had not ensured their right to 
proper free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) and committed overt ‘violations of human 
rights and commitments to sustainable development’ (McGee 2000). Energy companies 
make astronomical profits while Brazilians pay one of the highest electricity prices in the 
world. 
No compensation came from the dam. MAB (a movement for dam victims) still seeks 
compensation. Teachers from the settlement who survived took their school folk classes to 
the city to become a commercial success and led a revival of the semi-religious ‘Boi 
Curumim’ festival in which the whole of Nazaré takes part, attracting crowds from the city, 
lifting self-esteem in their identity as ‘riberinhos’. 
During my degree, I won an OBSEA social entrepreneurial award to research ethno-tourism 
for these dam victims. Santander bank was corporate sponsor, who I discovered was the 
leading financier of the dam project. I arrived in Nazaré with the Brazilian NGO NAPRA in 
September 2016 to work on various community income-generation projects. 
Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein 1969) explores participation and power. 
The Nazaré community experience ‘manipulation’ by ‘ravening wolves’. LCP is appropriate 
as they do aspire to participation (starting with FPIC) and multi-scalar power-sharing (‘citizen 
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control’). The ladder diagram offers hope, hooking the interest of the less literate. It is less 
apt where citizens might only want to be consulted, not involved in power. Powerlessness 
situates them on the bottom rungs. 
The consultation process did happen according to government and dam powerholders, in 
reality more like the ‘distortion of participation into a public relations vehicle by power holders’ 
(Arnstein 1969: 218). A ‘consultation campaign’, ‘Eu Quero’ (I want [it]), was followed by 
television dam-spin adverts. The Nazaré population needed the rung of ‘therapy’ to cure of 
their ‘uneducated’ belief that building a 50-foot high wall across their river could not be a 
good thing. Putting words into their mouths shows insidious ‘tokenism’. LCP seems to 
explain power thus far. 
For city dwellers, aiding and abetting dam powerholders, riverside settlements are a place to 
move from not to, joining in ‘polite hand claps’ when participation is ‘advocated by have-nots’. 
In the climate of the present government of Brazil, exactly as LCP says, ‘redistribution of 
power… explodes into many shades of outright racial, ethnic, ideological and political 
opposition’ (ibid.: 216). 
It serves well in cases of the triple whammy of marginalisation, race and gender 
discrimination developed in the context of institutional marginalisation versus the ‘American 
consensus’ (ibid.: 216). Temer’s government is exerting more than downward pressure on 
the marginalised on the ladder – attempting to remove the higher rungs before the oppressed 
reach them. 
Freirian NGO NAPRA build capacity in this community, giving a repertoire with which to 
negotiate with powerholders. The community, in this continuum, experienced ‘therapy’ and 
‘placation’. Riverine Fishermen in 2016 were offered one year’s funding for a fish farm. They 
were too untrusting of the dam to accept, too used to the frames empty rituals and empty 
promises that LCP describes. 
In Sheffield, ‘Europe’s greenest city’, where I also lived, 6,000 trees are threatened to 
prevent pavements cracking. George Monbiot (2017) writes of citizen non-participation in the 
decision by the Council in also in 2012, to lock the city into a 25-year contract of street 
maintenance with the multinational Ferrovial without public consultation because ‘the issue is 
too big and too contentious for a public consultation to handle’, ‘protected from challenge by 
commercial confidentiality, property rights and civil law’. Citizens protesting are now in 
contempt of court, facing imprisonment. 
The LCP tool, despite inbuilt intersectionality seems not to suit non-minorities who are not 
easily deceived. The marginalised here are affluent educated citizens. The Power Cube 
conceptual framework accounts better for complexity and globalisation, beyond ‘zero-sum’ 
concepts of ‘nobody’ trying to become a ‘somebody’, more situating in the bigger picture: 
‘The [neoliberal] system, protected from challenge by commercial confidentiality, property 
rights and civil law, places it beyond the reach of democracy’ (Monbiot 2017). 
PC’s three-dimensional symbolic sophistication, in contrast to the fixed vertical framework of 
LCP, takes us on a journey through ‘levels, spaces, forms and evolutions of power’ to 
analyse power mechanisms (Gaventa 2011: 8). Unlike LCP it has the potential to map the 
progression across all the interrelated and interacting dimensions – analysis as the basis for 
social action. 
According to PC, ‘any sustained and effective change strategy must build and sustain 
effective change across the full continuum… working across each of the dimensions 
simultaneously’. Hence one-dimensional concepts of power do not help where power is a 
contradictory slippery global fish (Gaventa n.d.). PC effectively tracks power across 
dimensions. It recommends starting with ‘forms of power’ to diagnose participation.  
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We check the box of ‘hidden power’ for Brazil to get going. Powercube.net gives definitions, 
examples and interaction of dimensions to apply. What are PC’s implications here? Trying 
macro analysis, we see ‘Brazil’s government was run like a cartel for years, with political 
parties selling favours, votes...’ (The Guardian 2017). From local to international levels, we 
understand how government colludes with big business in Sheffield and Nazaré acting 
across levels, an interplay of ‘hidden’ and ‘visible’ power. At the supra-national level, COP21 
failed to file dams under ‘dirty energy’. Invisible power expresses in England with Santander 
selling itself as a champion of justice, as a visible sponsor; Sheffield Council visibly 
championing ‘progress’ with its ‘Streets Ahead’ tree clearance, while deciding agendas with 
corporations behind closed doors. Government and business in both examples, express 
power ‘within’ negatively as superiority and intransigence. Power ‘with’ as entrenched power 
and imposed policy. NAPRA is careful to include power gatekeepers in the local communities 
where it works, not bypassing them to other levels, to avoid power imbalance. Riverines’ new 
power ‘within’ shifted them from ‘invisible’ acquiescence in stigma. The PC lens highlights 
potential tensions easily – of political, gender, racial discourses and more. The ‘dynamic tool’ 
of PC offers strategies for change too: ‘organising around common concerns… clout through 
numbers… strengthening coalitions… use alternative media… exposing true agendas… 
dominating public debate’ (Gaventa 2018). 
Nazaré considered travelling to ‘invited’ space at COP23, and are networking now, mobile 
across levels, with other traditional communities. Sheffield activists wearing fancy dress 
block a felling contractor, ‘claiming’ space at a council depot to get round a court injunction. 
But PC doesn’t explain how, when the oppressed gain power, they sometimes become 
oppressors. ‘Change’, so cherished in development and politics, can mean constant swinging 
between binary opposites within the status quo (Labour–Conservative/PT–
PMDB/democracy–dictatorship/happy–sad). Rowlands is also sceptical. Power to dominate 
‘can be bestowed by one person on another… it can just as easily be withdrawn; 
empowerment as a gift does not involve a structural change in power relations’ (Rowlands 
and Oxfam 1997: 12). 
Eastern mysticism resolves this gap by defining a point of balance in the ‘three gunas’. 
Swinging between ‘rajas’ (mobility, change) and ‘tamas’ (inertia/unwholesomeness) is a 
game of thrones that finds resolution by the achievement of ‘sattva’ (harmonious 
response/homeostasis). The Martin Luther King Jr. quote illustrates this trinity. ‘Good’ is not 
essentially good if it turns ‘bad’. Change, for Eastern philosophy, is an experience through 
which to find the ‘real’, stabilising it with the power of being. Strategies for change 
emphasising doing are therefore questionable. Playing the change game under the ‘invisible’ 
spell of growth fetishism is ‘tamas’ for the environment (Bailey 1960: 4). 
International development at worst is a pro-growth binary swinger: ‘development-as-
Westernisation’ (Rowlands 1997: 11). Both case studies show abuse by ‘developers’. 
‘Sustainability’, with growth enshrined in the SDGs, promises more of the same. 
John Gaventa pays attention to belief systems but does not attempt to intervene. Spirituality 
and religion is outside the discourse, not exemplified in PC analysis despite exerting power 
with more than half the world’s population. In Nazaré religion is a hot topic. Could a belief 
that religion is ‘opium’ by IDS founders exert hidden power over methodology, for example? I 
question PC’s claim to cognise the whole ‘continuum’ (Gaventa 2011: 54). 
In Questioning Empowerment, Jo Rowland, a feminist at the spiritual end of PC, considers 
the ‘CariWheel’ (Rowlands 1997: 21) developed by women questioning empowerment with 
Jennifer Harold. ‘Being’ is at the centre with integrated spirituality/sexuality. It maps the 
potential to break ‘invisible’ power affecting identity and self-worth, promising release from 
the slavery of power structures (situated at the periphery). ‘Love’ power is present in the 
wheel too. Rowlands proposes research to clarify the empowering potential of spirituality, 
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adding a footnote to the World Bank Spiritual Unfoldment Society Conference of 1996 
showing ‘Bank staff now has permission… to bring their hearts, as well as their minds, to 
work. The supremacy of the intellect is being challenged in the World Bank’ (Barrett 1998, 
cited in Rowland 1997: 21). 
Rowlands questions power tied with heartless male economics (Rowlands 1997: 23). 
Challenging colonialism and patriarchy by awakening to deeper love, resonates with both 
case studies: having in common the expressed love for their natural world. CariWheel has 
ontological power, its authors may not be academics but that does not mean they are less 
right, expressing themselves symbolically. Nazaré’s teachers spent long years working from 
their spiritual centre, building power ‘with’ relations in their community. With love and 
tolerance they overcame the evangelist boycott of the ‘superstitious’ yearly festival to be 
inclusive of all (Kozan 2016). They became commercially successful regionally and 
nationally, making riverines proud of their identity, until then a derogatory term. Their songs 
celebrate identity and love of environment. During the floods, their culture and root spirituality 
held most of them together. Power ‘within’ translated into power ‘to’ and ‘with’ – opening up 
multi-scalar relations. 
‘CariWheel’ is about Honduran women but explains Nazare’s renaissance better than PC. 
Energies of spirituality and sexuality in dense colour are at the centre are suggestive of a 
radiating sun. The ‘context of Caribbean women’s oppression’ in faded grey at the periphery 
suggests clouds that the sun can dissipate. It inspires women to ‘control resources, 
determine agendas and make decisions’ (Rowlands 1997: 21). Spiritual power can 
disintegrate permanent, intractable power structures with collective focus in their essential 
nature. The sun (psycho-spiritual reality) was there all the time, behind the illusory cloud 
formations of distorted power systems and generational complexes. In Sheffield, collective 
spirituality like Occupy could mobilise sufficient support to stop the chop. Adam Bucko, an 
Occupy activist, says in his book Occupy Spirituality: ‘This marriage of contemplation and 
action, mysticism and prophecy, is greatly needed in our time’ (Bucko 2013: 11). 
Power Cube, like psychoanalysis, can help one become acutely aware of one’s problems, 
unable to do anything about it. Sheffield’s aware tree champions are just as impotent as 
oppressed minorities. I argue that until we radically institutionalise ‘power-within’ in 
education, and politics, power can never be stabilised (‘sattva’) in the hands of the just. 
Social science overlooks simple transforming qualities such as love and goodwill, antidotes 
for the collective ‘unthinking emotional mess’ (Bailey 1950: 20). Psychology and depth 
psychology is a gap in development thinking. Even the World Bank is using the L word now. 
I have challenged the use of ‘politically expedient’ ‘fuzz’ words (Cornwall et al. 2005: iii) of 
‘change’ and ‘participation’, suffering from overuse and abuse. ‘Participation’ sits well within a 
framework of ‘sharing and caring’, safeguarding us from the ‘participation of wolves’, on 
feminist lines. Sharing, like caring, works with intangibles as well as tangibles and has inbuilt 
ethics: ‘care implies attention, concern, compassion, surrender…’ (Martín 2008: 31). 
Sharing connotes redistribution of resources, not the drive for more. It has no history in 
development that I know of, and is simple enough for a two-year-old to understand. ‘Sharing 
is not an ideological construct or ‘ism’ that is accompanied by a specific set of policies or 
procedures’ (Share the World’s Resources 2013). 
The North lives ‘far too high from the standpoint of possessions and far too low from the 
angle of the spiritual values’ (Bailey 1944: 18). More spiritual frameworks highlight the need 
to learn to live on less, redistribute wealth, and reduce economic ‘doing’. ‘Sharing’ is more 
challenging for the so-called ‘elite’ than ‘participation’ in its implications for justice, with its 
implications of power-sharing. Integrating the power of the East and South with the ethics of 
‘sharing and caring’ could institutionalise ‘power motivated by love’ in place of the love of 
power to heal the marginalised. 
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I have shown some of the virtues of power analysis frameworks amid the complexities, 
contradictions and confusion prevalent in our case studies. Of the strategies presented, I 
have shown a strong bias toward inner power as a strategy forward in the face of intractable 
conflicts in the world, which no ethical system, religion or science has yet solved. My critique 
of participation’s tyrannical potential is not original. One psychological implication of a ‘within’ 
approach is to question ‘motivation’, ensuring right use of power and that the insights gained 
from power frameworks are used for the common good. Scientific thinking is gradually 
integrating with Eastern thought with spirituality arguably moving from East (and South) to 
West, while the personality of the West moves ever East and South. Religion is a taboo 
subject for mainstreaming, which is not surprising as religious conflict is arguably the world’s 
most difficult problem to solve, although not perhaps the world’s most serious problem. 
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Two Forms of Indigenous Autonomy in 
Mexico 
Diego Orozco Fernández 
1 Introduction 
The uprising of the Zapatista movement in 1994 was a breakpoint for the indigenous 
communities in Mexico. It attracted the state’s attention as no other indigenous movement 
has done it in the last decades. It represented a clear and strong claim for the collective and 
individual rights that had been neglected to the indigenous people and to their recognition of 
self-determination and autonomy. Almost one year after the rebellion, the Zapatistas 
launched their own autonomous municipalities. Nevertheless, over 20 years after, it is hard to 
see substantial improvement in social development of these communities (Estrada 2007, 
2009; Merino et al. 2014; Rico 2013). 
More recently, in 2011, the indigenous community of Cherán in western Mexico was 
recognised as autonomous by the federal government. Unlike the Zapatistas communities, 
Cherán indigenous authorities maintain channels of cooperation with the state. It is too soon 
to assess the outcomes of this cooperation, but there are signs of progress in some social 
and productive programmes that could improve social development within the community. 
This paper goes beyond acknowledging the right of autonomy that the indigenous 
communities have. Instead, its purpose is to analyse and contrast two forms of indigenous 
autonomy. One in which there is a clear cleavage between the communities and the state, 
and the other in which they find ways of cooperation. It aims to answer if a form of autonomy 
that includes cooperation with the state could lead to social development and break the 
systematic development dependence that has been imposed until now to the indigenous 
people across Mexico. 
It is pertinent to make this analysis now that we are learning from two ongoing cases of 
indigenous autonomy in Mexico. In addition, we see better organised efforts advocating for 
the indigenous rights (Sierra 2005), and the international picture has changed during the past 
decade in which some Latin American countries responded for indigenous justice from a new 
perspective of plurinationalism. 
In the first section I will frame my analysis using the literature of plurinationalism, 
contextualising social development for indigenous peoples in Mexico and analysing the 
impact that local governance can have at the national level. In the second section I explain 
what the indigenous people are demanding in relation to their autonomy. Then, I examine the 
case of the Zapatistas self-declared autonomous communities and the case of the officially 
recognised autonomous community of Cherán. On the third section I make some final 
remarks related to the two different forms of autonomy and the implications that each one of 
them can have in the social development for the indigenous people in Mexico. 
2 Plurinationalism, indigenous social development and the implication of 
local governance at the national level 
2.1 How states are dealing with indigenous autonomy? 
Countries like Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and New Zealand consider themselves as 
plurinational states. This mean that they recognise the coexistence of two or more groups 
within the same polity (Keating 2001). According to Santos and Exeni (2012), the recognition 
of the existence and justice of the indigenous peoples is acquiring a new political meaning 
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from this perspective of plurinationalism. It is not only looking for the recognition of cultural 
diversity, but to conceiving indigenous justice as an important part of a political project from a 
decolonising and anti-capitalist vocation. A second independence that finally breaks the 
Eurocentric links that have determined the development of these people. 
In Latin America this change of perspective is more recent. For instance, constitutional 
reforms in the early 1990s in Colombia, led to significant changes in the relationship between 
indigenous peoples and the state (Van Cott 2002). Other important transformations were 
carried through in countries like Bolivia and Ecuador during the last decade. The core of 
these reforms is based in the recognition of the rights and self-determination and autonomy 
of the indigenous people (Santos and Exeni 2012; Sierra 2005). 
Pro-indigenous reforms are also part of the new legal system that is promoted within the 
international arena. Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank are promoting human 
rights and identity policies. However, some scholars have pointed out that the reforms 
recognising cultural diversity and multi-ethnicity are closely linked to globalisation and 
neoliberal economic policies (Sierra 2005) which paradoxically have an adverse effect to 
vulnerable groups like the indigenous peoples. Such is the case of Mexico, where the 
implementation of pro-indigenous reforms has been limited and highly questionable (Sierra 
2005; Van der Haar 2004). 
2.2 Social development of the indigenous peoples of Mexico 
For the purpose of this paper I see social development as an ultimate objective for the 
indigenous communities. Certainly, autonomy could be a means to improve social 
development, but in the same way some forms of autonomy could create more obstacles. 
Thus, it is important to analyse the impact that some forms of autonomy have had in the 
social development of the indigenous communities and possibly readjust the advocacy 
strategy. 
Social development of the indigenous in Mexico is discouraging. Being an indigenous 
represents a clear disadvantage to access social rights and economic wellbeing. A report of 
The National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL 2014) 
provides some clear evidence: at the end of 2014, 73.2 per cent of the indigenous population 
was living in poverty, and 38 per cent in extreme poverty. This latter percentage is four times 
higher compared to the non-indigenous population. CONEVAL reported that one fifth of the 
Mexican population is considered as non-poor or not vulnerable to become poor. For the 
indigenous this wellbeing indicator is only 3.5 per cent, which means that 96.5 per cent of 
them are either poor because their income is not enough to cover basic needs as food, or 
because they are vulnerable by the lack of any public services as water, education, 
electricity, health, or housing. Closing the poverty and vulnerability gaps between the 
indigenous and non-indigenous populations in Mexico will be a sign of social development 
improvement. 
2.3 Local governance and its impact at the national level 
More autonomy in local communities can lead to more isolation from the state and national 
government. It also gives incentives to stay home from state and national-level elections. 
This could create less incentives for state and national politicians who are providers of 
revenue, services, tools, experience (Fox and Aranda 1996). We can see this as a paradox 
in which the more autonomy, the less participation in the higher political sphere, the less 
influence and support from the state for rights recognition and public services, which can 
lead to perpetuation of the development dependence from the central government or other 
non-state actors as NGOs or international aid (Hiskey and Goodman 2011). 
While in Mexico the central government and the legislative power play a strong role in 
policymaking, and the states are gaining more fiscal power, autonomous communities may 
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lose their power of voice if they are isolated from state institutions. A study of Hiskey and 
Bowler (2005) suggest that local context governance have far-reaching consequences at the 
national level. Put in a different way, an autonomous community that fits well at the national 
level could have higher benefits than one that is secluded from national level politics. 
3 Two forms of indigenous autonomy 
3.1 The demands of the indigenous people and the response from the government 
To explain what the indigenous people’s claims are, I will use the demands made by the 
Zapatista movement as it has been the most powerful voice of the indigenous groups and 
they have been adopted by other groups. Although, this does not mean that there are no 
other indigenous groups across the territory that may have different demands. 
The Zapatistas have two main demands. The first is the legal recognition of their rights and 
cultures. This demand has a connotation of inclusion through participatory democracy and 
accountable governance. It is based on their aim to be respected as full Mexican citizens; ‘to 
be included in a democratic state rather than to secede from it’ (Fox 2000: 201). 
The second demand is the implementation of autonomy. That is, a degree of self-
government within a national framework, that involves political, administrative and juridical 
decentralisation without secession (Esteva and Pérez 2001; Van der Haar 2004). It draws on 
the right to self-determination as defined in the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples, ratified by Mexico. 
Even that the Zapatista’s demands expressly looked for greater inclusion and participation, 
the Government of Mexico argued that the proposed agreements could lead to the 
‘Balkanization’ of Mexico and to legal spheres of exception and refused to translate them into 
laws. Since the late 1990s the negotiations are suspended. 
3.2 Self-declared Zapatistas autonomous municipalities 
After the negotiations between the Zapatistas and the state failed in terms of legal 
recognition, the Zapatistas moved to the terrain of practice. In 1994 they created self-
governance structures based on their traditional forms of organisation and launched 38 
autonomous communities.1 These structures are ‘spaces in which the Zapatistas seek to 
construct more effective and legitimated government, as much as they are spaces of 
resistance’ (Van der Haar 2004: 103). As one autonomous community leader put it: ‘the main 
goal is to show the government that with or without resources [from the state] we can 
promote sustainable development’ (Rodriguez-Castillo, cited in Fox 2007: 552). 
But, is it possible to improve sustainable development with a profound cleavage with the 
state? To answer this question, we must look closer to this form of autonomy and the 
progress they have had in more than two decades. 
The autonomous communities comprise institutions for the administration of justice, 
maintenance of order, civil registry and services such as health, education, land tenure and 
local and economic development. Most of the people working in these institutions receive no 
compensation. The system is sustained on local resources from collective enterprises and 
outside help from national and international NGOs (Van der Haar 2004). Local resources are 
not enough to invest in large projects, such as infrastructure. International donations are also 
not enough and may not be sustainable as the government can impose restrictions and 
control to the flow of resources at any time. Moreover, the autonomous communities operate 
parallel to the government official municipalities, overlapping and competing between each 
                                               
1 In 2003, they added a higher layer of governance called Juntas de Buen Gobierno. 
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other. This has led to frictions and a continuous uncomfortable co-existence of governance 
(Van der Haar and Heijke 2013). For instance, there is often uncertainty of who is 
responsible for what in issues that transcend Zapatistas communities, like roads and water, 
or in villages formed also by non-Zapatistas communities. 
This form of autonomy has been criticised for being isolated and secluded (Estrada and 
Viqueira 2010). The main argument is that the self-sufficiency of the Zapatista communities 
is not realistic and perpetuates poverty (Estrada 2007, 2014; Estrada and Viqueira 2010; 
Rico 2013). In this light, the critics agree that the opportunities to improve their precarious 
economic situation are limited by the few resources they have access to (Estrada 2007, 
2009; Rico 2013; Van der Haar and Heijke 2013). 
The Zapatistas declare that their governance system is highly inclusive, participative and 
democratic. There are surveillance institutions and any government worker can be dismissed 
in case of misconduct. One of their mottos is Mandar obedeciendo, which means ‘lead by 
obeying’. So, we can infer that they are accountable to all the community. However, this 
system of governance and its mechanisms have been out of sight from the non-Zapatistas 
and there are claims that it is authoritarian (Estrada 2009). 
Villafuerte (2009) states that meagre economic development and marginalisation remain in 
the Zapatista region despite the mobilisation of resources originated by the uprising. 
Moreover, Rico (2013) says that poverty increased an average of 9.2 per cent in three of the 
municipalities where the Zapatista communities are. However, this cannot be simply 
attributable to the self-governance of the Zapatistas as the municipalities in which the 
Zapatistas communities are also comprised by non-Zapatistas population. So, these poverty 
indicators lack methodologic rigour. In response, a study made by Merino et al. (2014), 
compared Zapatistas autonomous communities with neighbour non-Zapatistas communities 
that in the 1990s had a similar set of sociodemographic indicators,2 including the proportion 
of Zapatistas and non-Zapatistas populations, to find out if 20 years after the uprising of the 
Zapatistas there has been any improvement in their social development. 
In sum, they found that there is no substantial improvement in social development in the 
Zapatistas communities. Both types of communities still lag in social development compared 
to the national medium. However, there are some slight differences that provide interesting 
information that contributes to formulate some hypothesis. 
The economic indicators show that, public investment has increased in both communities, 
although 11 per cent more in the Zapatistas communities. Net per capita income grew at the 
same pace in both communities, but it was already higher in the Zapatista communities in 
1995, so the gap proportion has not changed. 
Regarding social indicators, the Zapatistas communities are 2.5 per cent behind than the 
non-Zapatistas in literacy rates, and education level is practically the same. In infant mortality 
rates, the Zapatista communities are doing better, even though the rate increased 68 per 
cent from 1995 to 2010, while in the non-Zapatistas it was reduced 37 per cent. 
The infrastructure indicators show that the Zapatistas communities are considerably behind. 
60 per cent of the Zapatistas households do not have drainage systems compared to 25 per 
cent of non-Zapatistas households. And, the proportion of households with no electricity 
service is 3 per cent higher for the Zapatistas households. 
We can conclude there is no substantial difference between the Zapatistas autonomous 
communities and the non-Zapatistas communities. Moreover, the slight differences suggest 
                                               
2 Geographic location, proportion of indigenous population, income, and level of education and marginalisation. 
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that the lack of infrastructure and the isolation from public policies may be holding back the 
social development of the Zapatistas. 
Lastly, van der Haar (2004: 106) points that the whole strategy of autonomy is difficult and 
costly to the indigenous people. They ‘not only carry a heavy burden in sustaining with their 
effort and resources, the autonomous structures, but also face a constant threat of 
harassment from opponents of Zapatismo’. 
3.3 The case of Cherán 
In April 2011, after years of being affected by the organised crime, the people of Cherán, a 
community in the state of Michoacán comprised mainly by Purépecha indigenous people, 
confronted the delinquents who were accomplices with the local authorities and took control 
of the village. They expelled the municipal authorities and eventually established an 
organisational structure composed by a Major Council and eight other councils such as civil 
affairs, social, economic and cultural programmes, justice procurement, and administration, 
among others (Gobierno Comunal de Cherán K’eri 2015–2018, 2017). As part of their new 
organisation, they decided to exercise their right of self-determination and self-governance. 
The Government of Michoacán tried to stop the movement in Cherán, but the indigenous 
community started a legal battle at the national level which they progressively won. First, in 
November 2011 through a resolution of the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Power of the 
Federation which gave them the right to appoint their own authorities through their traditional 
system. Then, three years later through a resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice of the 
Nation that recognised Cherán as an autonomous indigenous municipality and established 
that Cherán must be consulted by the Michoacán government on all legislative and 
administrative matters that interest or affect them as a community. Also, Cheran’s traditional 
electoral system was incorporated to the state’s electoral law (González-Hernández and 
Zertuche-Cobos 2016). 
The Government of Michoacán and the political parties have been trying to restore the 
regular elections system, but the federal resolutions have held them back. Moreover, as part 
of their form of autonomy Cherán maintained channels of cooperation with the federal 
government and some state agencies. For instance, the National Forest Commission, the 
federal agency for the conservation and sustainable forestry is providing resources and 
assistance to reforest the forests affected by the illegal logging. Likewise, the National 
Indigenous Council is funding projects such as restaurants run by the wives of men 
assassinated by organised crime (Pérez 2018). 
The annual governance report issued by the autonomous Government of Cherán (Gobierno 
Comunal de Cherán K’eri 2015–2018, 2017) shows more examples of this cooperation. 
Federal and state social assistance programmes, like the cash transfer programme 
Prospera, subsidies for housing improvements, and economic support for older people, are 
active in Cherán. In matter of financial resources, the autonomous government is allowed to 
collect local taxes and obtain revenue from the provision of public services, issuing 
commercial permits, fines and other activities. Cherán also receives transfers from the 
federal and state governments that correspond to the municipality by law. 
National and state ministries such as the Secretary of Communications and Transport and 
the Secretary of Health are providing funds for public infrastructure like road pavement, 
sewage and hospitals. The Council of Civil Affairs organises health awareness and service 
campaigns in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. Also, there is collaboration with the 
national agency in charge of doing socioeconomic diagnosis. Furthermore, the Major Council 
publishes a three-year development plan for their term time that includes goals and 
strategies for social development. 
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Within the autonomous government there are well-defined accountability rules and spaces. 
The Major Council is accountable to the General Assembly which is composed of all the 
inhabitants of Cherán (González-Hernández and Zertuche-Cobos 2016). Still, it runs a 
website3 under the official domain of Mexico’s government containing information as details 
and responsibilities of the Major Council and the eight councils, the legal framework under 
which they operate and all the financial information, resources management, and 
accountability reports. All according to the national laws in transparency and access to 
information. Added to that, every year the Major Council issues a governance report which 
helps to build confidence and give legitimacy to their government. 
It is too soon to assess the outcomes of this form of autonomy but there are signs that the 
cooperation between the autonomous Government of Cherán and the federal and state 
government agencies can lead to the improvement of social development in the community 
but from position that is respectful with the rights, culture and traditions of the Purépecha 
people. A form of autonomy in these terms is not only beneficial to Cherán, but also to the 
government. Mexico has been highly criticised over governmental commitment to the 
indigenous population, losing legitimacy and credibility. The case of Cherán could be a form 
of autonomy that respects the rights of the indigenous peoples and at the same time is in line 
with the state, with clear institutional relations and within a legal framework that guarantees 
certainty and eliminate any concerns of the government. 
So far, the most visible benefit in Cherán has been the expulsion of organised crime and the 
colluded local authorities (ibid.). This resulted in the end of extortions, kidnaps, murders and 
illegal logging. It has provided peace and stability to the community to run social and 
economic programmes from below that can improve social development. If so, the state will 
be fulfilling its responsibility of maintaining order and providing welfare within its territory, 
which can mean more legitimacy. 
The state can also win more legitimacy among the international community by complying 
with the international regulations of organisations like the United Nations and the ILO. 
Complying in the case of Cherán is not enough. However, the government can use this case 
to set a precedent and replicate similar forms of autonomy in other areas and finally break 
the systematic development dependence that was imposed to the indigenous peoples of 
Mexico. Only then we can acknowledge that the Mexican government is being respectful of 
the indigenous people’s rights. 
4 Concluding remarks 
It is too soon to answer if the cooperative form of autonomy of Cherán will lead to social 
development, but there are promising signs of progress as the state is filling in the spaces 
where small communities are weaker, such as financing social assistance programmes and 
infrastructure, and in exchange complying with its responsibilities to win legitimacy. 
Analysing this form of autonomy is a good opportunity for activists, academics and the 
Zapatistas that are pursuing their autonomy, to re-think and re-organise their efforts in a 
more constructive alternative of cooperation with the government that could also lead to 
social development. This does not mean losing the essence of the social movement that 
seeks for the respect and dignity of the indigenous people, and to overcome their 
marginalisation and poverty. 
We must not forget that the Zapatista’s self-declared autonomy is a last resort because of 
governmental closure to official recognition. While there is no the minimum condition of legal 
recognition, it may not be possible to achieve the kind of cooperative autonomy as in Cherán. 
                                               
3 www.concejomayor.gob.mx/Acceso-a-la-informacion.html. 
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However, it is important to understand the implications of the two different forms of autonomy 
in social development. This could help to adjust the positions of the Zapatistas and the state 
and to untangle the negotiations. 
One thing is true, we have learned that weak groups that did not have power of voice in 
Mexican transitions are the most vulnerable. So, we must find new ways for their inclusion in 
political participation from a position that is respectful of their rights and ways of life. 
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Can Developmental States Include Labour 
as Stakeholders in State–Society Relations? 
Benjamin Preclik 
1 Introduction 
The most remarkable economic transformation in the latter half of the twentieth century has 
been the incredible growth of East Asian countries. The commercial success of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan in the post-Second World War period has attracted a lot of attention and 
has triggered a renewed debate on the role of the state in the promotion of development. 
Extensive studies on the nature of the state during the East Asian miracle gave rise to the 
‘developmental state theory’. Chalmers Johnston (1982) first coined the term ‘capitalist 
developmental state’ in his seminal work MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Johnston and other 
theorists argue that the state played a fundamental role in economic transformation and the 
construction of comparative advantages in East Asian economic development. Over the last 
few decades, the developmental state theory has been particularly attractive because it 
provides an alternative to the free market development orthodoxy. Going beyond active 
Keynesian demand management, the developmental state theory argues that there is ‘strong 
evidence that the state can be effective in pursuing targeted catch-up policies by focusing 
resources on being dominant in certain industrial sectors’ (Mazzucato 2015: 47). 
The ability of these East Asian countries to implement such strategic industrial policies 
heavily relied on particularities in the political and institutional endowment of the state. An 
unusual combination of bureaucratic autonomy and private–public cooperation facilitated the 
creation of targeted policies for relevant business actors. This symbiosis between business 
and the state is argued to have been at the heart of this incredible success story (Evans 
1995; Weiss and Hobson 1995). But while this coalition between the state and industry did 
foster economic growth, it coincided with the oppression and side-lining of other stakeholders 
in the development process. Accounts of the East Asian miracle, in fact, do not seem to dwell 
on the significance that the marginalisation and repression of labour interests played in these 
economic transformations. While the state as an agent of social change and economic 
development has been given a lot of attention, the often violent and unequal trajectories of 
developmental states have been less highlighted. The initial model advocates a narrow 
perception of development as economic growth, where human development is perceived as 
a secondary concern. 
In the following paper, I want to ask whether the repression of labour is essential or if 
alternative conceptualisations of the developmental state can provide a break from the 
relatively repressive model that was evident in the East Asian examples? In other words, I 
will try to find out if contemporary developmental states can be more inclusive towards labour 
as stakeholders in state–society relations. Is it possible to avoid the marginalisation of 
workers in the context of developmental states? 
In the first section, I will introduce the concept of the developmental state and the state–
society relations that are argued to have been vital to its success. This will provide a basis for 
the second part, where I will investigate the role of labour in the East Asian developmental 
state literature and practice. I will show that structural features and strong states limited the 
agency of labour and contributed to its oppressed position. The working class was perceived 
as an economic input and depicted in relatively passive terms. The case study of South 
Korea, one of the more authoritarian developmental states, will provide an opportunity to 
illustrate this and highlight repression as a critical factor. I will also argue that the oppression 
and violence towards the working class ultimately resulted in the demise of the Korean 
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developmental state. The third part will first engage with critical approaches that claim that 
the developmental state model is inherently irreconcilable with the inclusion of labour. These 
radical critiques crucially point out one of the main shortcomings of the developmental state 
paradigm: namely that state–society relations are narrowly conceptualised as state-business 
relations. More recent neo-developmentalist approaches have recognised this shortcoming. I 
will argue that the developmental state and the inclusion of labour are not mutually exclusive. 
Contemporary developmental needs call for a developmental state in which state–society 
relations include both civil society and labour. 
2 Late development, developmental states and the importance of state–
business relations 
As mentioned above, the developmental state concept emerged in the 1980s based on a 
series of case studies that gave an alternative explanation to the orthodox interpretation of 
rapid industrialisation in East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
(Oenis 1991). It was fundamentally conceived as a counter-critique to the prevailing 
neoclassical consensus of the time which advised countries to follow market-oriented policies 
and greater liberalisation as the right mechanism to catalyse late-industrialisation. Instead, 
the studies emphasised the critical role that the state and its institutions played in the 
promotion of the East Asian late-development. The concept is heavily inspired by early statist 
political economy thinkers such as Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, who argued that 
the state had a crucial role to play in late development (Chang 2002). Indeed, developmental 
state theory ‘suggests that far more options exist for industrialising countries than is implied 
by the pessimistic predications of culturally based modernisation theory, dependency theory 
or world theory’ (Pempel 1999: 142). Instead, the rise of East Asian states has been heavily 
attributed to the importance of countries’ institutional endowment and their ability to lead the 
way in the process of development (Schmit 2007). 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) was the first to acknowledge the importance of the state’s 
fundamental role in the post-war industrial transformation of Japan. He argued that four 
factors were crucial for this transformation: (i) the presence of a small, highly qualified 
Weberian style state bureaucracy, (ii) a political system that gave this able bureaucracy the 
room to take initiative and work effectively, (iii) the mastering of market conforming methods 
of state interventions in the economy, and (iv) the existence of a pilot agency such as the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan which ‘controls industrial policy 
through its influence over planning, the energy sector, domestic production, international 
trade, finance and government funds’ (Johnson 1982, cited in Stubbs 2009: 2). Following 
Johnson’s analysis, a wide array of studies emerged arguing that similar structures were 
crucial in the economic successes of South Korea and Taiwan (Amsden 1982; Wade 1990). 
Today, the concept has been extended beyond the limits of East Asia and has been claimed 
to have become a somewhat ‘generic term to describe governments which try to “intervene” 
actively in economic processes and direct the course of development, rather than relying on 
market forces’ (Beeson 2014: 120). 
But the focus of an interventionist state alone cannot explain the East Asian success. 
Arguably one of the most relevant insights from the study of these developmental states is 
the importance that government–business networks played in the formulation of active 
industrial policy. While close state–capital ties are usually linked to corruption and rent-
seeking activities, Evans (1995) explains that this was avoided in the context of 
developmental states and bureaucracies managed to remain independent. While the state 
administration displayed some Weberian traits regarding meritocratic recruitment and highly 
qualified employees, it broke with the idea of being isolated from society. Instead, East Asian 
developmental state bureaucratic apparatuses were ‘embedded in a concrete set of social 
ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for continual 
negotiations and re-negotiations of goals and policies’ (ibid.: 12). Evans first described this 
seemingly paradoxical relationship, where the bureaucracy remains insulated but not isolated 
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from private interests as ‘embedded autonomy’. Similar observations on the importance of 
such insulated relations between the bureaucracy and business to achieve industrial 
transformation and long-term growth were made by Weiss and Hobson (1995), who referred 
to this as controlled or governed inter-dependence. 
The literature on the East Asian developmental state shows how designing effective 
industrial policy relies heavily on the ability of governments to extract information on the 
constraints and opportunities that the private sector faces (Rodrik 2007). Active state–
business relation is one of the core components of the developmental state. Ayele et al. 
(2016: 15), summarising the literature on developmental states say that to ‘be truly 
developmental, a state must show good bureaucracy, good leadership, good relationships 
and good policy, and direct these in practice towards economic development’. This includes 
the existence of institutionalised state–society relations and a developmentalist outlook to 
promote better lives for citizens. But, as I will show in the following part, the developmental 
strategy also heavily relied on the super-exploitation and oppression labour. 
3 The role of labour in the East Asian developmental state 
As mentioned above, central to the developmentalist ideology is a particular focus on 
improving the welfare of its citizens through state fostered capitalist accumulation and 
industrialisation (Ayele et al. 2016). But while this might suggest a progressive and positive 
vision of development, it relied heavily on the control and exploitation of labour. The following 
will review the position of labour in the developmental state literature and illustrate this 
through the case study of South Korea. 
3.1 The role of labour in the developmental state theory 
Most writings on the developmental state only marginally address labour as a group. Weak 
civil society, including labour, is however mentioned as one of the preconditions that 
provided the emergence of the developmental state and facilitated unrestricted rapid 
accumulation (Stubbs 2009; Weiss and Hobson 1995; Leftwich 2008). The literature seems 
to perceive ‘cheap’ and ‘weak labour’ as a structural feature that helps to explain the 
economic success of the East Asian states (Amsden 1990). While business is acknowledged 
as having played a key role in economic success, the contribution of the working class and 
suppression of labour as a stakeholder is deemed a by-product of the development 
trajectory. Indeed, the oppression of labour seems to be described as a necessary condition 
in the late developmental project and furthering of economic growth. Amsden (ibid.: 18), for 
instance, claims that ‘labour repression is the basis of late-industrialisation everywhere’. 
Strict workplace discipline and the absence of unions were key features that contributed to 
the profitability and competitiveness of industries since ‘corporatized labour keeps gains in 
productivity ahead of gains in wages’ (Kohli 2004: 381). In other developmental states such 
as Singapore, labour control is asserted as having been essential to providing an attractive 
investment environment for foreign capital (Crone 1988: 260). The literature thus seemingly 
reduces labour’s position to an input factor and element that provided the right environment 
for rapid economic growth. 
The state’s role is described as crucial in the subordination and incorporation of labour 
through the instilment of a ‘paternalistic, corporatist structure of collaborative but 
authoritarian management’ (ibid.: 259). The East Asian developmental state had the ability to 
discipline and repress labour consistently (Kohli 2004). There is an acknowledgement that 
the capacity of developmental states to foster unrivalled economic growth was not merely the 
result of well-functioning state–business ties, but also included limiting the ability of other 
interest groups to become significant enough to influence the policy process. In his review of 
early developmental state writings on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Ziya Oenis finds that: 
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The strategic power of the East Asian developmental state has depended on the 
formation of political coalitions with domestic industry and on the destruction of the left 
and curtailment of the power of organised labour plus other popular groups. 
(Oenis 1991: 114) 
Actively obstructing the mobilisation of labour groups from the outset, by denying them entry 
into the political process, is argued to have removed the space for conflictual politics and the 
delegitimisation of East Asian developmental states’ vision (ibid.). The absence of 
established interest groups, such as dominant landed classes or a mobilised working class, 
facilitated the subduing of everything to the developmental project (Leftwich 2008). This 
depended on the nature of the elite political compromise and the fact that ‘radical opposition 
has often quickly and effectively been neutralised and coopted’ (ibid.:13). 
The muting of labour voices and those of other social interest groups is asserted to have 
been a crucial element in facilitating the ability to implement long-term planning and keep 
alternative demands off the political agenda (Kohli 2004). The private sector was naturally 
supportive of this marginalisation since the inclusion of other interests would have threatened 
to infiltrate politics with the ‘logic of distribution’ rather than the ‘logic of accumulation’ (Bellin 
2000: 181). Instead, the ability to promote sustained economic development and the 
subsequent improvement of living standards is highlighted to have appeased populations 
and secured legitimacy in the early developmental state examples (Leftwich 2008). The case 
of South Korea will serve as an example and highlight the coercive relationship of 
developmental states with labour. 
3.2 Labour in the South Korean developmental state 
South Korea is referred to as one of the ‘big three’ developmental state examples in which 
high growth was attributed to the interventions of the state through a professional and 
autonomous bureaucracy. Alice Amsden (1989) famously linked the country’s development 
to Johnston's ‘capitalist developmental state’ model in her influential book Asia’s Next Giant: 
South Korea and Late Development. She described South Korea as a case that revealed the 
importance and effectiveness of state intervention. The Korean developmental model was 
characterised by a strong, repressive authoritarian bureaucracy that disciplined the private 
sector and labour, guided businesses and provided financing to strategic business interests 
(Oenis 1991). The Economic Planning Board (EPB), a capable expert bureaucracy, worked 
closely with the Korean business elites to catalyse growth in sectors it deemed essential for 
its economic advancement (Leftwich 2008). This contributed to the empowerment of the 
Chaebol, sizeable Korean business conglomerates, which became increasingly powerful 
actors over time (Kim 1993). 
The state not only provided the Chaebol with favourable industrial policies but also 
administered the working class through restrictive policies. Furthermore, strict control of 
labour was an essential service provided the Chaebols by the state (Minns 2001: 181). This 
included the enforcement of low wages and exponentially increasing work hours. From 1975 
to 1985, Korea consistently topped world rankings for both the longest working week and the 
highest rate of work-related accidents. Even in 1990, when the working week hours had 
reduced significantly, Koreans worked an average of 49.8 hours a week (Kim 1993: 234). 
Labour organisation was eliminated as an active force by the authoritarian Park regime early 
on. While the introduction of basic labour laws was initially announced, they were soon 
revoked by the Park regime to widen the scope for state interventions (ibid.). The 
administration saw an advantage in the existence of weak unions and therefore selected 
labour representatives to organise a union that could be controlled by the state (Minns 2001). 
Labour representation thus became divided into 12 industrial unions under the leadership of 
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). Minns (2001: 180) argues that ‘the 
remarkable speed at which this all happened suggested that the FKTU was nothing more 
than a government body without real roots in the working class’. Furthermore, restrictive 
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laws, complicated strike procedures and the infiltration of unions by state police officers 
diminished labours agency considerably (ibid.). This allowed the state to keep wages 
artificially low to ensure the competitiveness of products on the world market and increased 
profits for the chaebol business conglomerates (Kim 1993). Buchanan and Nicholls (2003: 
204) argue that a combination of super-exploitation of human labour and highly subversive 
work environment in South Korea created ‘despotic relations in production and in the political 
interaction between the state, business and the working classes’. They describe this 
combination in South Korea as ‘despotic labour politics’. 
Increasing wages were claimed to have been an incentive to increase productivity and a 
remuneration for the harsh working conditions (Amsden 1990a). Leftwich (2008: 16) insists 
that despite civil, political and human rights being abused in developmental states ‘it remains 
one of the most remarkable features of these states that their incumbent regimes appear to 
have enjoyed remarkable legitimacy’. However, this ignores that repression and despotic 
labour politics did not provide room for contestation. In South Korea, this repression and poor 
working conditions eventually ended up in strikes and turmoil. Ultimately, ‘the labour 
movement exploded in full force, like a pressure cooker building up steam for two decades’ 
(Kim 1993: 236). Despite coercion and constraining labour policies, the movement grew to 
become the most militant of the East Asian developmental states (Shin 2010). The response 
to this growing labour movement was very violent, with brutal police repression against 
protesting workers. After an unusually conflictual year in 1987, in which there were over 
3,700 labour conflicts, the labour movement was joined by other civil society forces (Kim 
2010: 105). This resulted in massive protests which ultimately led to the breakdown of 
authoritarianism and the gradual move towards democracy. The violent transition eventually 
led to the demise of the developmental state in South Korea. It demonstrates that an 
authoritarian developmental state model that excludes labour and other stakeholders cannot 
be a sustainable form of governance. In 1997, Korea’s economy was hit by the Asian 
financial crisis, which forced the country to accept structural adjustment packages to acquire 
emergency loans from international financial institutions. Kim (2010) argues that if societal 
actors had been more represented in the economy and politics, they could have warned the 
state of the imminent crisis. But can the developmental state model be reconciled with labour 
inclusion? 
4 Towards the inclusion of labour into the developmental state model 
4.1 Critical perspectives 
As mentioned above the developmental state model in the post-Second World War period 
relied heavily on the suppression and exploitation of labour. Critical scholars argue that the 
marginalisation of labour lies at the intellectual origin of the developmental state as a theory 
that denies labour agency and voice. Fishwick and Selwyn (2016) argue that the 
developmental state model is a fundamentally elite-driven development project that sees 
development from the perspective of capital. Labours needs are considered secondary and 
only achievable by securing capital’s needs first. They suggest that the developmental state 
is part of a host of elite development theories (EDT) that regard securing the needs of capital 
essential for achieving human development. EDT are argued to be built on an ‘elite subject-
subordinate object’ premise that insists that the development of the poor calls for effective 
elite leadership (Selwyn 2016a). This ‘elite subject-subordinate object’ relationship is 
enforced through the identification of elites as drivers of the development project. 
Furthermore, EDT perpetuate elite visions of development by ignoring or dismissing 
emancipatory poor-led efforts and legitimising economic and political repression and abuse 
by elites. ‘Such conceptions… legitimate various forms of coercion and subjection of 
labouring classes to elite-led development processes’ (Selwyn 2016b: 794). Rather than 
considering contestation by the poor as an integral part of development, it is considered to 
hamper the elite development project (Selwyn 2016a). The idea of the developmental state 
as a progressive theory and antithesis to neo-classical and neo-liberal development then 
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seems flawed. Both the developmental state theory and neoliberal orthodoxy have a similar 
predisposition to the control and exploitation of labour. The developmental state paradigm 
‘intellectually denies labouring classes the agency and justifies the latter’s political repression 
and economic exploitation for the “higher goal” of national development’ (Fishwick and 
Selwyn 2016: 235). 
This elite focus becomes clear when analysing the narrow definition of state–society relations 
that are deemed essential to the workings of the developmental state. Because the theory 
solely preoccupies itself with the relationship between private business and government it 
‘already indicates the conceptual and analytical exclusion of labour’ (Chang 2009: 61). By 
equating ‘business’ with ‘capital’, the developmental state ignores capital as a social relation 
in which labour is an important stakeholder. Dae-oup Chang (2013) argues that this explains 
why state–capital relations are considered complete by just looking at government–business 
relations. The state is regarded as an entity of ultimate power and legitimacy in the process 
of development, and labour is reduced to a productive factor, equal to technological and 
financial inputs. Labour’s ‘role as an active social force, other than as one that is potentially 
disruptive, is denied, and it is otherwise depoliticised and disempowered’ (Chang 2013: 94). 
The autonomy of the state from society is essentially argued to be a response to needs of 
capital for favourable industrial policies as well as disposable and docile labour. 
These critical perspectives highlight the fact that the developmental state theory didn’t 
address the issues of labour because its analysis narrowly focuses on the collaboration with 
state elites. By concentrating on the primary goal of catch-up industrialisation, the 
developmental states seem to give little attention to the conflicts that this creates regarding 
political contestation and economic inequalities. 
4.2 Room for inclusion? 
The widespread labour marginalisation practised in the East Asian developmental state, 
especially in the case of South Korea, should however partly be understood as a product of 
the socioeconomic and international conditions of the time (Pempel 1999). The East Asian 
developmental state has increasingly been recognised as the sum of its unusual class 
structures, embeddedness, capable bureaucracies and the international context at the time 
(Evans 2010). A contemporary developmental state faces entirely different developmental 
challenges and opportunities. Neo-developmentalist thinkers agree there is no right model for 
a developmental state and that merely replicating the approaches that were successful in 
East Asia is unlikely to result in success (Chang 2010). The building of a developmental state 
needs to take into account the specific setting regarding the political, economic, ideological 
and institutional environment (ibid.). Whittaker et al. (2010) argue that today’s late-
developers face a path of ‘compressed development’ in which various stages of development 
happen simultaneously rather than sequentially. Deepening global integration creates global 
interdependency that requires contemporary developmental states to be more adaptive as 
they have to coordinate a wide range of foreign as well as domestic stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the ability of states to act independently is constrained by ‘a host of 
international treaties and initiatives that are now deemed essential for membership of the 
international community’ (ibid.: 459). This arguably restricts the room for the categorical 
exclusion of labour because of international pressures that insist on the respect of human 
rights, social liberties and political freedoms. 
The different context today calls for an alternative approach to the developmental states 
including more encompassing state–society relations which include labour. There has been a 
realisation among scholars that recognises the need for the inclusion of labour and civil 
society into the framework of the developmental state beyond a simple factor of production 
(Koo 2001). In his seminal work Embedded Autonomy, Peter Evans (1995) predicted that the 
developmental state would be under increasing pressure from various groups in society and 
therefore argued for a reconceptualisation of state–society relations. He explained that 
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‘embeddedness does not necessarily take the form of exclusionary ties to entrepreneurial 
elites’ (ibid.: 235). Drawing from examples of broader-based forms of embeddedness in 
Kerala and Austria, he highlights the vital role that a coherent state apparatus can play in 
providing the setting for bargaining between capital and labour. In the Indian state of Kerala, 
institutionalised links were formed between the political leadership and industrial and 
agricultural workers. This contributed to more welfare-oriented policies as development 
became conceived as something more than just economic growth. Furthermore, it 
contributed to more sustained labour peace. The Austrian case shows how a competent 
state bureaucracy can facilitate a platform of exchange and bargaining between capitalists 
and organised labour. Just as in developmental states a relatively strong state fostered the 
creation of coordinated industrial class interest representation. But contrary to the 
developmental states this was complemented by a strong unionised labour representation. 
With both interest groups being represented the state bureaucracies’ role was to translate 
the interests of labour and capital into policies. In both the Keralan and Austrian case 
‘embedded autonomy did not entail the marginalisation of subordinate groups’ (ibid.: 241). 
This highlights that embeddedness, one of the developmental states core characteristics, 
does not have to take the form of exclusionary and coercive means. For contemporary 
developmental states, this suggests a reinterpretation of embeddedness beyond the East 
Asian example. Such encompassing embeddedness could provide the base for a sturdier 
economic and societal transformation. 
These broader forms of embeddedness might best be incorporated into democratic 
structures. Neo-developmentalist thinkers therefore argue that today’s developmental states 
should be democratic in nature. It is claimed that democratic developmentalism might also 
provide more relevant development outcomes (Edigheji 2010). Democracy has previously 
not been associated with the developmental state because electoral politics were considered 
to limit its ability to implement long-term visions. Instead, as the case of South Korea has 
shown, more authoritarian structures were supposed to provide the necessary bureaucratic 
autonomy. Through despotic rule developmental states were argued to be able to ‘suppress, 
or ignore interest groups, which enables their bureaucratic autonomy’ (Routley 2014: 165). 
The democratic developmental state perspective instead suggests that twenty-first century 
developmental needs have shifted fundamentally and provide a setting in which broader 
embeddedness is achievable as well as necessary (ibid.). It suggests that the contemporary 
developmental state needs to be a capability enhancing state (Evans 2010). Evans (2010, 
2014) argues that a capability enhancing developmental state, which draws inspiration from 
Amartya Sen’s (1999) notion of the capability approach to human development, is more 
fitting today. Because the focus has moved away from the emphasis on capital accumulation 
and growth, the capitalist development state is argued to be outdated. Value creation is 
attributed to the production of knowledge and jobs are becoming increasingly concentrated in 
the service sector. The ‘new centrality of services forces any state that wants to be 
“developmental” to focus more intensely on people and their skills, instead of machines and 
their owners’ (Evans 2014: 86). This requires the distribution of basic rights that emancipates 
workers and incentivises them to invest in their own abilities (Evans 2010). The state should 
also provide social support for goods such as education and health care that contribute to 
facilitating such capabilities. To achieve this goal there is a need for effective ties to societal 
actors. Like state–business ties in the traditional developmental state model, state–societal 
ties suggested to be crucial to determine collective priorities, defining developmental goals 
and gathering information to create policies (ibid.). Engaging with labour and building up its 
capacity has thus become central in the twenty-first century. This means that the oppression 
and marginalisation of labour is not a desirable feature of the contemporary developmental 
state anymore. The repression of labour would instead limit the willingness of labourers to 
invest in their own capabilities. The democratic developmental state advocated by neo-
developmentalist suggests that a more pluralist engagement with society and labourers is 
possible. Yet it requires considerable infrastructural ability that can construct and manage 
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such broad-based development alliances. This is a major challenge for developing countries 
that are looking to implement developmental regimes today (Routley 2014). 
5 Conclusion 
This essay has attempted to review the role of labour in the developmental state. Much of the 
literature has emphasised the centrality of institutional particularities in facilitating the 
implementation of a capitalist developmental vision and a close engagement with business 
as the cornerstone of the developmental states. As a consequence, less attention has been 
paid to the role and position of labour in this context. As this essay has shown, labour was 
neglected as a relevant stakeholder and effectively reduced to a factor of production, a 
human input necessary in the process of accumulation and growth. This essay has tried to 
determine to what extent the marginalisation of labour is decisive and whether there is an 
alternative to ignoring and repressing this relevant stakeholder. Research on developmental 
state describes the weak position of labour and the ability of the state to discipline the 
working class as a precondition for the emergence of the developmental states in East Asia. 
In South Korea, this resulted in ‘despotic labour politics’ in which the labour force was 
exploited and abused. This has impacted the longevity of the developmental state as 
repression contributed to discontent and the dismantling of the developmental state. Radical 
critics argue that the repression and marginalisation are entrenched in its theoretical core. 
While they do not see the developmental state paradigm as reconcilable with labour 
inclusion, they have helped to point out that the problem of exclusion comes from a narrow 
conceptualisation of state–society relation and the bargain between government and 
capitalist elites. This suggests that the developmental state model practised in East Asia 
cannot and should not be replicated. Instead, the contemporary setting necessitates a 
reinterpretation of the developmental state. Today's developmental needs and the 
international agenda calls for a capacity enhancing state in which labour and civil society at 
large are empowered to succeed. In this new capacity-enhancing developmental state model 
democratic structures and broader-based state–society ties are crucial. As such it would 
provide a radical break from the capitalist developmental state of the twentieth century and 
provide room for the inclusion of labour. The question how these capacity enhancing 
developmental states would look is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Taking Off the Mask: Using Participatory 
Photography as the Reflective Medium to 
Explore and Understand Myself in the Web 
of Power Structures and Psychosocial 
Relations Underlying Feminine Appearance 
Norms 
Isabella Pyrgies 
Women have been cast as an object, a phantasm. She is never her own mistress. Her 
being is constantly divided between what she really is, and what she imagines she is… 
as her femininity manifests itself in forms men have invented for her. 
(Octavio Paz 1961: 197) 
The function of art is to do more than tell it like it is- it is to imagine what is possible. 
(Bell Hooks 1994: 281) 
1 Introduction 
In this essay I will reflect on my process of understanding myself within the nexus of power 
structures around feminine appearance norms. I will present the process of dealing with 
PCOS (polycystic ovaries syndrome) in relation to external and internal pressure to adhere to 
feminine norms. On my reflective journey to re-establish an inner dialogue with myself, I was 
surprised to find how deeply feminine norms were located in my very sense of lived and 
sexual identity. Centring my analysis around the feminist depiction of the body as a site of 
political contestation, I allowed myself creative space to question and explore myself in 
relation to what I had previously taken to be natural and unalterable. In the past few months, 
I have used various methods of reflective practice to attempt to become aware of the norms 
of appearance with which I identify, and to interrogate the problematic politics of aesthetic 
and semiotic objectification and representation that underpin norms of feminine appearances 
(Bordo 2003). 
My reflective practice journey took many forms. I wrote a journal, practiced mindful walking 
and engaged with embodied writing. In conjunction with those processes, I took photos. 
Together they enabled me not only to ‘facilitate consciousness of consciousness which 
enable[d] critical self-enquiry’ (Moon 2013, quoting Holly 1991) but to disentangle critical self-
enquiry from, the unfortunately more natural, negative practice of self-criticism. 
What aided my reflection most was the process and the result of making images, as its 
‘aesthetic’ form enabled me to obtain a ‘unique form of understanding’ (Moon 2013) through 
creative expression that helped me recognise, embody and better comprehend the role of 
power dynamics. This materialised into two photography projects which I will present as my 
primary means of reflection. 
The first project took the form of a participatory photographic project on myself as both object 
and subject. The project attempts to create a channel linking Butler’s (2011) 
conceptualisation of resistance as a conscious disruption of repetitive gender norms to my 
own version of resistance as parody of feminine norms. I found the potential of images to 
empower, build and engage with not only ‘power within’ but also bridging over into ‘power 
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with’ (Gaventa 2008). After, I will reflect on my second project ‘one-tone/size-fits-all’ to show 
the necessity of decolonising the mind and deconstructing privilege to highlight the 
importance of understanding the power I hold over others and the importance of 
intersectionality. Ultimately, I will look at the reflective practice, and my reflections that 
emerge from it, in my work as a development actor/scholar, paying particular attention to 
issues of ethics of representation and cultural politics within development. 
2 Motivation 
The pressure of ‘becoming a woman’ (de Beauvoir 2014) in a society that involves living up 
to a cultural reality encumbered by prescriptions and rules has had strong impact on the 
development of my anxiety and self-consciousness. When diagnosed with PCOS I was 
forced to question two things about my identity that society deems to be attributable to 
women: feminine appearance and motherhood. The former, through suffering from severe 
acne, thick hair growth in all the ‘wrong places’, brittle dry head hair, and painful bloating. 
And the latter, as a result of cysts on my ovaries, my identity now no longer fitted with 
society’s identification of ‘woman’ as one who is a ‘natural’ carer. Instead of coming to terms 
with the condition I spent time trying to conform to these often-unattainable feminine 
appearance norms, which has resulted in the psychic fragmentation and estrangement 
between my mind and body. In contrast to feminist literature that talks about objectification as 
taking place from the external viewer, I felt that I had internalised this gaze and started, to my 
detriment, to objectify myself (Bartky 1997). The consequence of PCOS made me check 
mirrors constantly for blemishes, averting my gaze when spoken to and becoming more 
introverted. Constant self-policing has made crucial and critical damage not only to my 
relationship with myself and others in the private sphere but has spilt over into other areas of 
my public life, such as my inability to engage in public speaking. It is for this reason I have 
chosen to reflect on the relations between feminine norms, objectification, representation and 
self-hood. The process of reflective practice has allowed me to keep track of my emotional 
and intellectual processes through journaling and photography. Although challenging, as it 
requires both time and self-honesty in order for the practice to work, I believe, that reflective 
practice can support self-discovery while also enhancing awareness. It does so by aiding the 
feminist practice of drawing connections between the personal and political (Bordo 2003). 
3 Gender performativity 
When researching for this paper, the theory I identified most with was Butler’s (2011) account 
of gender identity construction. For her, gender performativity is the theory that gender is a 
social performance, the result of repetition of ‘stylised acts’ prescribed by cultural norms 
(ibid.). Over time the repetition of particular body gestures, activities and movements become 
the mechanisms by which the ‘dualistic heteronormative structure of gender is perpetuated, 
and an individual gender identity created’ (Lloyd 2015: 7). Gender is not passively scripted 
on the body, but rather acts are described as corporeal and involves gestures that ‘style the 
flesh’ (Butler 2011). Sufficient repetition of stylised gender acts generates an illusion that a 
sexed body is natural and provides the grounds that builds culturally shared specific modes 
of difference. What interested me most about her theory was when she states; ‘‘the task is 
not whether to repeat’ the practices constitutive of gender; but ‘how to repeat’ so that 
‘through a radical proliferation of gender’ it is possible to ‘displace the very gender norms that 
enable the repetition’’ (Butler, quoted in Lloyd 2015: 8) By taking Butler’s theory of gender 
identity construction as my framework, I fused the idea of how one impersonates and 
performs one’s identity with her example of drag as a form of resistance through exposing 
unnaturalness of femininity. This inspired me to use images to present a playful stepping 
aside from fixed gender stereotypes by recreating this resistance in a meaningful way in the 
form of parody of female norms. In an attempt to break-away from my unconscious 
reproduction and enforcement of norms that govern sexual behaviour, speaking styles, diet, 
emotional range, mannerisms and dress, I used photography as a way to reflect on and 
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re-imagine myself in a way that could subvert the internalisation of stereotypes and 
transgress limiting normalised scripts. 
4 Method: Participatory photography: ‘Parody of Feminine Norms’ 
One reason I chose participatory photography as method was to break out of the current 
fast-paced image-culture of the digital world. My intention was to slow the process down and 
work with imagery in a more mindful and considered way. I was drawn to it as it allows one to 
create a process of storytelling, connecting those at the margins of society, bringing in 
different realities and voices, fostering social change on both a personal and global level, 
creative advocacy and communication skills (Pink 2001). It is a powerful tool for providing us 
not only with access to different cultures and creativities but also a much more human way of 
looking at the world as it gives those being photographed, written and talked about, a voice. 
For this project, it allowed me to disrupt photography as a commercial product as used by 
advertising and media and turn it into a critical space where I entered into a process of 
openness in order to perform myself in new ways. As I was both subject and object, defined 
by my own female gaze, photography allowed me to express myself in a way not always 
possible for me with words alone. As a form of public speaking that allowed me to transcend 
the white-hot paralysing terror that usually accompanies my body when words are involved, I 
was able to delve deeper to rekindle an authentic dialogue between my psyche and body. 
The act of turning the lens onto myself at first made me feel uneasy, but the active 
participation of the body in the creation felt liberating and empowering. I felt myself enter into 
a process of re-embodiment through the dialogue of absurdity and play, which allowed me to 
‘pass beyond my usual borders and exceed the given to move between perspectives and 
systems of knowing’ (Nolas 2009: 190). Using girlish/absurd props and body gestures to 
parody the conventions of femininity allowed me to upset old paradigms of male gaze and 
female as victim and break-out of processes that produce the passivity, docility and 
subordination in women. Underneath I present three photos that I took to resist external and 
internal objectification, framed in a ‘power over’ and ‘power within’ response to negative 
comments I had underlined in my journal that had been said to me over the past months. 
a) ‘You know you would look so much prettier if you made more effort’ 
 
Source: © The Author. 
The idea for this photo came to me after seeing a sign in the bedroom of a friend before 
going on a night out. It read ‘Do women have to be naked to get into the Met. Museum?’ 
Getting ready with three other girls, we’d all chosen to wear tight jeans, heeled boots and 
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crop tops. Reflecting on the sign, I felt the urge to write in my journal and it seemed fitting to 
try embodied writing. Once actually reflecting on and listening to my body about how these 
clothes made me physically feel was shocking, as I had probably worn something similar a 
thousand times but had never questioned it. I realised the uncomfortable truth that the 
expectation of women in art to be naked does not stop at the boundaries of the art-world, as 
even on a cold night in Brighton, feminine norms dictate girls are to be half naked and/or 
uncomfortable in tight clothes. Often in art women are represented as muses or models, in 
Western art history, docile and passive in the shadows of ‘great’ male artists (Berger 1972). 
In this photo, my body provokes the stereotype of the nude woman as prominent object. The 
make-shift absurd high heels are a reference to the pain and suffering many go through to 
appear feminine. The response of my body is to get up off the chair where I should be posing 
and tear the frame apart as my female body loses balance. Self-expression allows 
experience to transmute into an art object or project and cathartically releases the 
experience from my body. 
b) ‘What’s that hair on your face? You know you should really sort that out’ 
 
Source: © The Author. 
When returning from a mindful walk, I was thinking about the things I had to do to get ready 
for my date that evening: the list was extensive. Then I started to question why I was doing 
them, and certain thoughts such as, ‘to feel pretty’, ‘to feel confident’, to feel I could ‘be 
myself’ whirled around my head. The latter part particularly shocked me as I had 
subconsciously equated my appearance as a core part of lived and sexual identity. My mind 
wandered back to an article I’d read that day, where Bartky (1997) appropriates Foucault’s 
account of power in the context of self-surveillance to explain how and why women take up 
tiresome, time-consuming, and expensive feminine body practices in order to produce their 
sense of natural femininity. ‘Femininity’ is marketed at a price and presented to us neatly 
packaged in the form of lotions and potions that promise to fix flaws and enhance beauty. 
Internalised behaviour conformity and capitalism cannot be separated as it aids the dualistic 
commodification and objectification of women’s bodies to create self-policing subjects. Media 
often acts as the policer of norms by punishing those who do not comply by fat-shaming and 
beauty-shaming. To resist this, I parody the feminine norms by using a hula-hoop, a girlish 
object used as an extension of a paint-brush, to throw paint on lists I found in magazines that 
tell us how to be ‘our best selves’ (Cosmopolitan 2018). I followed my interest in creating 
situations where exaggerated movements or physical accidents of my body result in failure to 
remain upright or in control and my body is destined to fail at performing femininity. 
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c) ‘You should really smile more, you look far more attractive’ 
 
Source: © The Author. 
Since journaling, I have been more aware of the regularity of receiving sexist and objectifying 
comments. Re-reading through my journal, I realised that I often stated facts such as; my 
friend told me ‘I looked like I had lost some weight’, my boss said ‘I had let myself go’ and 
‘this man told me ‘looking at you, you would never say you were clever’’. It made me realise 
that women’s bodies are constantly objectified and judged as there is a notion that it is 
acceptable to comment both positively and negatively. I turned into myself to listen to the 
psychological implications that I usually ignore. This picture aims to unpack the inner-conflict 
created by prescribed feminine norms- sexualisation and objectification as a result of 
ascribing to them- but also punishment for non-adherence. Here my aim is to reject, as 
L’Oréal so incessantly puts it, my ‘worth’ as measured by consuming and adhering to beauty 
standards. To do so, I decided to use make-up, the thing that I needed most to cover my 
acne scars and flaws to feel confident both as a form of parody and also to write a response. 
I used eye-liner to write the message across my chest, symbolically turning an object I have 
incorporated into my daily routine to look beautiful into an act of resistance. Taking this photo 
allowed me to reflect on and provide my own resistance to everyday sexism and wrestle 
power back for myself. 
5 Image creation and the three Rs: reclamation, resilience and resistance 
for social justice 
An important part of using a camera or a paint-brush is not only to equip women individually 
but also to enhance the collective organising power of women by providing a medium to 
share experiences. Community engaged image creation can build connectivity, 
understanding, mobilisation and above all pathways to self-determination. Images and art are 
powerful mediums with which to create platforms of learning through sustaining safe spaces 
in order to resist the patriarchy. Photography is thus a key tool for reflecting a world in crisis 
through the exploration of important themes often silenced or distorted in the mainstream, 
such as domestic violence, gender identity, safety, sex, bodies and race. It is important to 
create a dialogue around these topics to ‘transform the mindlessness and massification that 
accompany social oppression, replacing it with higher levels of cultural sensitivity, 
intelligence and humanity’ (Fredrickson 1997: 201). Spaces such as Devils Dykes, Girl Gaze 
and the Canadian Feminist Art Show, work wonders in breaking down subjectivity and 
creating inclusive solidarities based on difference in order to branch-out from neoliberalist 
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individualism that is often characterised by personal well-being. The power of image creation 
thus ‘arise[s] from the deepening of capacities for dialogue, improvisations, and resistance, 
all of which contribute to resilience’ and empowerment (Nolas 2009: 174). Participatory 
photography as a subsection to image creation is a particularly important practice for social 
justice as it creates space for marginalised voices, empowering with connection and 
education on a personal and community-level. As race, age, class all intersect with gender, 
different bodies have different histories and contexts, it is crucial that they need to represent 
their own experiences. I highlight here that it is important to note that subjectivity comes not 
from exclusion but in relationship through difference; as acknowledging difference retrieves 
‘multiple potential sides for solidarity, making binary opposition of self and other less likely’ 
(ibid.: 185). Two particularly important projects that touched me in their power was Ingrid 
Guyon’s project with Colombian women from the diaspora that were victims of violence, and 
the ‘save us from saviours’ project which brought a community of sex-workers together to 
deflect the moralising interventions of developers (Ingrid Guyon 2018, Cornwall 2016). 
Silenced voices were brought to the forefront to expose injustices and bust stereotypes. Both 
projects show the process of marginalised communities reclaiming their bodies/rights, 
resisting oppression and building resilience. 
6 ‘One-tone/size-fits-all’ 
 
Source: © The Author. 
I will now use my project to reflect on wider issues around the need to deconstruct privilege, 
whiteness and representation in development. I had the idea for this project when wandering 
around town and saw that all the clothes that I was looking at described the colour ‘nude’ to 
be a light paleish pink when in fact by its very name ‘nude’ is supposed to represent ‘skin 
colour’. The aim of this project is to represent mainstream societies views as engraining ideal 
feminine appearance norms as whiteness/Western. As a person who identifies as being 
white, it acts as an example that only just noticing this link highlights my privilege. 
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Characteristic of privilege is that the group defines the societal norm which often benefits 
those in the group, they rely on their privilege and avoid objecting to oppression and also are 
usually blind to it (Wilderman and Davies 1996). There is thus an obvious need to 
acknowledge the different sources and relations of power and privilege that are at play that 
have served to increase my advantage over others (Mohanty 1988). In order to be a better 
development practitioner, it is important to deconstruct whiteness and also to decolonise my 
approaches, histories and realities to prevent further exacerbation of asymmetrical power 
relations. One way is to practice active listening, allowing others to speak and share their 
experiences. This allows for the role of ‘expert’ to be shifted more into one of ‘facilitator’ in 
order to prevent, as much as possible, my ‘power over’. The act of deconstruction helps to 
look for assumptions behind opinions and listen to the diversity that is present (Brydon-Miller 
2004). ‘The-one-tone-fits-all’ project also alludes further to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ development 
projects which like this example shows, covers up differences, context and intersectionalities, 
and end up stereotyping and doing further harm by following the Western master-script. As a 
development practitioner and scholar, it is important to look at how the interplays of different 
aspects of identities across the intersections of race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality and 
age interact with each other and ethics of representation when speaking about other’s 
experiences (Crenshaw 1997). I will implement these processes of interrogating power-
relations, deconstructing privilege and looking at identities as intersectional when conducting 
qualitative interviews for my dissertation with female beneficiaries of a CCT in Colombia this 
summer to make sure those voices taking part in the research are represented in the most 
‘genuine manner’ possible (Spivak 1988: 271). 
7 Conclusion 
Reflecting on feminine norms has allowed me to reconceptualise how power works through 
the interrogation of the processes of norm creation and enforcement that ‘helps’ us see, 
experience and reproduce ourselves according to dominant hierarchies. It allowed me to re-
establish a connection between my psyche and body by providing a process of reflection 
which has aided the deconstruction of self and other. Image creation at the community-level 
has also been shown to be a powerful tool for reflection and creative advocacy by exploring 
conflicting realities inhabited by different actors. Importantly, participatory photography as a 
medium for reflective practice and development as a whole align over issues I have explored 
such as ethics, inclusions/exclusions, gender, empowerment and representation. My 
reflective practice journey is one that has not concluded now that this essay has finished. I 
have started the reflective process which I will carry-on in my personal and professional life, 
as it has been instrumental in teaching me theoretically and practically how to be more self-
aware, challenge assumptions and established patterns of behaviour in order to develop new 
ways of knowing, connecting and understanding to bring about social change. 
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Using London as a Case Study to Examine 
the Positive and Negative Aspects of Urban 
Gentrification 
Tracy Taylor-Beck 
An Englishman’s home is his castle. 
(William Pitt the Elder, 1763) 
1 Introduction 
Gentrification is complex. Its origins were straightforward enough; it was a term coined in the 
1960s by sociologist Anna Glass to describe the middle classes ‘invading’ long-standing 
working-class areas of London (Glass 1963). The language was strong enough then, but it 
has since become a loaded term and shorthand for urban society’s ills and successes. It is 
used to describe urbanism, enrage class divisions, highlight political indifference, and 
transformed to represent the march of globalisation and the inexorable effects of capitalism. 
In this paper, I will examine these different versions of ‘urban gentrification’ by looking at the 
term’s origins, how it has changed and in turn changed London. I will explore whether it 
reflects a drive for economic prosperity and freedom, or the displacement of those without a 
voice. I will also consider how societal changes and government policy has allowed and 
supported these changes and show how debates about gentrification cannot be separated 
from the wider political economy of the UK. I will finally look at what policies around taxation 
and rent could be used to mitigate negative impacts. 
2 A brief history of housing and gentrification in London 
Post-war London was battered, and Britain had a severe housing shortage. A new Labour 
government ushered in the ‘Welfare State’ and a new philosophy on housing introduced by 
Aneurin Bevan, Health Minister. The ‘New Towns Act’ of 1946 created new suburbs around 
London and in 1949, Bevan introduced the ‘Housing Act’ which ‘removed the restriction of 
public housing to the “working classes” so that council housing was available to all’ (Winckler 
2012). These new towns and new railways moved the middle classes out of the city (Ryan-
Collins, Lloyd and Macfarlane 2017). This left a run-down inner London to the working 
classes and commonwealth migrants who arrived to take up jobs and help rebuild the capital 
(Hamnett 2003). 
In the 1960s, the rise of the post-war baby boomers saw the start of a shift in British society 
from an industrial economy towards a service economy. This facilitated a move from a large 
working class to a growing population of educated middle classes. Couples were getting 
married later than previous generations and London, in particular, offered a chance at a 
career. 
These changes saw a move back to the city begin. The first wave of gentrifiers were known 
as the ‘pioneers’, people from marginal groups with a low income, such as artists and gays 
who ‘took a risk on areas’ (Hamnett 2003: 165). The second wave were more affluent. They 
‘tended to be highly educated, highly skilled, and highly paid professional and managerial 
households, either childless or with young families’ (ibid.). It was this second wave of 
gentrifiers that Glass talks about as an emerging ‘urban gentry’ paralleling the rural gentry of 
Jane Austen (Hamnett 2003; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). Glass describes the middle 
classes moving into ‘shabby’ cottages and making them ‘elegant’ and explains that 
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gentrification continues ‘until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced 
and the whole social character of the district is changed’ (Glass 1963: xviii). 
In the 1970s this process was given a boost by the deregulation and liberalisation of credit 
markets. Buying a home in Britain had long been held as aspirational, so when access to 
credit became easier, it led to a property boom (Ryan-Collins et al. 2017). At the same time 
there began a decline in building of public housing as there was a belief that supply was 
sufficient (ibid.) and due to recession and economic decline, there was pressure on 
government to cut building programmes. 
In 1979, the Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, actively encouraged a ‘property 
owning democracy’ (ibid.: 88). Their ‘Right-to-Buy’ (RTB) scheme in 1980 allowed council 
tenants to purchase their homes, and by 1987 a million homes had been bought under the 
scheme. This, and the removal of rent regulation and consequently the introduction of 
assured shorthold tenancies (ibid.) led to the revival of the private rented sector and the 
commodification of housing. Homes had become an investment, as the rate of return on 
property was greater than return from the economy and employment (Minton 2017). This 
shift in policy led to what urbanist Richard Florida called a ‘neo-colonist land grab’ (Florida 
2017: 63). 
It was this land grab that shifted gentrification from describing house by house purchases to 
whole sale regeneration of areas by property developers. This and the consequences of 
these changes have split commentators. 
3 Positives of gentrification 
The first wave of ‘pioneers’ were marginal groups finding security in new communities, for 
example, artists, gays, lesbians and single parents (Butler 1997; Lees et al. 2008). By 
creating networks across similarities – i.e. the ‘gay scene’ – early gentrifiers created security 
for themselves that they may not have found in smaller towns and villages, which provided 
them with a better quality of life (Butler 1997). This group of gentrifiers mixed well with 
working class and ethnic communities and ‘took a risk in an area by investing their own 
“sweat equity” in it’ (ibid.: 2). They improved the housing stock through the renovation and 
preservation of old buildings, increased property values and began the process of urban 
regeneration by making places ‘cool’.1 
On the back of this initial investment, came the second wave of gentrification, the ‘creative 
classes’ (Florida 2017) who moved into areas that were perceived as interesting and a good 
investment. These groups are good for the local economy. They pay taxes, introduce new 
shops, coffee bars and cafes which help to regenerate neighbourhoods in decline. 
Infrastructure is improved, services and public spaces are invested in, and crime is reduced. 
Crucially, jobs are created which helps grow the economy. Today, ‘London’s creative class 
totals 1.7 million workers, comprising 41.6 per cent of its workforce’ (Florida 2013). This 
clustering of people is a driver of innovation: ‘in the 24 months to March 2014, 32,000 
businesses were created in one modish postcode, EC1V’ (Hawkes 2018). In another 
example, famously gentrified Shoreditch in North London is now the world’s most expensive 
tech district (Morris-Jones 2017). 
London ‘generates 22 per cent of UK GDP [gross domestic product] despite accounting for 
only 12.5 per cent of the UK population’ (Hawkes 2018). It is this kind of urban growth and 
tax benefits that attracted the third wave of gentrifiers; the global elites and billionaires 
(Minton 2017) who buy London prime real estate. In 2015, Savills Estate Agents reported 
that London housing stock is worth as much as Brazil’s annual GDP (Hawkes 2018).  
                                               
1 See ‘Gentrification’ by Grayson Perry: www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/gallery/2014/sep/12/grayson-perry-comic-
art-world-jackson-pollock-damien-hirst-in-pictures. 
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A further example of the success of this urban renewal is Canary Wharf; ‘Canary Wharf 
Group is one of the largest regeneration projects in Europe, attracting global firms. With 
120,000 jobs, Canary Wharf claims to be the biggest single centre of employment in the UK’ 
(Martinson 2018). This third wave of gentrification has completed London’s journey from 
bombed out city to global force. 
However, despite the remarkable economic development that gentrification has helped to 
drive in London, each wave has seen the benefits concentrated in the hands of a smaller 
number of people, and the displacement of original communities. 
4 Negatives of gentrification 
The London property market is fine if you are a property tycoon. 
(Boris Johnson, Home Secretary; Minton 2017: 259) 
The first wave of pioneers valued mixing with existing communities (Lees et al. 2008) and 
their investment brought economic improvement to the area. However, as the second wave 
of creative middle classes moved in, they reclaimed the inner city as their own, and created a 
new ‘culturally sophisticated, urban class fraction’ (ibid.: 210). This meant that small local 
businesses with low prices for the working classes were eventually pushed out by higher 
rents. These rents are then paid by new artisan food and coffee shops who charge higher 
prices than the locals can afford. This negative impact of gentrification is ‘the spatial 
manifestation of these new cultural values’ (ibid.: 210) that displaces existing communities. 
By the time the third wave move in, prices increased further, the creatives were pushed out 
and only large multinational chains could afford the rents. The high street became sanitised 
and communities lost their unique character. For example, Canary Wharf now hosts 
London’s fourth largest shopping mall ‘fully occupied with high fashion brands and 
convenience retail’ (Allen 2013). 
5 Affordable housing 
Without doubt the biggest criticisms of gentrification concern the impact it has had on 
affordable housing which has in turn led to displacement of communities. It is the lack of 
affordable (social) housing in the capital that has resulted in competition for space and 
homes which has driven up the price of rents; the income of working classes and lower and 
middle-income families can’t keep up. 
Successive governments have not addressed the issue of lack of housing stock that was 
caused by the effects of the RTB scheme, and as such it has depleted significantly.2 Instead 
of funding housing, budgets have focused on housing benefit. Government now spends 
‘£21 billion a year on housing benefit which goes to private landlords’ (Jones 2011: 207). In 
1970, 42 per cent of people lived in social housing, now, it is 8 per cent. In London ‘more 
than 36 per cent of formerly publicly owned units are now rented out privately; in some areas 
this figure is more than 50 per cent’ (Madden and Marcuse 2016: 41) which means there has 
been a shift of tenants into the private rental sector, yet still funded by housing benefit. 
                                               
2 See ‘New Homes Built by Private and Social Sectors, 1949–2013’ in Wheeler (2015): www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
14380936. 
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Figure 5.1 Average London rents 
 
Source: Trust for London (2018), reproduced with permission. 
Figure 5.1 shows this increase in rents to be much higher in the private market in London 
than elsewhere, and more than twice the average for England (Trust for London 2018). This 
has a huge impact on people’s livelihoods as today, more than 50 per cent of people in 
London are private renters who spend 40 per cent of their income on rent (Colson 2017). In 
one example, ‘a tenant told reporters she is charged £800 per month by a private landlord, 
while her council rent for the same unit would have been £360 per month – with the public 
making up the shortfall’ (Madden and Marcuse 2016: 42). 
Throughout wave two and then three of gentrification, the increase in house prices has 
benefitted a few long-standing owner residents. For example, in recent years they have 
increased by 46 per cent in Shoreditch (Brooker 2015). However, it is the renters that suffer 
and are priced out of the market. Because of the high rent, it is difficult for people on lower 
incomes to get a job that can keep up, which can create dependency on welfare-funded 
housing. 
6 Displacement 
In addition to the lack of building, successive government policy has not maintained focus on 
existing social housing, which has meant that council tower blocks and estates have fallen 
into decay and are described by councils as ‘sink estates’. 
At the same time, gentrification creates desirable places that appeal to developers who want 
to maximise profit from this housing boom. Where this occurs, local authorities are given an 
excuse to regenerate these estates by demolishing them and selling the land to private 
developers. Since 1997, 135,658 council tenants and leaseholders in London have been 
displaced through this process, and 54,623 units have been either demolished or slated for 
development (Lees 2018). This process is described by critics as ‘social cleansing’ (Lees 
et al. 2008). 
It is social cleansing and resulting ‘redevelopment’ that made space for the third wave of 
gentrifiers. Anna Minton argues it is a wholesale take-over of areas by state led, privately-
funded corporations – pushing out not only the poor but middle and upper classes to make 
room for the global rentiers as described by Piketty (Minton 2017). 
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An example of this is the Heygate Estate in Elephant and Castle. A deprived area, a 
‘muggers paradise’ (Minton 2017: 53) built in 1974 and demolished between 2011 and 2014 
to make way for the new development ‘Elephant Park’. As a result of this regeneration, 3,000 
residents were displaced (Figure 6.1). Only 74 flats were available in Elephant Park at social 
housing rates with a further 500 available to rent at an ‘affordable market rate’, ‘i.e. rented 
out at up to 80 per cent of London’s superheated market rate’ (Wainwright 2015). To buy 
would cost £569,000 for a studio, or £801,000 for a two-bed flat (ibid.), clearly unaffordable 
for an average wage in Southwark (£30,881) (Adzuna 2018). Instead, they were bought by 
the third wave of super-rich gentrifiers who invest in property in London; in the end every flat 
in this development was sold to a foreign investor (White 2017). 
Figure 6.1 Heygate tenant displacement 
  
Source: London Tenants Federation, Just Space, Southwark Notes Archive Group and Lees, L. (2014), reproduced with 
permission. 
This displacement had a huge negative on effect on the original Heygate residents and 
destroyed long-standing communities. It meant splitting up families, friends and support 
networks and a loss of jobs as people were unable to afford to commute back into London. 
7 Discussion: How has this happened? 
Nowadays there really is no primary poverty left in this country… There may be poverty 
because they don’t know how to budget, don’t know how to spend their earnings, but 
now you are left with a really hard fundamental character-personality defect. 
(Margaret Thatcher; Jones 2011: 64) 
The majority of British people would balk against the loss of Bevan’s NHS (Evans and 
Wellings 2017), but the loss of social housing gets much less attention. Why? One possible 
reason that social housing does not get the attention and funding it needs is that it is seen as 
something that only the most desperate want. Council housing has become stigmatised as 
being there only for the very poor. 
At the heart of the challenges of gentrification in the UK is the issue of class. The principal 
class divide used to be between working class and middle and upper but has now become 
between those with jobs and those without. Over the last 40 years this divide has grown. It 
was started by Thatcher’s government who believed in market-driven development and 
celebrated these neoliberal beliefs as the ideal. As a result, poverty and even the working 
classes were demonised; ‘those who were poor or unemployed had no one to blame but 
themselves’ (Jones 2011: 71). 
This view was expressed again in 2013 by Cameron and Osbourne, who used ‘shirkers’ to 
describe those on benefits to justify welfare cuts. It has been reinforced through the media 
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via countless headlines and more recently through ‘poverty porn’ documentaries, such as 
‘How to Get a Council House’ and ‘Benefits Britain’ (Jensen 2014). The working class or 
those on benefits are seen as feckless, lazy and ‘scroungers’ from the state. This in turn 
influenced the view of social housing. It was the BBC that labelled the Heygate Estate a 
‘muggers paradise’, but in fact it had no reality in actual crime figures (Minton 2017). 
Gentrification has increasingly been blamed for the growing class divide, but it is in fact just a 
symptom of a deliberate set of policies designed to cast poverty as a personal choice rather 
than a public issue, and thus allow governments and councils to ignore social housing. The 
crime is lack of affordable housing supported by a narrative of these people as worthless – 
not communities and individuals adapting to and fighting cultural and economic changes. 
8 Solutions? 
The last time we had a housing crisis in Britain the answer was building more homes. This 
would still be the answer now, however, the shift in culture and politics to a neoliberal belief 
in the market has left no role for social housing. Since the economic crash in 2008, 
successive governments’ austerity policies have made the problem worse. Whilst many 
economists have argued they are damaging for the economy as a whole (Eaton 2018), social 
housing faces particular problems as it must involve public spending which is the antithesis 
of the austerity project. Any building is likely to be left to the private sector, who don’t have 
financial incentives to build affordable homes as it is more profitable to maintain the status 
quo. Government also has a vested interest in maintaining this status quo. Across the UK 
there are many voting home owners and any changes which would affect those who have 
invested in property for stability or a pension (Ryan-Collins et al. 2017) may well cause an 
outcry. Currently, any drop in house prices are seen by the mainstream media as a bad thing 
(Prynn 2018). 
However, the balance of home owners and renters is tipping. A third of millennials are likely 
to be renters for their whole lives as they can’t afford to get on the property ladder (Ahmed 
2018), moreover the children of baby boomers, the generation-Xer’s in their forties are now 
‘more than twice as likely to be renting than they were ten years ago’ (Peachey 2018). This 
suggests a shift in the priorities of the electorate, which could mean a shift in the political 
landscape. 
The mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, has promised a more democratic approach to council 
redevelopment in London, stating that any new regeneration of social housing will be voted 
on by tenants to give them a voice (Mayor of London Office 2018), and the percentage of 
genuinely affordable homes in any new builds will be increased. 
In addition, recently both the main political parties have recognised housing as a problem. 
Jeremy Corbyn has promised to tackle gentrification and Theresa May admits there is a 
‘housing crisis’. Yet, however positive these comments are, at the heart of the matter their 
different political ideologies mean they propose different solutions to the crisis. For example, 
the Conservatives have cut Stamp Duty (Pickard and Williams 2017) whereas Labour want 
to redefine what ‘affordable’ means (Brady 2018). 
Ultimately it is a shift in policy that places people at the centre that needs to happen in order 
to recognise that housing is a basic human right, and not just an investment commodity 
(Florida and Schneider 2018). 
9 Conclusion 
Gentrification is very complex. It was around long before Anna Glass gave it a name. It 
describes the very nature of cities as ‘perpetual works in progress. As they grow and change, 
their demography and class structures shift’ (Florida 2017: 67). Gentrification in itself not a 
bad thing, it can improve conditions, create jobs and grow the economy. 
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However, if uncontrolled, it will inevitably lead to the kind of displacement we have seen in 
London. The neoliberal ideal that the free market will solve all is proved wrong. The negative 
effects visible in London are the result of a clear set of policy decisions that are based on 
notions of the undeserving poor. Gentrification thus becomes a moral as well as an economic 
or political process – the displacement occurs because those people deserve to be 
displaced. 
Sensible changes to policy with people and their right to a home at the centre of the 
philosophy can ensure that this no longer happens – even if there seems to be precious little 
political will for that currently. 
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